Fault lines

Does anyone think that the Machimura faction, that 89-member monster of a faction that sits at the intersection of the LDP's divisions between "neo-liberal" reformers, party leaders, and ideological conservatives, will survive this party election?

Following up on both his previous dismissal of Koike Yuriko's prospects and his endorsement of Aso Taro, Mori Yoshiro said of Nakagawa Hidenao's promotion — he being one of the faction's three titular leaders — of Ms. Koike, "The position of the daihyo sewanin [Mr. Nakagawa's difficult-to-translate title] of pushing (Ms. Koike) to the fore is a bit of a problem."

"He says 'a candidate must stand on behalf of the reformists,' but is not Secretary-General Aso a reformist?"

Whatever you want to call Mr. Aso — I agree with Jun Okumura that it is far too simplistic to dismiss Mr. Aso with the word "conservative," not because he isn't, but because the label conceals more than it reveals — the LDP's reform school clearly does not view him as one of their own and is desperate for an alternative. Indeed, their desperation can be seen in the fears of the Koizumi kids, as they sense that Fukuda Yasuo's resignation and the chaos it has engendered can only hurt them in the eyes of the public. For the Koizumi kids, this party leadership election may represent one last chance to pick a leader who will enable them to go before their constituents and declare that reform lives.

But the reform school is not the only LDP group desperately seeking an anyone-but-Aso candidate.

Yamasaki Taku, Kato Koichi, and Koga Makoto, three doyens of the LDP's once-dominant mainstream conservatism (which in the contemporary context makes them the LDP's liberals, in Mr. Kato's own reckoning), met Wednesday to discuss an anti-Aso candidate. It is worth noting that despite Messrs. Yamasaki and Koga being faction heads, the article notes that they spoke as individuals, implying that they were not speaking on behalf of their factions.

It seems that we are witnessing a post-faction LDP presidential election, less than a year after the Fukuda election in which conventional wisdom proclaimed that the factions were back in control. This campaign is already breaking down along ideological lines, not factional lines. As I've argued previously, the relevant groupings are not the factions but the ideological study groups and associations that cross factional lines. Mr. Aso's campaign rests not on his twenty-member faction — which conveniently has enough members to nominate him as a candidate — but on the party-wide network of conservatives that backed his candidacy last year in defiance of their faction heads and who subsequently organized (in part) under the aegis of Nakagawa Shoichi's "True Conservative Policy Research Group." Similarly, Mr. Nakagawa's Koizumians, while clustered within the Machimura faction, can also be found in other factions and among the party's independent members. The liberals, such as they exist, are also found in more than one faction.

Seeing how this LDP presidential election campaign is unfolding, I think it is safe to assume that the recommendations of faction heads will have little or no role in determining how the LDP's parliamentarians vote on Sept. 22. Ideology, not faction will determine who the LDP chooses.

I still think Mr. Aso will emerge at the top based both on his support at the grassroots and the strength of the conservatives in the contemporary LDP — who are hungry to reclaim what they lost when Abe Shinzo resigned, but the LDP that emerges on Sept. 22 will not be the same LDP that existed at the moment of Mr. Fukuda's resignation.

UPDATE: I should add that in addition to the three major ideological groupings there is the cautious bulk of the LDP parliamentary party, which will give its allegiance to no camp but the one that appears to be the most beneficial for their electoral prospects. I think Mr. Mori, with his mission of preserving LDP dominance, best speaks for this segment, which is why I think Mr. Aso will prevail. Mr. Aso may be the less risky choice — at least for the average LDP member — come the next general election.

Komeito riles the LDP

It is safe to assume that when Mori Yoshiro admonishes someone, the mood in the LDP is bleaker than previously thought.

Mr. Mori, whose mission is not the advancement of an agenda of reform or reaction but the preservation of LDP primacy, has taken it upon himself to use his bully pulpit as a former prime minister and head of the party's largest faction to warn those who threaten the LDP's position that they are mistaken. (See his criticism of Nakagawa Shoichi for his dealings with LDP exile Hiranuma Takeo, for example.)

With Mr. Mori's criticism of Komeito, we can now be sure that the LDP's guardians are panicked now that the coalition's long-silent partner has discovered that it holds the balance in the nejire kokkai.

Speaking at a Komeito event in Ishikawa prefecture Sunday, Mr. Mori — in Yomiuri's reckoning (note the passive voice) — "was seen to have as its purpose the containment of Komeito's growing distance from the Fukuda government." It bears mentioning that Jiji's report on Mr. Mori's remarks paint them in a different light, as a defense of the recently announced stimulus package shared with Komeito leader Ota Akihiro. Yomiuri's emphasis on the perceived threat to Komeito actually reinforces the idea that Mr. Mori's remarks hint at the depth of the fears of the LDP's doyens in the face of an invigorated Komeito; if any press organ shares the philosophy of Mr. Mori and the other risk-averse LDP elders, it is Yomiuri.

And they should be afraid.

Only now, a year into the divided Diet in which Komeito, thanks to its status as the guarantor of the lower house supermajority, holds power disproportionate to its numbers, is the junior partner beginning to flex its muscles and push for a lowest common denominator consensus. I had anticipated Komeito playing such a role in the Fukuda government, but I didn't anticipate that it would take a year before Komeito began to take its position seriously.

