Australia and Japan in the same boat

After being criticized at home (and, supposedly, in Tokyo) for failing to visit Japan on a swing through Asia in March, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd will be in Tokyo this week for meetings with Prime Minister Fukuda.

Andrew Shearer, a fellow at Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy, has an excellent op-ed in The Australian (H/T to JG) putting Mr. Rudd's visit in perspective and proposing a framework for Australian foreign policy that balances relations with China and Japan.

Without denying the importance of the Sino-Australian relationship, Shearer argues that a strong relationship with Japan — Australia's largest export market — is an indispensable asset for Australian foreign policy. He gets at the important point that Australia and Japan share concerns. Both have deepening economic ties with China, but at the same time they fear China's growing heft and want the US — each country's most important ally — to remain engaged in the region. But "engaged" is not a code word for containing China. As Shearer argues, "It doesn't mean Australia and the US should not pursue realistic, constructive relations with China. Calm dealings between Washington and Beijing, in particular, are important for Japan's deep relationship with China and for vital Australian strategic and economic interests."

The challenge for not only Japan and Australia but for India, South Korea, and China's neighbors in Southeast Asia is balancing their ever more important economic relationships with China with their security relationships with the US, a US that is unfortunately prone to militarized overreaction that could undermine economic relationships with China. (To be fair, US bluster is matched by a China that is rapidly modernizing its military and looking to bolster its power projection capabilities). The countries on China's periphery, especially Australia and Japan, clearly value the US hedge against a belligerent China. The challenge for all of these countries clustered between the US and China is to moderate the behavior of both powers; these mid-sized players must ensure that the US is around and engaged but not overly aggressive or prone to crusading, and that China is a "responsible stakeholder" and force for stability in the region.

Accordingly, the value of cooperation between India, Australia, and Japan is not as a democratic ring around China but as a force for restraint acting on both China and the US.

In light of Mr. Fukuda's recent remarks on Japanese foreign policy, I think that the prime minister would be sympathetic to this vision of the region. Is Mr. Rudd capable of achieving this balance in Australian foreign policy?

I'm optimistic that he will. The need to balance the economic relationship with China and the security relationship with the US is bound to push Canberra in the direction of closer relations with other countries in the region that share this predicament.

Irony watch

I couldn't resist linking to this item at Foreign Policy's Passport, which notes that Australia's navy is struggling for recruits.

Why?

It can't compete with Western Australian mining companies that are expanding operations to take advantage of growing Chinese demand (and accordingly, rising prices) for commodities.

This may be the single best illustration of why the simplistic, "arc of democracies" model of dealing with China favored by former prime minister Abe Shinzo and some conservatives in Washington is wholly inappropriate for Asia in the twenty-first century.

New wind in Asia?

Is it me, or in a few short months has the mood in Asia changed?

Remember Sydney in early September? A bedraggled Prime Minister Abe, fresh from proclaiming a new era of cooperation among Asian democracies in India, went to Sydney for APEC, where he met with President Bush and Australia's John Howard. It was at that meeting, days before his resignation, that Prime Minister Abe promised that Japan would not withdraw from the Indian Ocean, a promise of support for his fellow democrats.

Now, in November, the second of the three leaders at that summit has left office, this time directly at the hands of his voters in a shining example for the region of the workings of democracy. John Howard, Australia's prime minister for eleven years, has lost to the Labour Party's Kevin Rudd in a landslide.

With Fukuda Yasuo replacing Mr. Abe, and the Mandarin-speaking Mr. Rudd replacing Mr. Howard, the "deputy sheriff," the "quad" may be no more. Both Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Rudd seem to believe that their power is best spent promoting cooperation in Asia, not deepening security cooperation among democracies conveniently located on all sides of China.

But how to build on this happy coincidence of leaders interested in an Asia without walls, an Asia of which I saw hints at the September APEC meeting? For the moment, the Bush administration will be absent from Asia as it prepares to launch yet another initiative in pursuit of peace between Israel and Palestinians. But should this latest effort fail — as seems to be universally anticipated — perhaps the presence of Messrs. Rudd and Fukuda will present Mr. Bush with another possibility to leave some sort of positive legacy.

Asia needs an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia. China's integration into the regional security environment has lagged behind its integration into the regional and global trading systems. Accordingly, there is a grave need for an organization that will promote military transparency, arms control, and conflict resolution in a region that combines territorial disputes and burgeoning defense budgets. Critics will no doubt argue that such an effort is futile, that China (and the PLA) cannot be trusted to participate in such an effort in good faith. Maybe, but the region's powers should at least give Beijing the opportunity to refuse. Even US Pacific Command seems to think that efforts to cultivate more open security relations between the US and China are worthwhile.

That said, without US engagement — sustained engagement — this sort of initiative would be doomed to fail. Perhaps this is an opportunity for two US Asian allies, which have periodically chafed at their dependence on the US, to carve out new political roles in the region by pulling the US and China to the table to discuss building a new Asia-Pacific security architecture. There might never be a better opportunity to construct a durable framework for security cooperation in Asia: the US, distracted in the Middle East, is increasingly interested in regional stability and cooperation with China, at the same time that changes of government in two of its major allies in the region have brought to power prime ministers interested in better relations with Beijing.

