Nakagawa's fantasy world

For once I'm not talking about Nakagawa Shoichi.

Nakagawa Hidenao, onetime LDP secretary-general under Prime Minister Abe and now the putative leader of the LDP's Koizumians, has written a series of posts at his blog over the past week, starting with one on 19 July in which he criticized the DPJ for its "former Socialist Party ideology" in its support for collusion among government and labor, its anti-US, anti-US-Japan security treaty, UN-centered foreign policy — for its policies that are, in his words, "at the same time unrealistic and lacking in persuasive power for the popular will."

He followed it up with a post on 20 July in which he discussed the DPJ's ties to Jichiro, the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union, which the LDP holds responsible for the pensions scandal thanks to the union's illegal practice of having workers paid for full-time work despite not being present full time. He claimed, "In order to destroy the Abe cabinet, which fought boldly against the practice of illegal pay received for illegal full-time work, wasn't the suicide bombing of leaking the case of the 50 million missing pensions records launched?"

On 22 July he discussed an Asahi editorial and declared that the LDP stands for "eradicating amakudari," while the DPJ, as a result of its ties to public-sector unions, is not really opposed to ending amakudari even though ending the practice is at the center of the party's approach to administrative reform. (Recall that the DPJ wanted tougher provisions against amakudari in the administrative reform bill it compromised with the Fukuda government to pass in the spring Diet session.) He asserted that because of Ozawa Ichiro's ties with Rengo, a DPJ administration would be "heaven for the illegal practice of receiving full-time pay without performing full-time work."

He repeated his criticism of the DPJ's silence on this practice on 24 July, and extended the criticism in a post today, in which he questioned the wisdom of giving the DPJ — which he says moves left or right depending on the political winds — carte blanche.

I would have more respect for Mr. Nakagawa's argument if his criticisms of the DPJ didn't also apply to the LDP — the contemporary LDP.

Mr. Nakagawa writes about the LDP as if we were living in a parallel universe in which the Koizumi revolution succeeded: Mr. Koizumi was able to break the back of the reactionaries, used his final year in office to push a series of wide-reaching reforms, and handed power over to Mr. Abe, who decided that he would continue the reforms and oppose the readmission of ousted reactionaries to the party instead of devoting his energy to the ideological obsessions of the right. He acts as if Mr. Fukuda is controlling the party with a firm hand, that he has faced no opposition from the road tribe to his plan to phase out the road construction fund, that he won't face more opposition this autumn as he attempts to write his road plan into law. In short, Mr. Nakagawa acts if the war for the identity of the LDP was already won by his reformists.

The reality is shockingly different. Mr. Nakagawa's emergence as the leading voice for reform may have given the beleagurered Koizumians some heft, but many of the first- and second-term Koizumi kids may be out of the Diet after the next election.

Yamauchi Koichi, one of those kids, illustrates just how silly this theme coming from the mouths of LDP members in a post at his blog called "The LDP-ization of Ozawa's DPJ." Mr. Yamauchi suggests that the push for reelecting Mr. Ozawa as DPJ leader without a vote is a sign of the traditional LDP tactics learned by Mr. Ozawa from his days as LDP secretary-general. At no point does Mr. Yamauchi say "old LDP;" he says LDP, as in the party of which he is currently a member. Mr. Yamauchi is not so foolish to deny that the LDP is not the bizarro world LDP in which Mr. Koizumi succeeded at transforming the LDP; Yomiuri reported this week that Mr. Yamauchi is finding that he will have to run against the LDP in Kanagawa's ninth district in order to win reelection.

Does the LDP really want to take this approach in attacking the DPJ? Does it really want to describe the DPJ as being like the LDP, an LDP that contrary to Mr. Nakagawa's wishes is still alive and kicking? Mind you, I'm uncomfortable with Mr. Ozawa's ties with labor unions, which are no less reactionary than businesses and farmers long coddled by the LDP, but given that the DPJ has no track record in power, I'm willing to give the DPJ the benefit of the doubt — and I suspect that many Japanese voters might be willing to do so too when given the chance. The LDP is betting that voters will prefer the devil they know (all too well) to the devil they don't; I'd be willing to bet others, and it may turn out that the DPJ isn't the devil that the LDP wants voters to think it is.

The feeling is mutual

MTC reports on comments by Koga Makoto and Suga Yoshihide, the LDP's chief and deputy election strategists regarding the possibility of a general election around the new year.

MTC notes that Nikkei believes that this scheme is connected with the desire of New Komeito's leadership not to have to vote on the latest enabling law for the MSDF refueling mission. MTC concludes that the LDP is unlikely to act out of charity to its junior partner, and will instead use Komeito's campaign machine and then break the partnership following the election.

If Shukan Shincho is to be believed, Komeito is no more eager to retain its partnership after the election than the LDP.

An article headlined "The LDP has finally been abandoned by Soka Gakkai's Ikeda Daisaku" in the July 24 issue of Shukan Shincho chronicles a series of recent remarks by current and former Komeito and Soka Gakkai officials expressing their dissatisfaction with the coalition and their willingness to consider a partnership with the DPJ.

Given the number of reasons for Komeito to be dissatisfied with the LDP — including not just their differing foreign policy views but the LDP's perceived indifference to the plight of Japan's elderly — I would question the political sense of Komeito's leaders if they weren't dissatisfied with their party's partnership with the LDP and searching for a way out.

Accordingly, the next general election campaign, says the article, will be the coalition's last. Komeito will adhere to the coalition to the last, but will look to jump from the LDP's side, especially if its support could make the difference in the DPJ's coming to power.

In light of both parties' dissatisfaction with their coalition, it is worth asking whether either party will be campaigning particularly hard for the other's candidates in a general election campaign. Will Komeito voters buck the party and vote for DPJ candidates over LDP candidates, or not vote at all?

Fukuda, the LDP, and Japan: all hamstrung

Fukuda Yasuo has returned from his vacation at the Prince Park Tower hotel near Shiba Park in Tokyo.

His agenda is no less crowded than it was last week.

In the final week of the month, Mr. Fukuda, his government, and his party will be considering the new budgetary guidelines, deliberating on when to start the autumn extraordinary session of the Diet, and considering whether to reshuffle his cabinet before the autumn session.

Mr. Fukuda has provided few hints as to his thinking on the latter, and day by day the pressure from his party — using the media to pour on the pressure — grows for the prime minister to decide on a reshuffle.