It appears to be making up for lost time, pushing for a late start to an abbreviated Diet session that could spare Komeito from having to vote for the renewal of the MSDF refueling mission, trumpeting a stimulus package that appears to be little more than a sop to its supporters (i.e., "energy subsidies for businesses most hit by higher energy costs, medical benefits for the elderly"), and generally using its clout to cajole the government (on the date of Prime Minister Fukuda's policy speech, for example).

The Fukuda government is increasingly looking like a lame duck, with Komeito increasingly looking like the probable executioner. Jun Okumura suggests that on the issue of the refueling mission — which will once again casts a shadow over the extraordinary session — it is theoretically possible for the LDP to overrule the upper house without Komeito's votes, provided Komeito's members stay away from the vote. Maybe so, but presumably the price of Komeito's staying away will be steep (perhaps even the power to decide the date of the next election?). Is Mr. Fukuda prepared to pay such a price, particularly on an issue that has little payoff for his political prospects? Beyond Mr. Fukuda, how will the LDP's members take Komeito's growing clout? Arguably Komeito's growing activism could fuel the conservative revolt against Mr. Fukuda. Japan's conservatives are, to the say the least, dubious about Komeito, its mother organization Soka Gakkai, and Ikeda Daisaku, the head of Soka Gakkai. Excessive deference to Komeito could well be the final straw for the LDP's conservatives.

Given a choice between acquiescing to Komeito and pushing for a general election that may be disastrous for the LDP, the conservatives may be drawn to the latter, seeing as how it would likely mean the end of both the LDP's partnership with Komeito and the Fukuda adminstration, clearing the way for the rise of their champion, Aso Taro.

All of which suggests that Mr. Mori's pleas will be useless. Like King Canute, Mr. Mori is trying to hold back forces beyond his control.

What is the DPJ to do in the midst of the feuding within the coalition?

Hokkaido University's Yamaguchi Jiro argues, "Now is the time for DPJ politicians to walk about the regions, see people's hardships, and hear their miserable hopes regarding politics."

"In the extraordinary session of the Diet," he continues, "the opposition should take the line of all-out confrontation. The lame-duck Fukuda administration lacks the skill and the legitimacy for policy discussions. If Komeito is opposed to reapproval in the lower house, important legislation cannot be passed at all."

Professor Yamaguchi's advice is probably sound. There is little the DPJ can and should do at this point than take the party's case directly to the people, call attention to the government's short-sightedness and disarray, and prepare the party for a general election that looks increasingly likely to occur by year's end.

Aso's the one for Mori

After months of appearing immune to Aso Taro's relentless courting of his support, Mori Yoshiro said on a TV Asahi program Sunday that he supports Mr. Aso as Prime Minister Fukuda's successor: "Aso's popularity must be used greatly for our party. Many within the party have the 'Aso is next' mood. I too think that."

He does not, however, appear to support replacing Mr. Fukuda with Mr. Aso before the next election.

Rather, it seems that Mr. Mori believes that the best use of Mr. Aso is to have him serve as the face of the party in his capacity as LDP secretary-general during a general election campaign and then ride in to save the party in the aftermath of what could be a disaster for the LDP.

The timing of the leadership election will make all the difference in whether we see an LDP president (and Prime Minister) Aso.

Naturally if LDP malcontents manage to maneuver Mr. Fukuda into resigning before a general election, Mr. Aso will likely have no problem winning the prize. Mr. Mori's endorsement may settle the question of who the Machimura faction will back. The faction, which has been home to the past four prime ministers, has been unable to decide who from its ranks should receive the party's backing. Former LDP secretary-general Nakagawa Hidenao backs faction member Koike Yuriko; former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo backs Mr. Aso; Machimura Nobutaka, the chief cabinet secretary, has been able to garner little enthusiasm for a bid for the leadership. With Mr. Mori's backing, however, Mr. Aso could be the faction's choice, giving him the votes of the LDP's largest faction. The Machimura faction may yet break, particularly if someone like Ms. Koike were to run an insurgent campaign for the leadership, but other things being equal, the support of Mr. Mori is a major coup for Mr. Aso.

But after a general election, especially one in which the LDP suffers a catastrophic loss? Will the LDP — or what's left of it — be eager to hand over the reins to one who led the party into the campaign? In short, it's difficult to predict what an LDP leadership race following the next general election because it's difficult to predict what the LDP will look like following the next general election.

So Mr. Aso, don't break out the champagne yet.

Fukuda the prevaricator

Fukuda Yasuo, done playing the (overly) generous host in Toyako, is back in Tokyo to face his ever growing pile of problems.

First on the agenda is, of course, the question of whether he should reshuffle his cabinet before going into the autumn extraordinary session.

After meeting with Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, at the Kantei on Thursday, Mr. Fukuda's perspective on a cabinet shuffle was unchanged from before the G8 summit: "a completely blank paper." He is giving no sign that he is leaning one way or another, although the very act of delaying and remaining noncommital could be a sign of his intention to keep his cabinet unchanged. Given the intra-LDP wrangling that will necessarily accompany a reshuffle, he will have to make a decision to proceed soon if he is going to have a new lineup ready by early August.

