Cracks in the Machimura faction?

Will the Machimura faction, the LDP's largest with eighty-eight members in the two houses of the Diet, be the victim of its own success?

Mainichi reported over the weekend that the Machimura faction — still unclear on who it should support as Fukuda Yasuo's successor, may be on the brink of splitting. The reason? As a result of having been the home of the past four prime ministers, the faction has too many power brokers jostling for control of the faction, with each preferring a different successor for Mr. Fukuda.

As noted previously, the Machimura faction is in some sense a microcosm of the LDP, divided among Koizumian structural reformers, cautious old-guard conservatives, HANA conservatives, and, as represented by Mr. Fukuda, pragmatic "quiet" reformers. Each group's power broker in the faction supports a different candidate for the leadership. Nakagawa Hidenao, who has claimed the mantle of the LDP's leading advocate for structural reform since stepping down as LDP secretary-general after Abe Shinzo reshuffled his cabinet in August 2008, has boosted Koike Yuriko, a member of the Machimura faction, and may be a contender in his own right (although his sordid past may still haunt him). Mori Yoshiro, the leading old-guard conservative and defender of Mr. Fukuda, has not only ridiculed Ms. Koike's prospects but tried — with little success — to stifle speculation about the post-Fukuda era. Mr. Abe, meanwhile, is happy to look outside the faction for a leader, and is Aso Taro's leading supporter in the Machimura faction.

On top of this, there's the question of Machimura Nobutaka, currently serving as chief cabinet secretary. Mainichi reports that there are concerns within the faction that if Mr. Machimura leaves the goernment after a reshuffle, he will be free to cause trouble within the faction and do battle with Mr. Nakagawa for control, competition that may force the faction to split as Mr. Nakagawa could leave to form his own faction. If Mr. Nakagawa were to leave the faction to form his own, it would be another indication that the (policy) content-free factions are giving way to new, more ideological and policy-oriented groupings that will jostle for control not just of the LDP's levers of power, but of its identity as a party.

The idea of the Machimura faction's crumbling under the weight of its heavyweights is intriguing. Are the limits of growth for LDP factions not the total number of members, but the number of members with experience in senior party and cabinet posts who can claim considerable personal followings independent on the faction?

And if the Machimura faction cannot keep its disparate pieces together, what does that say for the LDP as a whole?

The post-Fukuda landscape remains open — for now

Aso Taro, who has presumably been vying for the LDP presidency since losing it to Fukuda Yasuo in September 2007, was asked about his intentions at a speech on Monday. Like his potential rival, Yosano Kaoru, Mr. Aso demurred, declining to declare what has been openly acknowledged for months.

I suppose it would be inappropriate for Mr. Aso to start measuring Mr. Fukuda's coffin overtly, especially when he can let the media (and other members of the LDP) do it for him. But no one should take his humility at face value.

As noted previously, Mr. Aso's assumed candidacy has already upset the resurrection of the Kochikai, the onetime mainstream faction that was most notably home to dovish, liberal internationalist prime ministers Ikeda Hayato and Miyazawa Kiichi. An article in AERA, a weekly magazine, illustrates why the rebirth of the Kochikai does not mean the resurrection of the liberal internationalists as a major force within the LDP. The party, the article, notes has moved rightward in the years since the faction split in the aftermath of Kato Koichi's abortive rebellion against then-prime minister Mori Yoshiro in 2000. Not surprisingly, the resurrected faction is a diminished version of the faction that existed in 2000. The difference? The Aso faction, which in 2000 was the Kono (Yohei) group, did not reunite with the Koga and Tanigaki factions, largely because Mr. Aso's policy perspective is vastly different from the policy positions of leaders of the Kochikai.

Mr. Aso's candidacy poses a threat to factional discipline in all LDP factions, the Kochikai included, thanks to Mr. Aso's popularity among younger, reformist LDP members who are distributed throughout the party. Thanks to his "insurgents," Mr. Aso's showing in September 2007 was surprisingly strong considering that he was opposed by all factions but his own. It seems that Mr. Aso has learned his lesson, however: rather than tempt his supporters to buck their faction leaders, he appears to be using the fact of his cross-factional support to make appeals directly to faction chiefs. Two days after the Kochikai's first party, Mr. Aso met with Koga Makoto in an effort to heal a longstanding personal rift — presumably in the hope that Mr. Koga will swing the faction behind Mr. Aso's candidacy (which, as noted previously, would risk alienating his partner, Tanigaki Sadakazu).