On the question of timing, there is no hint as to when the Diet will convene again, but obviously if the government waits too long, the extraordinary session could turn into another marathon session stretching into next year as the government is forced to use Article 59 to pass priority legislation (like another enabling law for the MSDF's refuelling mission). Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, said as much at a press conference Tuesday, and expressed his desire for the new session to begin by the end of August. Asked about it at his press conference later Tuesday, Machimura Nobutaka, chief cabinet secretary, said no agreement had been reached and provided no insight to the government's thinking.

The timing of the new session is intertwined with the question of a reshuffle. The argument — at least as made by Asahi — is that a reshuffle now will strengthen the prime minister's efforts to pass legislation on health care, social security, and eldercare, and countermeasures to address high energy costs. By giving the cabinet a "Fukuda color," the government will apparently have an easier time moving its agenda.

I'm unimpressed by this logic. I don't know what a Fukuda-colored cabinet would look like, but I'm not certain that it would be an improvement. And I don't see how it would strengthen the government's ability to move legislation. Instead I see it as freeing people who disagree with the prime minister to intensify their activities to undermine the prime minister. Meanwhile, is Masuzoe Yoichi, the minister for health, labor, and welfare (HLW) and the point man on the aforementioned issues (and a major critic of Abe Shinzo's despite being a holdover from the second Abe cabinet, thereby exposing the folly in the logic that the second Abe cabinet inherited by Mr. Fukuda is out of place today) somehow an obstacle to the government's plans?

The arguments being made on behalf of a reshuffle are flimsy, and yet the media is repeating them unquestioningly.

In the end, talk of a reshuffle is a distraction from the realities of policy: the Fukuda government and the LDP are unable to rescue Japan from its ongoing crisis. As Ken Worsley noted, the Cabinet Office admitted that the budget won't be balanced by 2011 as desired by Koizumi Junichiro. The economic outlook is worsening. The latest HLW white paper on the Japanese labor market recorded the inexorable growth in the use of un-regular staff, indicating the crumbling of Japanese labor system.

In the midst of this, government and ruling party are dithering over whether a new cabinet will improve the prime minister's public approval ratings.

The LDP's empire is crumbling.

It is not yet known what will rise in its place — and if it's a new DPJ regime, whether it will be more of the same — but we are without question witnessing the death throes of the ancien regime. Problems are mounting faster than the hamstrung government can tackle them. The LDP has, according to Yamasaki Taku, abandoned Koizumism, but it has adopted nothing in its place, not even the old way of conducting politics. It is merely treading water, and poorly.

How will a prime minister who can't decide whether to change his cabinet push through sweeping changes to how Japan cares for its sick and aged, provides opportunities for young workers, and enables firms to innovate and grow?

The DPJ may find itself similarly hamstrung, but the DPJ's qualities should not (and are not, I would argue) the most important matter facing the Japanese people. The question is whether the party that failed to anticipate and act responsibly in the face of a gathering crisis should be trusted with the power to attempt to fix the mess it created.

General Rice criticizes the Japanese media (implicitly)

Your humble blogger was invited to attend a media roundtable with Lieutenant General Edward Rice, United States Air Force, the commander of US Forces Japan (previously discussed here), the sole "new media" representative sitting around a table with wire service correspondents and reporters from the major Japanese newspapers and TV networks.

The meeting wasn't General Rice's first with the press: he emphasized his desire to maintain an open channel of communication, especially with the vernacular media.

In his brief opening statement, the general expressed his belief in the strength of the US-Japan alliance, reiterated remarks by President Bush on the alliance's being the cornerstone of US foreign and security policy in Northeast Asia, and thanked Japan's coast guard and National Police Agency for the help they provided in guarding US bases before and during the G8 summit. He then shifted gears and provided an update on USFJ's efforts to combat crime by US service personnel stationed in Japan. He emphasized that USFJ takes crimes by US personnel extremely seriously, and is continuously looking to strengthen measures to prevent serious crimes and hold perpetrators accountable for their actions. But he also made a point similar to an argument made previously by Jun Okumura. US personnel in Japan, General Rice said, have half the crime rate of the crime rate for the Japanese general public. He stressed that there is no way to prevent crime entirely, but noted that US safeguards have been tremendously successful. He noted that the US has prosecuted service personnel for crimes in instances when Japanese courts would not have prosecuted. US service men and women are here to serve the alliance, he said, and the vast majority of them adhere to the high standards of the US military.

It is hard to read this as anything but a message to Japanese media to tone down sensationalist coverage of crimes by US military personnel and put said crimes in perspective, perspective both in the sense of the overall crime levels in Japan and in the sense of the benefits to Japan from having US forces forward deployed in Japan (namely the savings to Japan in terms of not having to spend as much on defense as it would have to otherwise). This impression was reinforced in General Rice's answers to questions about crime.

Will they get the message?

Meanwhile, I asked the general about the progress on realignment and his thoughts on the DPJ's latest "Okinawa Vision" paper. The DPJ released its latest statement on Okinawa policy last week, in which the DPJ provided a far more detailed and comprehensive statement on Okinawa than its previous vision paper (discussed here). The position on the realignment of US forces in Okinawa — and by extension US forces in Japan — can be found starting from p. 3, in the section covering the DPJ's policies in four areas. Realignment is the first area.

The DPJ once again emphasizes the need to reduce the US presence in Okinawa as much as entirely possible. Once again the DPJ wants to remove US forces first from Okinawa, and then from Japan, although it adds a proviso stipulating that this process will "be based on changes in the strategic environment." But the document proceeds to explain DPJ policies in eight areas related to the alliance that would mark a significant break from the LDP approach. Tellingly, the document does not mention the 2006 roadmap on realignment, suggesting that a DPJ-led government would look to start from scratch and cut the US presence in Okinawa even more drastically than under the terms of the 2006 agreement.

First, the DPJ wants to revise the Status of Forces agreement with the US, and together with the SDPJ and the PNP submitted a proposal to the government earlier this year (which the government dismissed). This plan would have the US military submit a plan on base usage every eight years, hold the US responsible for providing restitution for environment damage caused by US military activities, prohibit low-altitude flights, have only the lowest necessary level of air-traffic control at US bases, have service personnel living off-base register as resident aliens, and give Japanese authorities primary jurisdiction for off-base crimes and use Japanese facilities to intern suspects, and make the US 100% responsible for providing restitution for crimes committed by US service personnel, US military employees, or their families.

Second, the plan calls for the return of more US facilities in Okinawa — especially logistics and communications facilities in urban areas and unusued land — to Japan. The DPJ wants to hasten the suspension of flights from Futenma in the interest of reducing the danger to citizens of surrounding communities.

Third, the DPJ reiterated the concerns about how Japan's host-nation support (HNS) is used by the US military, concerns that led the DPJ to allow HNS to lapse for one month at the start of the current fiscal year. It calls for a more accountability and transparency in how Japanese money is used.