A possible sign that there will be no reshuffle can be found in an interview Mori Yoshiro gave to Mainichi. Asked about the reshuffle, Mr. Mori said that his previous argument was a "general argument." He was making no hints about Mr. Fukuda's intentions. He explained that his thinking on a reshuffle rests largely in concerns that the cabinet is Mr. Abe's, not Mr. Fukuda's, a situation that should be corrected. And he acknowledged that there is a "linkage problem" between a reshuffle and a possible lower house dissolution.

That, ladies and gentlemen, may be the sound of the bursting of the reshuffle bubble.

The prime minister is better off spending his time figuring out how to outmaneuver or neutralize LDP opponents to his initiatives and craft an agenda for the autumn session that will put the DPJ on the defensive. He should put an end to reshuffle speculation now and stop speaking about his "blank paper."

Fixing Fukuda's "good enough" cabinet

After Koizumi Junichiro called upon Prime Minister Fukuda to decide whether to shuffle his cabinet in the coming months, Mori Yoshiro — Mr. Fukuda's so-called "guardian" and an advocate of a reshuffle — and Kato Koichi suggested that the prime minister should form a new cabinet before the start of the extraordinary Diet session in the autumn.

In a speech Friday, Mr. Mori suggested that the prime minister should announce the new cabinet in the second half of July or the first half of August, before the O-bon festival.

Mr. Kato, meanwhile, said that a reshuffle would enable the prime minister to promulgate a Fukuda agenda that would serve to distance the LDP from the Koizumi agenda. He suggested that new cabinet should exclude members of the CEFP under Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe. [I would dispute the idea that Mr. Abe didn't mark a break from the Koizumi line; it appeared to me that Mr. Abe was keen to distance himself from his predecessor.]

For his part, Mr. Fukuda remains noncommital, insisting that he remains a "blank sheet" on the question of a cabinet shuffle.

Yamamoto Ichita, LDP upper house member from Gunma prefecture and supporter of a shuffle, argues that if Mr. Fukuda taps powerful, popular officials and times the new cabinet's appearance just right, Mr. Fukuda might reverse his decline and undercut the DPJ. He offers three reasons.

First, a new cabinet would distance Mr. Fukuda from the taint of the Abe cabinet. Mr. Yamamoto argues that Mr. Fukuda's cabinet is still the second Abe cabinet (with a few changes). A change, he suggests, would enable the prime minister to wield more control over the government and make some progress in tackling policy problems.

Second, Mr. Yamamoto cites Mr. Koizumi to argue that a shuffle is one of two tools (the other being the power to dissolve the Diet and call an election) that the prime minister has to impose his will on party and parliament.

Third, Mr. Yamamoto suggests that if Mr. Fukuda lets the new Diet session begin without forming a new cabinet (after which a shuffle is unlikely), it will signal to the LDP that Mr. Fukuda is doomed and presumably trigger more intense campaigning to succeed him.

(He also argues, in an unnumbered point, that a shuffle will enable the prime minister to bring young LDP leaders to the fore and boost the party's appeal.)

The aforementioned arguments sound logical enough, but they rest on the unfounded assumption that the Japanese public will be satisfied with a statement of good intentions, as opposed to concrete, resolute action to address their insecurities. Will a new cabinet be any more effective or dynamic than the current cabinet? Does Mr. Fukuda actually want to form a "Fukuda-colored" cabinet that will take a definitive policy position (pro-reform or anti-reform / pro-consumption tax hike or pro-growth / pro-Koizumi or anti-Koizumi, etc.), an approach that risks making enemies of the LDP members on the short end of a cabinet shuffle? Do the Japanese people actually see the current cabinet as a "Koizumi-Abe line" cabinet and reject it as a result? Or do they reject it because it has failed to deliver significant results?

A new cabinet may enjoy a small bump, but any bump is guaranteed to be short lived. The new cabinet will face the same obstacles faced by the current cabinet (hostile public, recalcitrant DPJ, divided LDP), with the possibility that opting for a policy-oriented cabinet over a "unity" cabinet will actually exacerbate the LDP's divisions. Ironically, a more ideologically cohesive cabinet could be less effective than a heterogenous cabinet that is more capable of exploiting opportunities and co-opting potential rivals. Advocates of a reshuffled cabinet must at least consider the possibility that the new cabinet could be worse than the current, adequately mediocre Fukuda cabinet.

Does Mr. Fukuda actually think that the source of his troubles are his cabinet? Why fix something that isn't broken?

Cracks in the Machimura faction?

Will the Machimura faction, the LDP's largest with eighty-eight members in the two houses of the Diet, be the victim of its own success?

Mainichi reported over the weekend that the Machimura faction — still unclear on who it should support as Fukuda Yasuo's successor, may be on the brink of splitting. The reason? As a result of having been the home of the past four prime ministers, the faction has too many power brokers jostling for control of the faction, with each preferring a different successor for Mr. Fukuda.

As noted previously, the Machimura faction is in some sense a microcosm of the LDP, divided among Koizumian structural reformers, cautious old-guard conservatives, HANA conservatives, and, as represented by Mr. Fukuda, pragmatic "quiet" reformers. Each group's power broker in the faction supports a different candidate for the leadership. Nakagawa Hidenao, who has claimed the mantle of the LDP's leading advocate for structural reform since stepping down as LDP secretary-general after Abe Shinzo reshuffled his cabinet in August 2008, has boosted Koike Yuriko, a member of the Machimura faction, and may be a contender in his own right (although his sordid past may still haunt him). Mori Yoshiro, the leading old-guard conservative and defender of Mr. Fukuda, has not only ridiculed Ms. Koike's prospects but tried — with little success — to stifle speculation about the post-Fukuda era. Mr. Abe, meanwhile, is happy to look outside the faction for a leader, and is Aso Taro's leading supporter in the Machimura faction.