Meanwhile the Machimura faction's failure to back a post-Fukuda candidate thus far is now an established fact. Mainichi, reporting on the occasion of the faction's party Monday night (which was attended by approximately 5000 guests), notes that the faction's chiefs are divided on whether to support a candidate from within the faction who if elected would be the fifth consecutive LDP president from the faction. Nakagawa Hidenao spoke of a "hero or heroine," presumably suggesting that he is continuing to back Koike Yuriko, despite Mori Yoshiro's openly dismissing her prospects. Mainichi rules out both Mr. Nakagawa and Machimura Nobutaka, the chief cabinet secretary and titular faction head. No word on Mr. Mori's thinking. Mainichi suggests that the faction leadership wants to nominate someone from within the faction for fear of forfeiting the faction's position, but there is no obvious contender — and the worst outcome of all (for the faction) would be for the faction to nominate one of its own over the opposition of a significant minority, prompting that minority to vote for another candidate.

Division within the Machimura faction is probably good news for both Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano, as it raises the possibility that either might receive the support of the largest LDP faction should it prove unable to resolve its deadlock.

Indeed, it seems conceivable to me that Mr. Aso might offer a "Tanakasone" arrangement to Mr. Mori and the other leaders of the Machimura faction, agreeing to pack his cabinet with members of the Machimura faction in exchange for its support in the party election.

The post-Fukuda era looms

Asahi conducted a poll of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters asking about support for the current party leaders.

In the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro's relationship with the prefectural chapters is secure: forty-four of forty-seven want him to remain as party head to lead the DPJ into the next general election.

The news for Fukuda Yasuo, however, is bleak. Twelve chapters want Mr. Fukuda to lead the LDP into the next general election; twenty-two want a new leader (no indication what the other thirteen said). Interestingly, there is little correlation between how a prefecture voted in the September 2007 leadership election and its support for Mr. Fukuda today. The reasons given for discontent with Mr. Fukuda are typical: low public support numbers, poor leadership skills, an inability to make progress on the many pressing policy issues facing the Fukuda government. Asked how they think is an appropriate replacement for Mr. Fukuda, only seven chapters answered with a name (as opposed to qualities desired in a leader), and all seven provided the same name: Aso Taro.

The news from the prefectures contributes to a growing sense in Tokyo that Mr. Fukuda is running out of time, a sense that has grown in the weeks since the LDP's defeat in the Yamaguchi-2 by-election as the party has studied its defeat. There is growing talk in the media of the post-Fukuda era, as the media probes the two leading post-Fukuda candidates, Mr. Aso and Yosano Kaoru, the leading anyone-but-Aso candidate for the LDP presidency. (A Google News search finds ninety-eight uses of the term "post-Fukuda" over the past week.) As expected, Mr. Yosano's failure to say yes or no to questions about his ambitions has only fed media speculation about his designs on Mr. Fukuda's job, and now Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano are spoken of in the same breath as having barely concealed intentions to hasten the arrival of the post-Fukuda era. Indeed, both men have articles in the June issue of Bungei Shunju discussing their plans for saving Japan.

Mr. Aso is at the point where he can no longer deny his intentions. At a press conference Friday, Mr. Yosano was asked whether he intends to aim for the premiership. His response skirted the question: "I am a person who takes pride in his work, and if I have a task, I perform it with all my might. I have no awareness of my individual ambition — I want to do good work." Not quite "I'm in. And I'm in to win." But it is consistent with his overall media approach in recent months: Mr. Yosano has emphasized his desire to do what needs to be done to save Japan (raising the consumption tax rate, for example), regardless of what the polls say.

It is still unclear who has the edge in the post-Fukuda horse race. By dint of his having the support of the LDP's conservative ideologues concentrated in the True Conservative Policy Research Group, his following among prefectural chapters and the public at large, and his tireless efforts to proclaim his understanding of the insecurities of the Japanese people, Mr. Aso probably remains the front runner.