Other demands include provisions related to the redevelopment of Okinawa following the reversion of bases, greater participation by prefectural and local authorities in talks on the bases, the elimination of US military noise pollution, and the use of Okinawa as a headquarters for peace and stability operations by international organizations.

Missing from these proposals is any indication of how a DPJ government would convince the US to accept these demands. Despite the use of the word "vision," there is little vision in this document, at least in terms of how realignment will (and should) impact the US-Japan alliance. Few if any of these changes can be implemented unilaterally. It will depend on negotiation with US military and diplomatic officials. Is the DPJ prepared for that? Do they have an idea of how they would get what they want in negotiations? Much of this report has to be classified as electioneering by the DPJ — making a less than reliable guide to how a DPJ government might act once in power — but it is still the best indication we have of what the DPJ will do with the 2006 agreement.

General Rice gave no sign that USFJ is reaching out to the DPJ and looking to open a channel of communication in the hope of forestalling an antagonistic relationship if and when the DPJ forms a government. He said, "We will work with the Government of Japan as it exists today. It is not helpful to speculate." He was optimistic about the implementation of the 2006 roadmap, stating that he expected it to be implemented on schedule, with the Marines in Okinawa leaving for Guamn in 2013 as planned.

I hope that USFJ will reconsider its attitude towards the DPJ. Obviously it shouldn't shift policy now in anticipation of a DPJ victory that might never come, but it is important that the military deepen its ties with the DPJ in the hopes of preventing the DPJ from running against the US military. By the same measure, if the DPJ is serious about governing Japan, it should be looking to develop its own ties with USFJ. US forces are part of the political environment in Japan, like it or not, and the DPJ must be prepared to negotiate in good faith should it have the opportunity to form a government.

I'm not convinced that the latest Okinawa vision is a demonstration of the DPJ's good faith.

Maehara backs down?

The DPJ is increasingly focused on its forthcoming leadership election, the date of which has been set for 21 September, with the campaign's official start set for two weeks prior.

The DPJ's anti-Ozawa groups have still not agreed upon a candidate to stand against Ozawa Ichiro, while Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto have both expressed their support for Mr. Ozawa. Mr. Ozawa, reports Asahi, will likely go into the campaign with a majority of the parliamentary party behind him. The groups (factions) of Messrs. Hatoyama and Kan, as well as the left-wing Yokomichi group have pledged their support for Mr. Ozawa. The Isshin-kai, an Ozawa-sponsored group for DPJ members who have been elected fewer than three times, is also expected to support Mr. Ozawa, as are a number of the party's endorsed candidates for the next general election (who get a vote in the leadership election). Mr. Ozawa's support among the party's prefectural chapters is also overwhelming.

In the midst of this gathering Ozawa landslide, Maehara Seiji has softened his critique of the party's policies. Speaking Wednesday at a symposium with Yosano Kaoru, a possibile post-Fukuda LDP president, Mr. Maehara stated, "I don't reject the party's thinking, but the manifesto must be made better." He suggested that the points of contention in the party leadership election should be (1) the form and manner of decentralization, (2) the place of the UN in the party's security policy thinking, and (3) the question of how to fund the party's manifesto proposals.

I'm not surprised by Mr. Maehara's retreat from Liebermanian territory in relations with the DPJ — and I'm not surprised that it looks as if Mr. Maehara will leave it to Sengoku Yoshito to fall on his sword in the September election.

And, I should add, I'm not particularly impressed with Mr. Maehara's attempt to spur a discussion about the DPJ's "failure" to demonstrate precisely how it will govern if and when it takes power.

Yahoo's Minna no seiji has published both Mr. Maehara's article in Voice and the conversation with Tahara Soichiro and Mr. Yosano in Chuo Koron that have prompted criticism of Mr. Maehara from within the DPJ (and given the LDP hope that the DPJ might fragment).

In the first part of his article in Voice, Mr. Maehara chides his party for its role in creating the nejire kokkai by prioritizing opposition to the government over solving national problems. (He also criticizes the LDP and Komeito for dismissing opposition proposals out of hand, unlike, he says, in Germany, where since "various opinions are presented from within the government and the opposition parties, seventy or eighty percent of legislation is revised.") In short, he argues that both the LDP and the DPJ should stop politicking and start working for the good of Japan, logic that sounds awfully similarly to the logic behind last year's push for an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. He then proceeds to criticize DPJ positions on the temporary gasoline tax, the new eldercare system, before explaining his ideas on the aforementioned points of contention in the leadership election.

The interesting section is when he discusses the Koizumi-Takenaka reforms, because this section reveals much about Mr. Maehara. He says, "The direction and sense of the Koizumi/Takenaka reforms is completely correct." But — there had to be a but — the reforms as implemented were sham reforms because the bureaucracy interfered with them. And perhaps, he suggests, Mr. Koizumi could have been a little more attentive to growing inequality and the need for more spending on health care.

In the second part, he provides fodder to those who see Mr. Maehara as being at the center of any political realignment by discussing the existence of "reformists" and "conservatives" in both the LDP and the DPJ. He then talks at length about his cross-partisan activities, especially on national security and foreign policy, and notes how there are many politicians in the LDP who understand Japan's problems.

Finally, he closes with advice to the DPJ. First, he has the gall to note that "only the LDP will profit" from cracks in the party that will be the result of internal squabbling. Second, he calls on the DPJ to resist the temptation to populism, to telling the people what they want to hear instead of what they need to hear.

The conversation with Mr. Yosano hinges more on specific policy questions, but Mr. Maehara's criticisms of the party and Mr. Ozawa are the same. (Part one; part two.)

I don't necessarily have a problem with Mr. Maehara's policy ideas; like most politicians, he has some good ideas and some not-so-good ideas (in the latter category I would put his statement, "If I were at the helm, I would make 'world leader in per-capita GDP' a national goal"). My problem is with his naivety. He genuinely believes that if reformists in both the LDP and DPJ just work together to craft good policy, Japan will be saved.

But to paraphrase Horace, you may drive politics out with a pitchfork, she will nevertheless come back. There is no escaping the "political situation," reputedly an obsession of Mr. Ozawa above all others. Working with the LDP simply means giving the LDP the means to cling to power. There may be reasonable, intelligent LDP members, but the LDP remains the LDP, collectively frightened of any change beyond that necessary to stay in power, allied with the bureaucracy, and bereft of any vision beyond survival.

This is the unspoken meaning of what Mr. Yosano says in his discussion with Mr. Maehara: "The LDP is a rather flexible political party. If we receive various requests, we change that which can be changed."