It will take persistence from Canberra and Tokyo — and it is probably overly optimistic to expect progress before January 2009 — but now is the time to start urging the US to reengage in Asia in a big way. The more concerted the effort the better.

Asia's future seen in Sydney

At the OPEC APEC summit in Sydney, the leaders of APEC's twenty-one member states have been holding bilateral talks in the run-up to the final summit this weekend. I don't put much stock in APEC as an organization that will be able to deliver concrete results — it's simply too big and too diverse — but as a forum for the region's leaders to sit down in the same room and talk about Asia (for the most part) for the better part of a week, it's irreplaceable.

President Bush, taking a break from Iraq, spoke at length about freedom and democracy in Asia, but at the same time, in reiterating the importance of the US security commitment to the region, made clear the limits of US power to deliver political change:

Today, our alliances with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines, and our defense relationships with Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, and others in the region form the bedrock of America's engagement in the Asia Pacific. These security relationships have helped keep the peace in this vital part of the world. They've created conditions that have allowed freedom to expand and markets to grow, and commerce to flow, and young democracies to gain in confidence. America is committed to the security of the Asia Pacific region, and that commitment is unshakable.

This is a fairly accurate description of what the US presence in Asia over the past sixty years has achieved. The US could do nothing more than give its allies the space to change domestically, but as South Koreans, Filipinos, Taiwanese, Indonesians, and others can attest to, the US by no means guaranteed the democratization of their countries, and in fact stood in the way of democratization for most of the cold war. The US role was and is providing the public goods of peace and security that have made it easier for the region's countries to liberalize. (This post at The Marmot's Hole, which wonders about the relevance of American power in Asia, misses this point completely.)

The US will continue to play this background role, enabling a dense web of connections between all the region's countries — even among those presumed to have confrontational relationships. And so talk of a community of Asian democracies is not only irresponsible, creating the impression of ideological battle lines in Asia, but it also ignores the reality of life in twenty-first century Asia.

The Pacific democracies cannot solve the region's problems without China, and they better get used to that fact. President Bush recognizes this on some level, based on the expansiveness of the agenda for his talks with President Hu. Australia, too, is aware that there is no avoiding China, agreeing to convene annual security talks with China from next year. Undoutedly, if Kevin Rudd becomes Australia's next premier, Australia will be even more careful to avoid the impression that it is part of a de facto alliance to contain China — as MTC notes, Rudd, fluent in Mandarin and well versed in Chinese affairs, would hardly be an enthusiastic participant in the democratic community.

Indeed, political change in Australia, the US, and Japan could make the "Asian spirit" more apparent. Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ are obviously not enthusiastic proponents of "values diplomacy," and would presumably highlight political cooperation with China (Mr. Ozawa's trip to China in December will be interesting to watch). In the US, it is difficult to imagine Mr. Bush's successor being as heavy on the rhetoric of democracy, even if a Democratic president might feel pressured to lean on China economically.

The Pacific rim and the Asian littoral is, in fact, much more peaceful than many observers admit (or want to admit). There is always the potential for misunderstandings, of course, but prudent, far-sighted leadership, not least by the US, could do much to diminish the potential for conflict.

Combating the China threat thesis

Japan's Ministry of Defense has issued its first white paper as the Ministry of Defense, and it seems that this year's edition is unique in its focus on China as a threat to Japan.

And it seems that the Yomiuri Shimbun is quite pleased by this, according to its editorial today. Citing America's debate on the same matter, Yomiuri notes the report's calling attention to China's pursuit of blue-water naval capabilities and long-range aviation capabilities. (Interestingly, Yomiuri published this editorial on the same day that Asahi devoted its entire editorial space to an editorial marking the seventieth anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge incident, which is recognized as marking the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War — pointing at the need for Sino-Japanese reconciliation.)

Not having read the report yet, I will limit my judgments to Yomiuri's position, which blithely talks about the threat posed by China's rapid military modernization without actually bothering to note what threat China poses exactly. It seems fair for a reader to ask whether Yomiuri has specific scenarios in mind, or if it's just peddling the same hysteria found in some quarters of American policy debate. As I (and others) have argued before, the casual assumption that Chinese military modernization — especially at sea — is necessarily a threat to the region is inappropriate, and ought to be challenged by those interested in maintaining peace and order in the Asia-Pacific. Rather than issue the occasional alarmist report, the US, Japan, Australia, and other powers in the region should be thinking about how to co-opt China's military strength, not making self-fulfilling prophecies of military struggles to come.

Indeed, given the deepening mutual interdependence between China and the region's powers, none of them can afford to be too antagonistic. (Australia's recent publication of a defense report that peddles the same line as Japan's is baffling, given that Australia is, if anything, more dependent on maintaining a healthy relationship with China.) Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo surely don't need to be told that. So why these reports?