He may also be poised to claim the support of the newly reunited Kochikai, which officially reemerged on Tuesday and with sixty-one members is the third largest faction in the LDP. At its launch the new old faction is already troubled; the phrase that has been used in the press is "setting to sea in the same bed with different dreams." The reason for tension is that there are hints that some faction members are open to supporting Mr. Aso's bid for the party presidency, despite Tanigaki Sadakazu, perennial candidate for the leadership (and likely candidate in the next leadership election), being the faction's number two. Mr. Tanigaki assumed that the new faction would be a major platform for his next bid for the leadership and has reportedly threatened to leave the faction if it fails to support him.

That said, the all-important Machimura faction (i.e., Mori Yoshiro) has yet to signal which way it is leaning, despite Mr. Aso's active courting of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction chiefs. The post-Fukuda non-campaign campaign is in full swing, the candidates are emerging, and the LDP barons are starting to choose sides — with Mr. Fukuda helpless in the midst of the open campaigning for his job.

Koike fever?

Within days of Mori Yoshiro's calling the prospect of Korike Yuriko, former defense minister, a "joke," Sankei writes that "Koike fever" is taking hold — even though Ms. Koike claims to share Mr. Mori's assessment of a Koike candidacy.

The basis for this "fever" is unclear to me.

The examples cited by Sankei? A long speech to a meeting of the LDP young turks, Nakagawa Hidenao's calling her "a new leader who will be responsible for Japan's future" on a visit to China in March, her participation in Mr. Koizumi's new study group, and Koizumian political instincts.

All well and good, but this strikes me as a thin foundation for declaring that Ms. Koike is in a position to seize the LDP leadership. Does she in fact have any of the support that would make her a viable candidate in a post-Fukuda party race? Being an able politician is not necessarily a criterion for being elected as head of the LDP, and Ms. Koike's "flexibility," which led her to migrate from party to party over the course of the 1990s before ending up in the LDP and Mr. Koizumi's cabinet, surely is less of an asset when it comes to vying for the LDP leadership.

Does she have the support of the party's prefectural chapters, which gave not inconsiderable support to Aso Taro in September 2007 — and which Mr. Aso has courted assiduously since the last LDP leadership election?

Does she have the support of any LDP faction, not least the biggest one, and the LDP's kingpins more generally? The "endorsement" of Nakagawa Hidenao is undoubtedly helpful, but surely Mr. Mori's put-down outweighs his Machimura faction comrade's praise (stunning considering that Ms. Koike is a member of the Machimura faction). Meanwhile, the manner in which she was chased out of the Defense Ministry as the party's leaders closed ranks to defend Moriya Takemasa suggests that she is short on allies in the highest councils of the LDP, not least because she's a woman.

I would welcome her candidacy; she would certainly be an improvement (and a better choice than Mr. Aso). But I must (sadly) agree with Mr. Mori: her prospects are a joke. She will not be elected as head of the LDP as it exists today. She might find a way to the premiership if Mr. Koizumi leads his followers out of the LDP and pushes Ms. Koike forward as his new party's candidate, but for now I feel confident saying that she will not be Mr. Fukuda's successor as LDP president and prime minister.

Three weeks and counting

Aso Taro continues to position himself as the LDP's savior in a rapidly approaching post-Fukuda period — in MTC's extended (and excellent) Fukuda-as-currency analogy, Mr. Aso is hoping that he is the best store of value in a chaotic environment.

His latest move is to come out on behalf of the restoration of the temporary tax on gasoline, using the environmental logic to make the case for the tax (and perhaps to present himself as a kinder, gentler Aso Taro.) Appearing at an event in Yamaguchi prefecture with Abe Shinzo in advance of the April 27 by-election in Yamaguchi-2, Mr. Aso said, "Since the gasoline tax is cheaper, it invites the consumption of more gasoline; for Japan, which is hosting an environment summit, this is an extremely bad state of affairs." Mr. Abe used the somewhat contradictory road construction logic, placing road construction above the environment, odd given his new environmental policy responsibilities: "I think that the consumers had a good feeling about the fall in the gasoline price, roads cannot be built and maintained. The LDP has a great responsibility to resolve this situation immediately."