On top of this, there's the question of Machimura Nobutaka, currently serving as chief cabinet secretary. Mainichi reports that there are concerns within the faction that if Mr. Machimura leaves the goernment after a reshuffle, he will be free to cause trouble within the faction and do battle with Mr. Nakagawa for control, competition that may force the faction to split as Mr. Nakagawa could leave to form his own faction. If Mr. Nakagawa were to leave the faction to form his own, it would be another indication that the (policy) content-free factions are giving way to new, more ideological and policy-oriented groupings that will jostle for control not just of the LDP's levers of power, but of its identity as a party.

The idea of the Machimura faction's crumbling under the weight of its heavyweights is intriguing. Are the limits of growth for LDP factions not the total number of members, but the number of members with experience in senior party and cabinet posts who can claim considerable personal followings independent on the faction?

And if the Machimura faction cannot keep its disparate pieces together, what does that say for the LDP as a whole?

Bowling against democracy

When not bowling together, former prime ministers Koizumi Junichiro and Mori Yoshiro apparently spend their time scheming against Japanese democracy.

Both have signed on as advisers — along with Abe Shinzo, another former prime minister from the Machimura faction — to a new LDP study group called the "Diet members league to integrate both houses of the Diet and establish a new unicameral 'People's Diet.'"

I have to concur with Yamauchi Koichi, an LDP HR member representing Kanagawa-9: this is an extremely radical group.

The league, founded by Eto Seishiro, Ota Seiichi, and other LDP Diet members, argues that if Japan were to implement a unicameral system, it would be in line with the majority of the world's countries, nearly three quarters of which have unicameral legislatures. Mr. Yamauchi retorts by noting that no member of the G7 has a unicameral system.

Mr. Yamauchi goes on to describe this proposal as "possibly giving an unfair impression" since it is being introduced after the opposition took control of the House of Councillors. I would say that "unfair" is a woeful understatement. How about anti-democratic? This desire to undermine the DPJ's control of the upper house appears to be all too common in the LDP (and Komeito), especially among senior members of both parties. Faced with its first institutional check on its power, the LDP's response has been to complain about how "useless" the HC is, how irresponsible the DPJ is, and how important it is for the LDP to be able to do whatever it feels necessary to save Japan, despite the voters having decided last year that they're not particularly pleased with the job the LDP has done to this point. Some LDP members, including the current prime minister, have taken the opposition of the public to heart and talk of the need to listen to the people; others, however, including the members of this new league, have decided that it is not the LDP but the system that's broken.

I've said it before and I'll say it again: before any specific economic or social reforms, what Japan needs is transparency and accountability in its political system, mechanisms for checking the power of the government and monitoring its policy execution. DPJ control of the upper house is a great experiment in checks and balances.

The league's proposal is not a particularly realistic one, as it would require a constitutional amendment, which would require approval of the upper house, which would in all likelihood not vote itself out of existence. (The head of the LDP's HC caucus has already voiced his opposition to this idea.)

The significance of this league is in what it says about attitudes within the LDP towards increased political competition. Some LDP members claim to want a "two big-party system" but I cannot help but wonder whether what they really want is just another one-and-a-half party system in which the opposition provides democratic window-dressing for an LDP that does whatever it wants — all in the name of "the people," of course.

The post-Fukuda era looms

Asahi conducted a poll of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters asking about support for the current party leaders.

In the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro's relationship with the prefectural chapters is secure: forty-four of forty-seven want him to remain as party head to lead the DPJ into the next general election.

The news for Fukuda Yasuo, however, is bleak. Twelve chapters want Mr. Fukuda to lead the LDP into the next general election; twenty-two want a new leader (no indication what the other thirteen said). Interestingly, there is little correlation between how a prefecture voted in the September 2007 leadership election and its support for Mr. Fukuda today. The reasons given for discontent with Mr. Fukuda are typical: low public support numbers, poor leadership skills, an inability to make progress on the many pressing policy issues facing the Fukuda government. Asked how they think is an appropriate replacement for Mr. Fukuda, only seven chapters answered with a name (as opposed to qualities desired in a leader), and all seven provided the same name: Aso Taro.

The news from the prefectures contributes to a growing sense in Tokyo that Mr. Fukuda is running out of time, a sense that has grown in the weeks since the LDP's defeat in the Yamaguchi-2 by-election as the party has studied its defeat. There is growing talk in the media of the post-Fukuda era, as the media probes the two leading post-Fukuda candidates, Mr. Aso and Yosano Kaoru, the leading anyone-but-Aso candidate for the LDP presidency. (A Google News search finds ninety-eight uses of the term "post-Fukuda" over the past week.) As expected, Mr. Yosano's failure to say yes or no to questions about his ambitions has only fed media speculation about his designs on Mr. Fukuda's job, and now Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano are spoken of in the same breath as having barely concealed intentions to hasten the arrival of the post-Fukuda era. Indeed, both men have articles in the June issue of Bungei Shunju discussing their plans for saving Japan.