For all of Mr. Maehara's ideas, he lacks wisdom (or political sense). He fails to see that any compromise behind tactical, issue-by-issue compromise abets the LDP. He fails to see that in many ways the continuance of the LDP in power — no matter how well-intentioned and sensible some members of the party are — is the single biggest obstacle to remaking Japan into the kind of society that Mr. Maehara purports to want. His fixation on balancing the budget in the DPJ's electoral manifesto simply misses the bigger picture that regime change will provide a new government, free of the pathologies of fifty years of one-party rule, with the opportunity to chart a new direction for Japan, a goal that Mr. Ozawa shares. Unlike Mr. Maehara, however, it seems that Mr. Ozawa has actually given some thought to how to topple the LDP in an election first. And his way of thinking would not only give the LDP policy victories, but it would also make it increasingly difficult to tell the two parties apart, a development that would make it easier for the LDP to fend off a DPJ challenge to its rule.

For all his unhappiness with how the DPJ is run — and all of his efforts to cultivate partnerships with LDP members — I expect that Mr. Maehara will ultimately fall into line. The election end in a landslide reelection for Mr. Ozawa, Mr. Maehara and a buoyant Mr. Ozawa will reconcile on Mr. Ozawa's terms, and the party will unite in pursuit of regime change.

Banning hereditary politicians

Koga Makoto, the LDP's chief election strategist, spoke in Fukuoka on Monday, where he suggested that the government might not wait until September 2009 to call an election after all. He noted that the prime minister might instead decide to call an election in early 2009, before the start of the ordinary Diet session, or in March or April following the passage of next year's budget.

But the more interesting portion of his remarks pertained to the role of hereditary Diet members. A recent column by Shiota Ushio in Toyo Keizai notes that there are 180 hereditary members between the upper and lower houses, amounting to a quarter of the total membership of the two houses of the Diet. Of the past ten prime ministers, all but Murayama Tomiichi and Mori Yoshiro have been second- or third-generation members of the Diet. 40% of LDP members of the Diet are, according to Shiota, hereditary Diet members.

Mr. Koga, not a hereditary politician himself, sees this as a problem. Indeed, he sees the prevalence of hereditary members within the LDP as a source of the party's fragility.

"Hereditary Diet members are not well acquainted with hardship — born in Tokyo, raised in Tokyo. Even if theirs is a rural electoral district, they don't really understand the area. This has led to the LDP's weakness."

Undoubtedly a certain portion of the party sees the matter differently.

Has the LDP been mortally wounded by its hereditary members? Would the LDP have governed differently, especially over the past twenty years, had its ranks been filled with more members who hadn't been born into politics? The LDP is weak not because its members are weak (or weak-headed), but because the system it engineered and used to stay in power is crumbling. One could even argue that hereditary politicians make better politicians, having learned the art of politics from a young age. (I don't actually believe this, but one could logically make the argument. Why don't I believe it? Exhibit one: Abe Shinzo. Exhibit two: the Hatoyama boys.) Non-hereditary members are little better. "Understanding the area," in Mr. Koga's terms, has often meant knowing the right people to deal with when it comes to rounding up votes and passing out favors (AKA public funds). No group of politicians is inherently better or worse than the other.

It is with this in mind that I read a recent Mainichi editorial on a proposal being mooted by the DPJ. A subcommittee of the party's headquarters of political reform headed by Noda Yoshihiko, charged by reviewing the Public Office Election law, wants to submit a bill to the autumn extraordinary session that will make it illegal for children to run in seats once held by their parents. (I suppose the bill would apply only to parents and children. No word on whether this would apply to other relatives [grandparents, aunts, uncles, etc.].) Mr. Noda hopes to secure LDP agreement on this issue. Mainichi applaudes this idea, and suggests that even if the bill doesn't become law, the DPJ should go ahead and write this provision into the DPJ's party laws, noting that this is a good way for the DPJ to distinguish itself from the LDP. Given the aforementioned ratio of hereditary to non-hereditary Diet members in the LDP — not to mention that presence of hereditary members in important positions in the DPJ — this bill is unlikely to be introduced to or passed in the Diet. And it won't make it into the party rules.

Is this such a bad thing? The Mainichi editorial suggests that the rise of the hereditary member is indicative of a drying up of the political talent pool. But is the prevalence of hereditary members a cause or an effect of the lack of talented candidates for public office? Does the party turn to hereditary members because it can't find anyone else, or do good people stay away from politics because of corruption, the inheritance of Diet seats included?

But as I argued before, hereditary members are not inherently better or worse than non-hereditary members, and I'm not certain that Mr. Koga's claim that hereditary members are more out of touch from their districts than non-hereditary members is true. I suppose that the reason why people — and Mainichi — have a problem with hereditary members is not that they dilute the talent of the political class or anything like that, but that they are an offense to democratic sensibilities. And they are! If hereditary members are not inherently superior to non-hereditary members, why not give non-hereditary candidates a chance to screw up rob the people blind represent the people. Some readers may recall that I had a certain grudging respect for the late, unlamented Matsuoka Toshikatsu, who clawed his way into politics and who was sacrificed in order to save the government of Mr. Abe, that exemplar of hereditary politicians.

But it seems to me that a bill along the lines suggested by Mr. Noda and encouraged by Mainichi would be unconstitutional. The first part of article 14 of the constitution reads, "All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin." Banning second- or third-generation politicians from running in certain districts looks to me like discrimination in political relations based on family origin.

The Japanese people will have to continue to tolerate the presence of hereditary politicians in their midst. After all, it is the people who are responsible for the existence of hereditary Diet members. Mainichi neglects to mention this, instead pointing to the advantages enjoyed by hereditary members in terms of money, name recognition, and preexisting campaign organizations. But the people still ultimately have a choice whether to elect a hereditary politician.

Instead of banning hereditary members, perhaps Mr. Noda and the DPJ should consider more substantial revisions to Japan's election laws that make it easier for challengers to contend with hereditary politicians. Why not lift restrictions that make it difficult for candidates to interact with voters one-on-one? Why not loosen restrictions on when, where, and how a candidate can compete for public office — Japan's incumbency protection laws? Arguably the job security enjoyed by incumbent Diet members is a greater threat to Japanese governance than hereditary Diet members.

Hashimoto Daijiro: key to a DPJ government?

As noted by MTC in this post, Hashimoto Daijiro, who served as governor of Kochi prefecture for sixteen years (1991-2007), has announced that before the next general election he will create a new party dedicated to radical decentralization that will give prefectural and local governments the tools with which to tackle socio-economic problems that have thus far been ignored by Tokyo.