I think that while Mr. Aso (and his fellow conservatives) believe that the tax should be reinstated irrespective of the politics of the matter, Mr. Aso also figures that supporting it strengthens his political position. In the event of a new leadership election, it hardly matters that his position is antithetical to the vast majority of Japanese. It does matter that his position is consistent with forty-one LDP prefectural chapters, according to an Asahi survey of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters. His views on the tax are also consistent with the bulk of the LDP's parliamentary membership, although as noted by Yamamoto Ichita, it remains uncertain whether Mr. Fukuda will be able to muster the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the temporary tax at the end of April. Mr. Yamamoto reports that nearly 200 LDP representatives support passing it again, leaving the government 120 votes short. Even if the government manages to corral Komeito members and the majority of the remaining LDP members, it will take a mere sixteen votes to scuttle the tax bill.

Would the LDP be willing to exile the sixteen (or more), in the process tossing away its supermajority? The potential dissenters, whoever they are, are incredibly powerful at this moment in time — their actions, aside from determining whether Japanese citizens have to pay more for gasoline, could be decisive in toppling the Fukuda government, breaking up the LDP, triggering a realignment, forcing a general election, or all of the above. It's safe to assume that Mr. Ozawa will be working hard to get them to defect to the DPJ, just as the LDP's elders will be doing the best they can to buy their allegiance (and/or threaten them with political oblivion).

As for the DPJ, based on the Asahi survey, the DPJ has its own problems with its prefectural chapters, which are split nearly evenly on the question of absorbing gasoline tax revenue into the general fund, with a slight majority (23-20) in favor of it. Oddly enough, forty-six of forty-seven chapters support Mr. Ozawa's response to the LDP's plan; forty-six (all except Tochigi) also oppose the extension of the temporary tax. In short, nearly half the DPJ's prefectural chapters support the continuation of the road construction special fund, just with less revenue due to the end of the temporary tax.

The DPJ can do little more but hold the line, try to tempt LDP defectors, and watch as the LDP continues to tear itself apart on this issue.

And Mr. Aso? He may yet get his chance to lead. As before, the deciding vote will be cast by the Machimura faction's elders, Mori Yoshiro, Machimura Nobutaka, and Nakagawa Hidenao. For the moment, Mr. Fukuda still has their confidence, but how long before they begin looking for a safer investment? And does Mr. Aso stand a chance of earning it?

It's probably safe to say that the revote on the tax bill will make or break Mr. Fukuda. If he can somehow muster the supermajority, he will likely survive until the G8 summit, if not longer. If he can't, his government will be finished.

Abe's — and the LDP's — dilemma

Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has been back in the headlines this week, first for his return to the Machimura faction, which he left when he became prime minister, second for the announcement that he will chair an LDP study group related to the implementation of his "Cool Earth 50" initiative. The latter prompted Asahi to ask whether this is the beginning of Mr. Abe's "re-challenge," referring to another of Mr. Abe's initiatives.

Mr. Abe's return to the Machimura faction makes him its sixtieth member from the House of Representatives.

I find the former of greater interest than the latter, because the Machimura faction increasingly appears to be a microcosm of the party at large.

Consider that the faction contains a moderate dove like Prime Minister Fukuda, risk-averse senior politicians like Mori Yoshiro, Nakagawa Hidenao, and Machimura Nobutaka, "true" conservative Abe Shinzo, and a healthy cohort (27) of first- and second-term members of the House of Representatives, many of them Koizumi Kids. With the Machimura faction having made the Kantei its private property over the course of this decade, its complexion matters considerably in the future of LDP governance.

The selection of Mr. Fukuda as prime minister, thanks in large part due to his own faction's support, illustrates this point — and illustrates that the party is, for the moment, in the hands of the cautious, reactionary Mr. Mori.

Will Mr. Abe's return make a difference? I suspect not. The very idea of an Abe comeback strikes me as laughable, and I expect that few of his conservative allies long for his return. (At least one of them doesn't.)