Mr. Aso is at the point where he can no longer deny his intentions. At a press conference Friday, Mr. Yosano was asked whether he intends to aim for the premiership. His response skirted the question: "I am a person who takes pride in his work, and if I have a task, I perform it with all my might. I have no awareness of my individual ambition — I want to do good work." Not quite "I'm in. And I'm in to win." But it is consistent with his overall media approach in recent months: Mr. Yosano has emphasized his desire to do what needs to be done to save Japan (raising the consumption tax rate, for example), regardless of what the polls say.

It is still unclear who has the edge in the post-Fukuda horse race. By dint of his having the support of the LDP's conservative ideologues concentrated in the True Conservative Policy Research Group, his following among prefectural chapters and the public at large, and his tireless efforts to proclaim his understanding of the insecurities of the Japanese people, Mr. Aso probably remains the front runner.

He may also be poised to claim the support of the newly reunited Kochikai, which officially reemerged on Tuesday and with sixty-one members is the third largest faction in the LDP. At its launch the new old faction is already troubled; the phrase that has been used in the press is "setting to sea in the same bed with different dreams." The reason for tension is that there are hints that some faction members are open to supporting Mr. Aso's bid for the party presidency, despite Tanigaki Sadakazu, perennial candidate for the leadership (and likely candidate in the next leadership election), being the faction's number two. Mr. Tanigaki assumed that the new faction would be a major platform for his next bid for the leadership and has reportedly threatened to leave the faction if it fails to support him.

That said, the all-important Machimura faction (i.e., Mori Yoshiro) has yet to signal which way it is leaning, despite Mr. Aso's active courting of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction chiefs. The post-Fukuda non-campaign campaign is in full swing, the candidates are emerging, and the LDP barons are starting to choose sides — with Mr. Fukuda helpless in the midst of the open campaigning for his job.

Koike fever?

Within days of Mori Yoshiro's calling the prospect of Korike Yuriko, former defense minister, a "joke," Sankei writes that "Koike fever" is taking hold — even though Ms. Koike claims to share Mr. Mori's assessment of a Koike candidacy.

The basis for this "fever" is unclear to me.

The examples cited by Sankei? A long speech to a meeting of the LDP young turks, Nakagawa Hidenao's calling her "a new leader who will be responsible for Japan's future" on a visit to China in March, her participation in Mr. Koizumi's new study group, and Koizumian political instincts.

All well and good, but this strikes me as a thin foundation for declaring that Ms. Koike is in a position to seize the LDP leadership. Does she in fact have any of the support that would make her a viable candidate in a post-Fukuda party race? Being an able politician is not necessarily a criterion for being elected as head of the LDP, and Ms. Koike's "flexibility," which led her to migrate from party to party over the course of the 1990s before ending up in the LDP and Mr. Koizumi's cabinet, surely is less of an asset when it comes to vying for the LDP leadership.

Does she have the support of the party's prefectural chapters, which gave not inconsiderable support to Aso Taro in September 2007 — and which Mr. Aso has courted assiduously since the last LDP leadership election?

Does she have the support of any LDP faction, not least the biggest one, and the LDP's kingpins more generally? The "endorsement" of Nakagawa Hidenao is undoubtedly helpful, but surely Mr. Mori's put-down outweighs his Machimura faction comrade's praise (stunning considering that Ms. Koike is a member of the Machimura faction). Meanwhile, the manner in which she was chased out of the Defense Ministry as the party's leaders closed ranks to defend Moriya Takemasa suggests that she is short on allies in the highest councils of the LDP, not least because she's a woman.

I would welcome her candidacy; she would certainly be an improvement (and a better choice than Mr. Aso). But I must (sadly) agree with Mr. Mori: her prospects are a joke. She will not be elected as head of the LDP as it exists today. She might find a way to the premiership if Mr. Koizumi leads his followers out of the LDP and pushes Ms. Koike forward as his new party's candidate, but for now I feel confident saying that she will not be Mr. Fukuda's successor as LDP president and prime minister.

Caption contest! (2008 edition)

The following picture from the Sankei Shimbun begs for funny captions.


Post your suggestions in the comments.

Aso, campaigning

Aso Taro's eponymous faction held a party on Friday night, with more than 2000 guests in attendance. Undoubtedly he was in good spirits, as his faction acquired two new members the previous day, Muto Yoji (HR, Gifu-3) and Hasegawa Tamon (HC, Ibaraki). The faction now has twenty members including Mr. Aso, meaning that with two more faction members Mr. Aso will be able to secure the necessary nominations to contest the LDP presidency from entirely within his own faction.

A number of faction chiefs and party officials were in attendance, and many made introductions. Mori Yoshiro, the putative head of the Machimura faction and thus the man with perhaps the greatest say of Mr. Aso's fate, was also in attendance, although he made no introductions.

The various guests tried to dissuade Mr. Aso from overtly challenging Mr. Fukuda. Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, said: "Mr. Aso is a powerful candidate for prime minister and LDP president, but with the DPJ as it is now, whoever becomes prime minister will not be able to resolve the situation easily."