MTC sees Mr. Hashimoto's announcement as stealing the thunder of Hiranuma Takeo, who has been talking about forming a new conservative party for months without doing anything about it.

(That's what he gets for waiting for his friends in the LDP — why would they leave the LDP to join Mr. Hiranuma in the wilderness when Fukuda Yasuo could fall at any time? And so Mr. Hiranuma is stuck with the eccentric exiles from the LDP, hardly a catalyst for triggering a political realignment.)

I'm more interested in the consequences of Mr. Hashimoto's announcement on the DPJ's prospects in the next general election.

DPJ head Ozawa Ichiro has, as discussed here before, made a point during his two years as head of the DPJ of bolstering the party's position in rural prefectures, building a DPJ that can contend with the LDP throughout Japan, not just in urban areas. He has had considerable success thus far; rural voters may be losing their allergy to DPJ candidates, if the results of last year's local and upper house elections are any indication.

Will Mr. Hashimoto, as a popular longtime governor of a rural prefecture in Shikoku, and his new party dedicated to decentralization undermine Mr. Ozawa's efforts in rural Japan?

Alternatively, will Mr. Hashimoto hurt the DPJ in wealthier suburban prefectures like Kanagawa, prefectures that might resent how the central government channels their wealth to poorer areas?

In short, will the HNP be a significant enough presence in the next general election to divide the anti-LDP vote and save the LDP from itself?

Mr. Hashimoto had harsh words for both the LDP and the DPJ in his announcement Tuesday, and although he met with senior representatives from both parties in May — Yosano Kaoru from the LDP, Hatoyama Yukio from the DPJ — he denied that he was meeting with them to discuss cooperation with either.

While it's one thing to declare the formation of a party, quite another for the party to be a serious, viable contender in an election campaign, the DPJ should take the creation of the HNP seriously and view it as a serious threat to its bid to unseat the LDP in the next election. I expect that it does, and I expect that Mr. Ozawa is working on a way to join forces with Mr. Hashimoto and use his popularity as a weapon against the LDP.

But for now the DPJ and the HNP will be competing, not cooperating. The DPJ has already endorsed a candidate — Tamura Kumiko, who stood for election in Kochi-2 and lost by considerable margins in 2003 and 2005 — for Kochi's first district, the district in which Mr. Hashimoto will stand. Will the DPJ withdraw its endorsement and give its support to Mr. Hashimoto to cement an alliance with the HNP, especially given that Mr. Hashimoto stands a strong chance of winning the district? Is Mr. Hashimoto willing to consider an alliance with either the LDP or the DPJ (is his support for sale to the highest bidder, the party that will promise the most progress on decentralization)?

This speculation is perhaps premature, as it is unknown how many candidates the HNP will be able to field — and where it will field them. For now, the only sitting Diet member who has agreed to cooperate with Mr. Hashimoto is Eda Kenji, an independent representative from Kanagawa-8, the only non-LDP winner from Kanagawa in 2005. Will more come? And if so, from where?

The LDP is shocked — shocked! — to find waste in the budget

I previously wrote that the LDP, in the midst of a debate over whether and when to raise the consumption tax to cover growing pensions liabilities, also organized a project team — headed by Sonoda Hiroyuki and staffed with fervent young reformists like Kono Taro and Yamamoto Ichita — with the purpose of identifying "waste" to remove from the budget.

The LDP hopes that "exterminating" waste will provide 200bn yen for the budget. To that end, the project team submitted a proposal to the prime minister on Tuesday. The proposal is something of a wish list, the items that the project team would most like to eliminate from the budget. There are the typical items one would find on such a list: "recreation," late-night taxi rides for bureaucrats (the latest outrage), PR documents, no-bid contracts for public corporations (note how they slip that in among more trivial items), and subsidies to public corporations (ditto). The proposal also calls for reducing duplicated work and more oversight by auditors.

All of this sounds fine. These measures would undoubtedly help Japan tackle its budget difficulties and free up money to finance growing liabilities.

But then remember that the LDP has been in power for more than fifty years. It presided over the ballooning of Japan's national debt, it dithered as Japan's population aged, and it failed to refit Japan's welfare institutions for the age of globalization. And now it wants to eliminate government waste to deal with these problems?

If the DPJ is smart, this should be a losing issue for the LDP, reminding voters how now, after years of mismanaging Japan's finances and coddling the bureaucracy, the LDP is ready to crack down on wasteful spending. The LDP would prefer that the public didn't think too much about wasteful spending in the first place, how it got there, how long it's been there. It didn't appear magically, and it didn't appear overnight. It's not a disease or a natural disaster. It is the product of decisions made by the Japanese government — by the LDP — over the course of decades. The DPJ would be wise to remind the Japanese people of this at every opportunity.

And people wonder whether the DPJ can be trusted with power. The DPJ will undoubtedly make mistakes of its own if and when it forms a government, but for now it is the LDP that should be judged in an election, not the DPJ.

Seems simple enough, right? And yet both the Japanese and the foreign press are obsessed with the idea that the DPJ might somehow be worse than the LDP at governing Japan.

Meanwhile, the DPJ might get an assist from the LDP's zoku giin, who will undoubtedly fight tooth-and-nail to ensure that their pet projects aren't classified as waste and eliminated, thereby exposing the LDP's sordid underbelly to the public yet again.

Sengoku steps forward?

Is this the next leader of the DPJ?


That is Sengoku Yoshito, a five-term member of the House of Representatives from Tokushima's first district.

When we last heard from him (on this blog), he was leading the fight against the nomination of Muto Toshiro to be the governor of the Bank of Japan from his position as chairman of the DPJ's subcommittee on joint appointments. Thanks in part to his opposition, Ozawa Ichiro opted for a harder line on the BOJ succession than he had perhaps initially intended, outmaneuvering Mr. Sengoku and other DPJ rivals while embarrassing the government (and, some would say, the DPJ) at the same time.

Speaking at a fundraising party in Tokushima, Mr. Sengoku alluded to a possible run against Mr. Ozawa in the party's forthcoming leadership election.

There is a certain logic to a Sengoku candidacy. At 62, Mr. Sengoku is the oldest member of the Maehara group and enjoys a reputation as the guardian of the rabble of (mostly) thirty- and forty-somethings. His anti-Ozawa credentials are sound — he was a prominent critic of Mr. Ozawa's attempt to form a grand coalition last November — and as a former member of the Socialist Party he is somewhat out of place in the hawkish conservative Maehara group. All of which make him an ideal patsy for the Maehara group, ensuring both that Mr. Ozawa is not reelected unchallenged and that allowing the young, ambitious members of the group to keep their powder dry for a future leadership election.