The next LDP presidential election, meanwhile, will likely test the Machimura faction's power. If it comes after the next general election — as I expect it will — it may find its numerical clout diminished somewhat as some of its one- and two-term members in vulnerable urban and suburban districts go down to defeat. The test will likely come from Nakagawa Shoichi's "True Conservative Policy Research Group" [The HANA group], or at least the movement symbolized by the HANA group. Unless the Machimura faction decides to take a chance on Mr. Aso this time around, which would defuse the situation, the next LDP election will ask certain LDP members to choose between their values and their faction, and perhaps ultimately, their values and their party. This dynamic was present in the September election, as evidenced by the subterranean support for Mr. Aso — and the formalization of a conservative anti-mainstream in the form of the HANA group only exacerbates the tension.

Mr. Abe will be no less immune to this dilemma than his less prominent colleagues. Indeed, his return, according to Mainichi, is the result of Mr. Mori's anger at Mr. Nakagawa's group. As noted previously, one of the first steps in Mr. Abe's political rehabilitation was his joining the HANA group last month. Writes Mainichi: "Mr. Mori, who frowned at this, urged Mr. Abe to return to the faction."

Mr. Abe will be serving as a counselor to the faction, a position offered perhaps in part to cement his loyalty.

The Machimura faction grows

Seki Yoshihiro, an LDP member of the House of Representatives representing Hyogo-3, has announced that he is joining the Machimura faction, making him the eighty-fifth member of the party's largest faction.

Mr. Seki, a "Koizumi kid" as indicated by his membership in the "Group of 83" (AKA, the Koizumi Kids Klub), is neither the first member of the class of 2005 to join a faction nor the first to join the Machimura faction. Indeed, fifteen Koizumi Kids have joined the faction that has produced the last four prime ministers.

Considering that factions are increasingly unable to deliver anything tangible to members other than sponsorship for junior political appointments, and that the bigger the faction the more competition for those appointments (and thus diminishing marginal returns to the most recent member of a faction), I wonder what Mr. Seki gains from this move. A guarantee that he won't have his seat taken from him by party election strategists?

Alternatively, it could be a function of the changing nature of the factions, with the Machimura faction — already the descendant of the LDP's hawkish anti-mainstream tendency — becoming more explicitly ideological, the home of ideologues of both Koizumi and Abe colors. (The two approaches undoubtedly share much in common on constitutional and defense issues, but those who belong to the latter appear to have little or no interest in economic reform.)

Of course, if that's the case, it raises the question of how long politicians like Fukuda Yasuo will be tolerated within its ranks.

The Machimura faction tries to untwist the Diet

The Machimura faction, which just gained a new member to solidify its position as the LDP's largest, has delivered a proposal to Prime Minister Fukuda that calls for the drafting of new rules for Diet management in light of the divided Diet. The proposal, according to Asahi, points to a "structural deficiency in the constitution," in that it mandates different methods for dealing with the budget and budget-related bills. As such, it demands that Mr. Fukuda push through rules that provide for the passage of the budget and budget-related bills at approximately the same time.

As usual for LDP and conservative complaints about the post-July political situation, the proposal bemoans how the divided Diet makes it difficult to address Japan's national interests, in this case fixing the country's abysmal fiscal situation. (No mention, of course, as to how that situation came about in the first place.)

May I make the modest proposal that perhaps more democracy is in Japan's national interest, no matter what the impact on public policy (and no matter how insufferable Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ can be at times)?

The rule changes demanded by the Machimura faction are nothing short of anti-democratic, in that they would limit the HC's ability to exercise its constitutional duty to act on a certain type of legislation. The Japanese people voted last year to give control of the House of Councillors to different parties than that controlling the House of Representatives. Just because it has made governing more difficult does not give the LDP the right to manipulate the political process to reverse the consequences of the election.

Fortunately Mr. Fukuda disagrees with the opinion of his faction. He replied by emphasizing that he intends to "take every opportunity to appeal to the opposition parties" for cooperation. And so it should be: as we learned this month, the government and opposition are perfectly capable of cooperating on legislation, despite the media-driven impression of gridlock. The constitution mandated roles for each house, and the LDP should not opportunistically undermine one house just because it's now become a hindrance to LDP rule.

(Incidentally, this is why Japan needs regular alternation of ruling parties: a ruling party aware that it could easily end up in the opposition would perhaps be less blithe about proposing rule changes to handicap the opposition.)