In case anyone still doubts his intentions, Aso Taro is campaigning to replace Fukuda Yasuo as head of the LDP and prime minister of Japan. Nominally still loyal to the prime minister, he clearly expects that his chance is coming sooner rather than later.

It is still an open question as to whether he has successfully wooed Mr. Mori and with him the Machimura faction.

He can probably rely on more solid support from the LDP's prefectural chapters. Mr. Aso was in Kochi prefecture this weekend making his pitch for regional decentralization. I wonder whether LDP-controlled prefectural and local governments would prefer to remain dependent upon Tokyo instead of being responsible for their own finances and policies as envisioned by Mr. Aso's radical plan. The fight over road construction has revealed that for the most part the LDP isn't interested in innovative solutions to the rural question. Why else would LDP leaders continue to assert the importance of road construction to the development of lightly populated prefectures despite evidence to the contrary?

In short, while Mr. Aso may be in a better position to contend for the LDP leadership in both Tokyo and the prefectures than last September, there are still questions concerning his support in the parliamentary party — and his ability to secure such overwhelming support in the prefectural chapters to make it difficult for the parliamentary party to reject his candidacy once more.

And despite his preparations, I don't envision Mr. Aso doing anything to force Mr. Fukuda out — he will nominally support the prime minister up until the moment that the party's powers-that-be abandon him.

Hiranuma's kiss of death?

After nearly returning to the LDP in the waning days of the Abe cabinet, Hiranuma Takeo, holdout postal rebel and conservative stalwart, is not particularly popular among the LDP's elders.

Recall, for example, that in January Mori Yoshiro scolded Nakagawa Shoichi for working with Mr. Hiranuma in their "True Conservative Policy Research Group," AKA the HANA no Kai. Undoubtedly Mr. Hiranuma's presence outside the party is noxious to LDP leaders like Mr. Mori eager to keep their divided party together, not least when he speaks of creating a new "true" conservative party.

In a move that will likely irritate the party elders, Mr. Hiranuma has endorsed Aso Taro for LDP leader. He said Friday, "If the Fukuda cabinet resigns en masse, everybody is looking to the birth of an Aso administration. Since my principles and opinions are very similar, I will work hard to realize it."

I don't see how Mr. Hiranuma's endorsement helps Mr. Aso, particularly since the latter is trying to make a case for why he is the best man to reunite the LDP in the post-Fukuda era, which may be coming sooner than anticipated (and may therefore begin before the next general election). Indeed, despite Mr. Aso's fervent courtship of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction power brokers, I wonder whether his association with Mr. Hiranuma — and comments made during last September's presidential election about factional politics — will once again deny him the LDP presidency, a scenario that leads me to wonder what Mr. Aso, Mr. Hiranuma, and the other conservatives will do in response.

Abe's — and the LDP's — dilemma

Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has been back in the headlines this week, first for his return to the Machimura faction, which he left when he became prime minister, second for the announcement that he will chair an LDP study group related to the implementation of his "Cool Earth 50" initiative. The latter prompted Asahi to ask whether this is the beginning of Mr. Abe's "re-challenge," referring to another of Mr. Abe's initiatives.

Mr. Abe's return to the Machimura faction makes him its sixtieth member from the House of Representatives.

I find the former of greater interest than the latter, because the Machimura faction increasingly appears to be a microcosm of the party at large.

Consider that the faction contains a moderate dove like Prime Minister Fukuda, risk-averse senior politicians like Mori Yoshiro, Nakagawa Hidenao, and Machimura Nobutaka, "true" conservative Abe Shinzo, and a healthy cohort (27) of first- and second-term members of the House of Representatives, many of them Koizumi Kids. With the Machimura faction having made the Kantei its private property over the course of this decade, its complexion matters considerably in the future of LDP governance.

The selection of Mr. Fukuda as prime minister, thanks in large part due to his own faction's support, illustrates this point — and illustrates that the party is, for the moment, in the hands of the cautious, reactionary Mr. Mori.

Will Mr. Abe's return make a difference? I suspect not. The very idea of an Abe comeback strikes me as laughable, and I expect that few of his conservative allies long for his return. (At least one of them doesn't.)

The next LDP presidential election, meanwhile, will likely test the Machimura faction's power. If it comes after the next general election — as I expect it will — it may find its numerical clout diminished somewhat as some of its one- and two-term members in vulnerable urban and suburban districts go down to defeat. The test will likely come from Nakagawa Shoichi's "True Conservative Policy Research Group" [The HANA group], or at least the movement symbolized by the HANA group. Unless the Machimura faction decides to take a chance on Mr. Aso this time around, which would defuse the situation, the next LDP election will ask certain LDP members to choose between their values and their faction, and perhaps ultimately, their values and their party. This dynamic was present in the September election, as evidenced by the subterranean support for Mr. Aso — and the formalization of a conservative anti-mainstream in the form of the HANA group only exacerbates the tension.

Mr. Abe will be no less immune to this dilemma than his less prominent colleagues. Indeed, his return, according to Mainichi, is the result of Mr. Mori's anger at Mr. Nakagawa's group. As noted previously, one of the first steps in Mr. Abe's political rehabilitation was his joining the HANA group last month. Writes Mainichi: "Mr. Mori, who frowned at this, urged Mr. Abe to return to the faction."