It grows increasingly unlikely that Mr. Sengoku or anyone else will unseat Mr. Ozawa. The DPJ's Hokkaido chapter has already declared its support for Mr. Ozawa on the basis of the party's success in elections under his leadership, a not entirely surprising announcement given that Hokkaido is something of a DPJ kingdom (home to both Hatoyama Yukio and Yokomichi Takahiro, head of the DPJ's former Socialist wing). Hokkaido is unlikely to be alone for long.

Mr. Ozawa, meanwhile, claims to be focused only on his next swing through the country's regions, scheduled for August. Asked about Mr. Sengoku's remarks, Mr. Ozawa said, "Since Setagaya-kun or anyone else who wants to step forward is free to do so, they may step forward."

The DPJ may get the best of all outcomes: an election, which deprives LDP members like Nakagawa Hidenao of the argument that the DPJ is less than democratic and not to be trusted, but one that is not especially rancorous and returns Mr. Ozawa to power with a solid mandate with which to proceed in his campaign to unseat the LDP.

An Ozawa indiscretion?

Ozawa Ichiro's comments on the US decision to proceed with removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism — mentioned here in passing — have apparently caused a tempest in Washington, as US Asia watchers have taken issue with his claim that the US "never" takes Japan's wishes into account when making decisions.

Wrote Chris Nelson, eponymous author of the Nelson Report, the indispensable newsletter on US Asia policy:

Japan's political leadership has never successfully restored adult supervision in balancing the DPRK's nuclear weapons and offensive missile threat vs the heartbreaking humanitarian issue of the "abductees."

As a consequence, Japan has played itself out of a central role in dealing with its most obvious strategic threat, and has compounded the failure by blaming it all on the US.

Opposition leader Ozawa today distinguished himself by saying that Bush's decision to start the de-listing process, in order to proceed with the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, shows that "...Japanese people now realize that the United States never takes into consideration Japan's wishes when making a decision."

Never?

I have a hard time taking issue with this interpretation of the split on North Korea; I made the same argument earlier this week in this post.

I will attempt, however, to defend Mr. Ozawa from detractors in Washington who have jumped on this latest remark as more evidence of a pronounced anti-American streak in Mr. Ozawa's thinking that will taint the foreign policy of an Ozawa-led DPJ government.

What is Mr. Ozawa's purpose in making this statement?

In all likelihood, Mr. Ozawa made this statement with domestic considerations in mind. Indeed, everything that Mr. Ozawa says and does should be considered in light of its consequences for the DPJ's position in the next general election. Will the position outlined help or hurt the DPJ in its campaign to unseat the LDP? Mr. Ozawa today is the consummate political animal. That may not have been the case at one time, when he was the great hope for reformers domestically and alliance managers in Washington who thought that under his leadership Japan might become a normal nation.

As Shiota Ushio wrote of the DPJ's embrace of Mr. Ozawa in Minshuto no kenkyu:

Ozawa has been called an 'ideas and policy politician.' More than this, the hidden side of the 'political situation and political game politician' is Ozawa's true self.

On the other hand, the 'ideas and policy DPJ' has structural flaws as a party, being conspicuously weak and fragile in its ability to respond to the political situation, its governance and management abilities, its election strategy, and its organization. Does 'political situation and political game Ozawa' plan to remake the DPJ's longstanding image as a 'ideas and policy party,' and with that, does he aim to fix the DPJ's structural flaws and strengthen the party?" (269-270)

Mr. Ozawa's behavior in the two years since taking control of the DPJ — and Mr. Shiota's own analysis — suggest that the answer to both questions is yes. For Mr. Ozawa, political calculations take priority over policy considerations, a trait that has frustrated certain DPJ members and American Japan hands to no end.

Accordingly, his statement on the US government's never taking into account the wishes of the Japanese people is less a criticism of the US government than of the LDP for its handling of the US-Japan alliance. A report at the DPJ website of the press conference where Mr. Ozawa made this statement provides context for the remark, context that is lacking from the Mainichi article from which Mr. Nelson quoted.

At the press conference — which, it is important to note, was held in Okinawa — Mr. Ozawa spoke on the alliance at length, not just on the Korean question. He addressed problems with the realignment of US forces in Japan, and in Okinawa in particular. His speaking in Okinawa should immediately set off a red flag. As noted previously, the DPJ has struggled in Okinawa in the past (Okinawa's lower house delegation currently has no DPJ members) and has tailored its policies on the realignment of US forces in Okinawa accordingly. Therefore, it is no surprise that in his remarks he embedded his criticism of the US shift on North Korea in a discussion of the problems with US bases in Okinawa and the status of forces agreement.

"To have a true alliance relationship, it is absolutely necessary that it be equal," he said. He then proceeded to criticize the LDP for failing to create a more equal alliance: "Under the current LDP administration, the US-Japan alliance cannot be called an alliance. This SOFA makes that perfectly clear."

It is this thread — that the LDP has failed in its management of the alliance — that runs throughout Mr. Ozawa's remarks in this press conference. Mr. Ozawa was primarily concerned with criticizing the LDP and making the case for a DPJ government to an Okinawan audience; he was not necessarily criticizing the US, at least not on North Korea.

Indeed, Mr. Ozawa recognizes that the US will make policy decisions based on its own assessment of its interests. He reserves his criticism instead for the LDP and its allies in the bureaucracy, both of whom he claims failed to recognize how the US makes its decisions.

"The decision by our largest ally America to lift [the terror sponsor designation] is a decision based on its own national interests and global strategy," he said.

"It is a tragedy for the Japanese people and a tragedy of LDP-Komeito politics that the government, that the bureaucracy has no recognition of this."

In short, Mr. Ozawa was making an election pitch to the people of Okinawa in this press conference. He was arguing that LDP governments over the past seven years have failed to stand up for Japan and have failed to articulate and defend Japan's national interests, preferring instead to hope that the US will defend Japan's national interests. Again, his position is less critical of the US for "abandoning" Japan than critical of LDP-led governments for leaving Japan in a position to feel abandoned in the first place.

In light of my own argument about the inequities in the US-Japan alliance, I am extremely sympathetic to Mr. Ozawa's argument here. The alliance is unequal. LDP governments have been overly solicitious of the US. The alliance will be stronger if Japan learns to say no when it disagrees with the US. Japan should not expect the alliance to function like a Japanese interpersonal relationship, a complex set of obligations accumulated over time that will enmesh the two countries indefinitely. What Japan's policymakers may come to realize from the North Korea shift is that past support for the US (in Iraq, for example) is no guarantee of reciprocal support for Japan in areas deemed vital to Japanese national interests (the abductions issue, for example). Future Japanese governments — LDP or DPJ — will likely take this lesson to heart and will likely be less forthcoming with support for the US unless (1) Japanese interests are clearly at stake or (2) there is an explicit quid-pro-quo.

Moreover, I should mention that Mr. Ozawa's position is likely a popular one. Insofar as the Japanese people are interested in foreign policy — and that's not particularly far — they are dismayed with the government's failure to stand up for Japan in its relations with other countries, whether China, North Korea, South Korea, or the United States. "Standing up for Japan" is a matter of style, not policy; Japanese citizens seem to desire a government that speaks out in defense of its interests and forcefully challenges insults to Japan's honor.

So would foreign policy be much different under a Prime Minister Ozawa? Probably not. In his remarks, Mr. Ozawa promised to listen to the people of Okinawa and solve the problem of US bases in Okinawa. He offers no hint of what this would entail (apparently not the 2006 realignment agreement?). He calls for an equal alliance with the US, but offers little hint for how to get there. Presumably in the event of a US-led war, Japanese involvement would depend on a UN security council resolution, as Mr. Ozawa has said on a number of occasions. An Ozawa government would undoubtedly look for closer ties with other regional powers, not least China.

But like the Fukuda government, a DPJ-led government would be overwhelmingly focused on "livelihood" issues — to borrow from the DPJ's 2007 election campaign, a DPJ government would be a seikatsu daiichi government. Foreign policy issues would take a back seat to fixing the welfare and healthcare systems and reforming the political system through redistricting to enhance the DPJ's long-term electoral prospects. An Ozawa government would not expend significant amounts of political capital on foreign policy, meaning that for better or worse the core of the US-Japan alliance would remain unchanged. It would probably be less global in its activities, but otherwise the US would remain Japan's leading ally in the region, and vice versa.

Would it be preferable for Mr. Ozawa to avoid hyperbolic remarks? Yes, of course, but observers must be aware of the reasoning behind his remarks and not rush to conclusions about the policy implications.

The DPJ debates its election

The DPJ is scheduled to hold a leadership election in September.

There is some debate about the election. Should the party even bother with an election (see this article in Liberal Time), or should it just reaffirm Ozawa Ichiro as party president to minimize the risk of election-related instability? Should it wait until September, when the extraordinary session of the Diet is likely to have already begun, or should it hold an election in August, just before or at the very beginning of the session?

On the former, there should be no debate. While the LDP hopes that the DPJ will hold an election and that it will be fierce, pitting Mr. Maehara and his followers against Mr. Ozawa, that is no reason not to hold one. On the other hand, if the DPJ doesn't hold a vote, the LDP will complain about the DPJ's being antidemocratic. So the DPJ should ignore the LDP, ignore the media, and hold an election. If Mr. Ozawa's position in the party is so strong that he can be reaffirmed without a vote, then he should have no problem winning a vote. Yes, having a proper leadship campaign will give Mr. Maehara or a surrogate an opportunity to air their grievances against Mr. Ozawa's leadership (something that Mr. Maehara is obviously already doing). The party is better off letting him challenge Mr. Ozawa in a formal setting than continue to undermine the party in the media and to add "dictatorial control" to his list of grievances about Mr. Ozawa's leadership of the party. A formal election could be cathartic, and as a result strengthen Mr. Ozawa's legitimacy and power at the head of the party.

As for the latter question, there is little reason to wait until September to hold the election. Tahara Soichiro argues in Liberal Time that "until the DPJ leadership election, nothing will improve in Nagata-cho." I think Tahara overstates internal opposition to Mr. Ozawa — large sections of the party may be uncomfortable with Mr. Ozawa, but I don't think a majority of the party "always opposes" him — but his general point is right. As long as Mr. Ozawa is distracted by sniping from his internal opponents, he will be less able to pressure the government. An election won't end internal opposition to his leadership by any means, but it will delegitimize it somewhat, as he will have a new mandate to lead.

There is no consensus on the timing of the election, however. Hatoyama Yukio, the secretary-general, has nixed proposals to move it forward; Koshiishi Azuma, the head of the DPJ caucus in the upper house and an advocate of reelecting Mr. Ozawa without a vote, would prefer to hold an election before the new Diet session, as soon as the party finishes its survey of party members and supporters eligible to vote in a leadership election (now scheduled for completion in early August). No word on where Mr. Ozawa himself stands on the issue.

He should push for an early election, giving his critics their moment in the spotlight , disposing of them, and getting back to the business of unseating the LDP before the Diet reopens in late August.

The consequences of the US-Japan rift on North Korea

With North Korea expected to deliver its account of its nuclear program Thursday — excluding its existing nuclear weapons, which Chris Hill has said will be addressed in the next round — the US is prepared to move forward in removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The long-awaited blow to the US-Japan alliance has been landed, even as the Fukuda government has agreed to go along with the US move.

On Tuesday, Prime Minister Fukuda said that he hoped this would contribute to progress on the nuclear front, even as he said that he looks forward to further cooperation with the US in resolving the abductions issue. At the same time, Machimura Nobutaka, in a press conference Tuesday morning, cautioned the US to examine the North Korean report carefully before proceeding, a lame statement of the sheer helplessness of the Fukuda government's position.

The US will go forward, and the Japanese government will follow along meekly behind — ignoring the wishes of the conservatives (and a bulk of the Japanese public) that North Korea should stay on the list until it follows through on the latest agreement on the abductees. They want North Korea's position on the terrorism list to remain linked to acts of terrorism (however long ago they occurred); the US, perhaps acknowledging that North Korea is no longer a state sponsor of terrorism (at least against other countries), is prepared to link removal to another, arguably more important issue. As argued in an article in this week's AERA, this latest move may trigger a spasm of protest from the public. It will be the latest and perhaps greatest charge in the conservative case against Mr. Fukuda: giving in to both the US and North Korea and abandoning the abductees, while getting nothing but an oral promise from the US that it will continue to pressure North Korea on the abductees. This probably destroys whatever chance Mr. Fukuda had of staying in power long enough to lead the LDP into the next general election.

That said, it is worth asking how Abe Shinzo would have handled this had it happened under his watch as prime minister.

His admirers seem to think that he would have been able to say no to the US. The bloggers at Pride of Japan ended a post on this issue with the statement, "I think that the time demands the appearance of a politician with backbone, like former Prime Minister Abe."

But would Mr. Abe have stood up to the US in this case and said no, his government will not support removing North Korea from the list? What would he do instead? What could he do instead? Would he respond by tightening Japanese sanctions even more? A US move to lift sanctions on North Korea makes Japan's sanctions, no matter how astringent, that much less effective. What would rejecting the US position at this point do but isolate Japan further and make it even less likely that North Korea would cooperate in resolving the abductions issue? Mr. Abe might have spoken in harsh terms, he might have appealed directly to President Bush for a promise that the US will continue to help on the abductions, but ultimately I suspect that Mr. Abe too would fall into line.