Mr. Abe will be serving as a counselor to the faction, a position offered perhaps in part to cement his loyalty.

Let there be strife

The LDP held its party convention in Tokyo on Thursday, and the mood was anything but cheery.

Prime Minister Fukuda spoke bluntly about the existential crisis facing the party today. "We are facing the greatest crisis since the foundation of the party," he said to a crowd of some 3400 party members and supporters.

Reiterating the party's mantra since losing last July's HC election, Prime Minister Fukuda emphasized the need to act on behalf of the Japanese people, joining the DPJ in putting lifestyle issues first. (Does anyone else find it odd that the prime minister of a long-standing ruling party needs to remind his own party of the need to govern on behalf of the people?)

Will the party's clans stop warring long enough to hear Mr. Fukuda's message?

In advance of the party convention, the discord within the party became ever more open. On Wednesday, former prime minister Mori Yoshiro bluntly addressed Nakagawa Shoichi's flirtations with former LDP member Hiranuma Takeo via their "true conservative" study group (discussed here), reminding Mr. Nakagawa that his faction, the Ibuki faction (whose head, Ibuki Bunmei, is the party secretary-general), should come before his dalliance with Mr. Hiranuma. Something tells me that Mr. Nakagawa is not about to halt his extracurricular activities in pursuit of "true conservatism" — and besides, when Mr. Mori speaks, does anyone actually listen? (Just to show to make clear exactly what his vision of the party is, he also lashed out at the Koizumi Kids, suggesting that Mr. Mori would love to go back to the old days when everyone in the party got along to distribute money to supporters and were returned to office over and over again.)

I think it's safe to say that Mr. Fukuda's remarks Thursday are aimed at his conservative rivals, whose allies in the media have castigated him relentlessly since not long after he took office. As I discussed here, the priorities of these conservatives are not those of Mr. Fukuda (or the Japanese people). Mr. Fukuda recognizes that the LDP cannot afford a repeat of July 2007; it cannot afford to ignore the concerns of the people and expect to escape unscathed, not with the DPJ — for all its troubles — doing its best to capitalize on the LDP's failure to address the many insecurities of the Japanese people.

The conservative ideologues will have to choose between their ideals and party unity (and power). I'm not entirely certain that they will choose the latter over the former, especially if they come to reason that an electoral disaster under Mr. Fukuda will enable them to discredit his leadership and reclaim the LDP for themselves.

Meanwhile, the new Kochikai lurched ever closer to its rebirth, with Messrs. Koga and Tanigaki formally agreeing to merge their factions on Wednesday. Announcing the merger, Mr. Tanigaki said, "Since we share DNA, we want to once more make a nucleus that will be a stream in support of the LDP's conservative politics." (Apparently conservatism is as contested in the LDP as it is in the US Republican Party.) But as I noted previously, although the new faction will have sixty-one members, making it the third-largest faction, it is possible that some of those members may be more interested in supporting Mr. Aso than Mr. Tanigaki or any other candidate that the new faction would back in a leadership race.

This might be premature of me to suggest, but I wonder whether we are witnessing the twilight of the LDP factions, at least the factions as we know them. The LDP will, of course, remain fractured, just as the DPJ is fractured, but part of a political realignment might mean the transformation of factions from being social clubs good for collecting cash and distributing patronage to being ideological clubs along the lines of Mr. Nakagawa's study group. Might not the September 2007 presidential election, in which faction members clearly ignored the instructions of faction leaders to vote for Mr. Aso be a sign of what's to come?

Fukuda in charge

Contradicting reports leaked while he was out of the country, Mr. Fukuda has exhibited once again how he differs from his predecessor by asserting control of government and party and declaring that he will not in fact reshuffle his cabinet at the end of this Diet session (HT: Shisaku).

It's not entirely clear who suggested to the media that a reshuffle was imminent, although at least one article I read quoted former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro as speaking of the benefits of a cabinet reshuffle in advance of the regular Diet session.

This episode illustrates just how parlous Mr. Fukuda's position within the LDP is, as he must contend not just with conservative ideologues, who have begun to reorganize within the party and whose comrades at conservative magazines and newspapers have turned sharply against the prime minister, but also with the party elders, who live in fear of losing power and thus overreact at the first sign of trouble (and reluctant to embrace anything but the most modest of reforms). By taking faction leaders into his government and party executive, Mr. Fukuda co-opted risk-averse party elders and likely limited the damage they could do to his government. (I floated this idea in this post, written right after Mr. Fukuda took office.) Mr. Mori's influence, however, appears undiminished — and this is a bad thing. Mr. Mori is an obstacle to genuine reform both within the LDP and Japan at large, and if he was behind the reshuffle rumors, then it is encouraging to see another prime minister reject his influence.

The folly of the proposed reshuffle does not need to be repeated. After all, as MTC wrote in a post about a conversation we had recently, the beneficiaries from a reshuffle would likely be the ideologues, who are currently marginalized in terms of holding cabinet and party leadership posts. Better to let them stew in their rage than to include them in the government and give them free rein to undermine Mr. Fukuda's government from within the cabinet.

By rejecting this bad idea, Mr. Fukuda has shown an adroitness that Mr. Abe lacked — it takes no small amount of fortitude to reject bad advice from professed allies.

Who's in control here?