I am fine with the turn that the six-party talks are taking. I think that the gain of neutralizing North Korea's nuclear program is a worthy goal, and that it should take priority to issues like the abductions issue. If lifting sanctions bit by bit — effectively a series of small bribes — moderates North Korea's behavior and buys the region's powers some time to plan for the tsunami of instability that will likely follow Kim Jong-il's death by keeping the Korean Peninsula stable, then the talks will have been successful. The US has had little choice but to talk (and to talk with China's assistance) because it had no other option short of doing nothing. Mr. Hill has made the most of a poor situation. All of which is why I opposed the Abe government's pulling Japan out of this process. Japan, like the US, had no real way to compel North Korea to change its behavior. As the country that may be most threatened by a nuclear North Korea, it should have been in the lead, alongside the US and China, in finding a way to defuse the situation, if not disarm North Korea. Instead it opted out of the process, on the grounds of North Korea intransgience on the abductees.

I have little sympathy with the argument that the abductees are a primary "national interest," on the grounds that the Japanese government must secure the lives of every Japanese citizen. (Mr. Abe makes a variation of this argument at length in Utsukushi kuni e.) Does it rank somewhere on the list of Japanese national interests? Probably. Is it a top interest that should take priority over other interests like, say, stability on the Korean Peninsula, good relations with Japan's neighbors, and a diminished threat from North Korea? I would argue no. The deal may yet fall apart due to another shift by North Korea or domestic opposition in the US (Steve Clemons has the details on the situation in Washington) — but given the lack of other options, it has been a useful effort, one in which Japan should have played more than a begrudging role.

The failure of the US to explain its reasoning more fully — and the failure of Japan to be more flexible in its defense of its national interests — have resulted in a blow to the alliance, in that both Japanese elites and the Japanese public have lost confidence in the US as an ally. That blow may have been unavoidable: I suspect that part of the reason for the loss of confidence, especially among elites, is that after Japan gave its full-throated support to the US in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would receive equally full-throated support in dealing with North Korea. The US wasted opportunities to disabuse Japan of that idea and left Mr. Hill to bear the brunt of Japanese anger; the president should have made it explicitly clear why the US shifted on North Korea. But even then it is likely that there would still be a feeling of betrayal among Japanese.

Where will the US-Japan relationship go from here? The alliance will survive, but I expect that future Japanese governments will be less trusting of the US. I would not go so far as journalist Aoki Naoto (author of a book entitled A State That Could Become An Enemy: USA), who argues that this is the beginning of an antagonistic relationship between the US and Japan and the start of a US-China security relationship. In fact, the US shift on North Korea might prove to be a good thing for the alliance. As a result of having been "abandoned" in the six-party talks, Japan may finally learn to say no to the US, which could result in a stronger, more effective partnership in which Japan feels less obligated to do whatever the US asks. Much like Japan's 1990 failure in responding to the Gulf crisis led to a decade of soul-searching for Japan's foreign policy establishment, so too might this incident prompt soul-searching that leads to a Japan better able to articulate its interests to the US, even if it means disagreement between Washington and Tokyo.

As in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis, Ozawa Ichiro may show the way. Asked to comment on the developments in the six-party talks, Mr. Ozawa stated that Japan has little ability to influence US strategy, and added on the abductees, "The US has until now said good things to the abductee families, but it did not take our national strategy and our interests into account at all." I expect that should the DPJ form a government in the near future, it will be much less inclined to follow the US in the way that LDP governments have (especially LDP governments under Messrs. Koizumi and Abe).

As a result of the six-party talks, future LDP governments may share Mr. Ozawa's assessment.

DPJ ranks swell

Nikkei reports that the DPJ now has more "party members/party supporters" than ever before.

The total number at the end of May was 270,000 members/supporters nationwide, compared with 244,000 in September 2006 (when Ozawa Ichiro's current term as party leader began) and 201,000 in 2007 (the month isn't specified).

What matters is where these new members are located. If they are concentrated in the rural districts targeted by Mr. Ozawa, they could be a sign that Mr. Ozawa's efforts in rural Japan are bearing fruit, a sign that rural Japan's "allergy" to the DPJ is vanishing and that the party is set to make major inroads in the next general election. The surge is less significant if it is comprised mostly of urban and suburban floating voters who have been pushed from the "leaning DPJ" category into the "firmly DPJ" category.

Unfortunately the party isn't sharing the geographical distribution of this influx of members and supporters.

Nevertheless, it is a sign that the DPJ is doing something right. Regardless of its internal squabbles, the party will profit from deepening discontent with the LDP-Komeito coalition's management of the government.

Meanwhile, for those wondering about the difference between party members and party supporters, the rules are spelled out in section two of the party's rulebook. Both members and supporters make contributions to the party in their applications for membership. Party members are attached to a campaign office — one per single-member election district — while party supporters apply to local campaign offices and prefectural chapters. Both members and supporters have a vote in party leadership elections. The biggest difference is that members "take a part in planning party administration, activities, and policies" (and are expected to agree with the party's principles and policies), while supporters "can [emphasis added] take part in planning party events and activities" insofar as they are inclined (but don't necessarily have to agree to principles and policies).

The money involved is negligible: members pay 6,000 yen annually, supporters pay 2,000 yen annually.

More important than money, the members and supporters provide bodies, ensuring that DPJ candidates will have volunteers to distribute fliers, stuff envelopes, and make phone calls. Again, if enough of these new members and supporters are in districts in which the DPJ has never won before, they could make the difference between victory and defeat for the DPJ.

Fukuda, a glutton for punishment

On Tuesday, at the same press conference where he complained about the stress of the job, Prime Minister Fukuda made a statement guaranteed to ensure that his stress will increase inexorably.

"Since [the consumption tax rate] is only 5%, we are burdened with a budget deficit. We must decide — this is an extremely important period. If we think about the aging society, the road is narrowing." He compared Japan's consumption tax rate unfavorably with European consumption tax rates, but admitted that he didn't know how the public would respond to a consumption tax hike. [This story was front page news in Asahi.] The idea is that the LDP and the Diet will debate comprehensive tax reform in the fall.

Yamamoto Ichita seems to have a better idea of how the public will respond — and finds it intolerable that some LDP members are willing to proceed with the tax hike even if it means an LDP defeat.

"In my thirteen years in politics, I have never met a politician 'resolved to discard his Diet member's badge at any time."

The prime mini