Prime Minister Abe has been bizarrely hospitalized, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yosano admits that Mr. Abe did not name someone to serve as the acting prime minister in his absence.

I guess Aso Taro is too busy getting ready to win the job legally to do his best imitation of Alexander Haig.

Mr. Aso, while still probably the front runner, will have to work harder to win the position than it appeared twenty-four hours ago. Fukuda Yasuo, member of the Machimura faction, has decided to throw his hat into the ring, and with the LDP pushing back the voting date until Sept. 23th, Mr. Fukuda now has more time to round up support among the prefectural chapters while consolidating his position in the parliamentary party. I don't think it's unreasonable to think that pushing the date back benefits Mr. Fukuda at Mr. Aso's expense.

The question I have is whether Mr. Fukuda can count on the Machimura faction completely, or whether there might be room for dissension. Mr. Mori, of course, backs Mr. Fukuda completely, and is undoubtedly thrilled at the prospect of having someone who might actually listen to him at the Kantei. Mr. Machimura, however, appeared hesitant to commit too quickly, stating that he wants to listen to the opinions of the members of his faction before making a decision.

I also think that it is important not to overlook the prefectural chapters, which are already in turmoil following the Upper House election. The costs of avoiding their input could be steep, and I suspect that the way the wind blows from the regions will influence the jockeying in Tokyo. Whether the wind will blow in favor of Mr. Fukuda remains to be seen.

In the midst of all this, the Koizumi Children have shown why they are a non-entity in the party. Short of Mr. Koizumi's returning to the fore, they seem to have no ideas and no standard bearers — and thus no chance of influencing the direction of the LDP, especially now that Mr. Koizumi has totally nixed their efforts to draft him. Between Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Aso, they have no one to back. (Perhaps Mr. Koizumi is sitting back watching his plans to destroy the LDP come to fruition.)

Abe to Mori: Do shut up

Prime Minister Abe, channeling his buddy George "the Decider" Bush, has responded to former Prime Minister Mori's "recommendations" for the composition of his next cabinet by reminding Mori who is responsible for the government. "I am the one person who must decide," he said.

While I'm not exactly sad to see the authority of an old pol like Mori challenged, I'm also not particularly pleased to see that Prime Minister Abe is responsible to...well, no one.

This situation does not seem to be sustainable; something will have to give. How many public rebuffs will Mori take before abandoning the prime minister in a very public — and very final — way? Will the prime minister actually dare to pack his cabinet full of yes-men again, ensuring that he does not have to brook any dissenting opinions from within his own government? Alternatively, is Abe just trying to assert his independence even as he plans to toe Mori's line by bringing old party leaders and critics into his cabinet?

Meanwhile, I cannot help but wonder what kind of maneuvering will occur in the palace while the prince is on tour in India, Malaysia, and Indonesia next week. Should the very public sniping between Abe and Mori continue this week, I would expect that in Abe's absence the former prime minister would redouble his efforts in forging a consensus on a replacement, if he isn't doing so already.

In any case, Abe's situation increasingly calls to mind those sage words of Lennon/McCartney: "Day after day, alone on the hill,/The man with the foolish grin is keeping perfectly still./But nobody wants to know him,/They can see that he's just a fool./And he never gives an answer..."

Mori keeps talking; will Abe listen?

Former Prime Minister Mori took his campaign against Prime Minister Abe to the airwaves on Sunday, appearing on Japan's Sunday morning talk shows to talk about the coming cabinet reshuffle.

The most headline-worthy portion of his remarks, based on articles in the major dailies, seems to be his call for Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki to be replaced due to his inability to manage the Diet, but he also called for Fukuda and prominent Abe critic Tanigaki to be included in the cabinet.

We've already seen Mr. Abe reject Mr. Mori's direct request on election night that he resign. One has to wonder whether the prime minister will also reject the LDP bigwig's suggestions on the composition of his next cabinet. If so, is this another sign of the new balance of power between prime minister and party? Or is it the sole remaining way for Prime Minister Abe to assert his authority? Whatever the case may be, it seems significant that Mr. Mori has been forced to repeat his calls for the prime minister to choose a broadly inclusive cabinet in any and every forum available, with little apparent impact thus far.

If Mori is unable to make the deeply unpopular and increasingly powerless prime minister see reason, who exactly holds the power in the LDP at the present time?

Ozawa attacks Abe — Mori does not disagree

Jiji reports on a meeting of members of the House of Representatives who have been elected thirteen times. The group? Ozawa, former Prime Minister Mori, Kokumin Shinto member Watanuki Tamisuke, former Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu, and DPJ member Watanabe Kozo.

Ozawa, not surprisingly, criticized the prime minister's inaction and lack of common sense; Mori, it seems, did not publicly disagree with Ozawa, noting the prime minister's lack of political experience. He also speculated on Abe's successor, floating the names of Fukuda, Tanigaki, and Aso and admitted that he doesn't know whether the coming cabinet reshuffle will succeed in rallying support for the Abe government and the LDP.

As others have mentioned, Mori is the man to watch when it comes to considering the future of the Abe premiership — and if he is unwilling to defend the prime minister from Ozawa, one has to imagine that Mori's patience with Mr. Abe is extremely short. (It must be, considering that he tried to push the prime minister out on election night.)

Just another sign of the sword of Damocles dangling over the prime minister's head...