Arguably it has as much to do with the need to justify expensive defense programs (creating a budgetary enemy), as with the actual threat posed by China to their interests. Australia of late has been having an active debate about its future defense doctrine, rooted in having the ability to defend Australia alone if necessary (see this article at Defense Industry Daily on Australia's new airpower thinking). Hmm, defense of Australia — what country would Australia have to defend itself against, and what expensive technologies would it need to purchase in order to do so?

In Japan, meanwhile, the government has, despite a decade of falling defense expenditures, focused on enhancing its naval capabilities and airpower. Indeed, Prime Minister Abe has approached the US once again about purchasing F-22s as Japan's next air superiority fighter — despite oft-stated US doubts about selling. (These doubts can be found spelled out in a recent Congressional Research Service report, available for download here.) For the Japanese government, approaching the US about the F-22, it can't hurt to have a thick report in hand showing the threat posed by China to Japan (and a newspaper headline or two reinforcing the threat).

Level heads in these three governments must steadfastly resist the alarmist rhetoric emanating from China hawks and their allies in the media and the defense industry. The region is too complicated — and the stakes too important — to fall into simple fear-mongering.

Australia plays the game

A day after reports that Australia is set to join the US and Japan in researching missile defense — an agreement reached at the first Australia-Japan 2 + 2 meeting — Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has, in the words of The Australian, "defend[ed] China's military build-up."

Readers can probably imagine that I have no problem with Mr. Downer's "defense." Some could accuse me of doing the same as Mr. Downer.

There is good sense in not exaggerating China's defense modernization, which is still overwhelming concerned with Taiwan, and even as China looks further afield for a defense role, there is no guarantee that a great regional security role for China will necessarily be hostile to the US and its allies.

This idea is, of course, controversial in certain circles in Washington and Tokyo (just ask Mr. Downer's Japanese counterpart). But Australia is not in a position to join a grand coalition to contain China, and thus Australia's involvement in missile defense research seems to come with major caveats, bearing in mind Australia's relationship with China. Does the Japanese government really think it can afford to act differently?

So I must raise the same objections I raised back in March, when commentators burdened the Australia-Japan security declaration with meaning that it was not designed to bear. Rather Australia, like its ASEAN neighbors, is playing — and ought to play — the great game, maneuvering among the region's great powers to maximize its advantage.

This is not another mutual security treaty!

I take issue with the opinion cited in this post at Japundit, which cites Shen Dingli, Chinese academic, as arguing:

If China wanted to invade Japan, Australia would come to Japan’s aid, and if China were to invade Australia, Japan would come to its aid. But if we don’t invade either of them, such a pact doesn't really work against China’s legitimate interests.

I'm not quite sure what agreement Shen is talking about. There is nothing in the joint declaration that evens hints at its being a mutual security treaty along the same lines as the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) between Japan and the US, in which,

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Take another look at the Japan-Australia agreement. Is there anything remotely resembling this kind of clause? Japan is still unable to promise any security reciprocity to the US. What makes him think that it is prepared to extend that kind of reciprocity to Australia, or that Australia is ready to commit fully to the defense of Japan in any and all circumstances?

Methinks that the international news media, which prefers the "conflictual" rather than the "cooperative" Asia in its news coverage, has blown this agreement far out of proportion.

Trilateral alliance or limited hedge?

With Australian Prime Minister John Howard set to arrive in Japan today for a four-day visit, Australia and Japan have reportedly agreed to a new security declaration that will likely (I say likely because it hasn't been released to the public yet) enhance bilateral cooperation on a range of defense issues, including intelligence sharing, PKO, and humanitarian relief. Prime Ministers Abe and Howard will meet on Tuesday.

It is probably a mistake -- for both Beijing and Washington -- to overestimate the value of this agreement, because Australia is especially trapped between the prospect of an antagonistic China and a cooperative China.

On the one hand, relations between China and Australia have enjoyed something of a renaissance in recent years (see this speech from 2004 by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer). The economic relationship has been particularly strong, with China hungrily importing a range of primary products and services from Australia, as this overview of the relationship provided by the Australian government as background to a China-Australia FTA attests.

At the same time though, under Prime Minister Howard, Australia has strengthened its alliance with the US, acting as the third partner in a kind of global Anglosphere posse (the activities of which are, to say the least, distinctly at odds with China's vision of the global order).

Howard captured Australia's unenviable position in this mealy-mouthed comment in a joint press conference with Vice President Cheney during the latter's recent visit to Australia:

In relation to China, Australia, as you know, has striven over the last decade to build a very close relationship with China. But we've always done it against a background of being realistic about the nature of political society in that country. We have no illusions that China remains an authoritarian country. We have sought to emphasize in our relations with China those practical things that we have in common. And we do, I hope, with appropriate modesty regard it as one of the foreign policy successes of this country over the last decade that we have simultaneously become ever closer in our relationship with our great ally the United States, but at the same time built a very constructive, understandable relationship with China.

But we always look at these things from a practical standpoint. We have no false illusions about the nature of China's society. But we see positive signs in the way in which China and the United States have worked together, particularly in relation to North Korea. And nothing is more important to the stability of our own region at the present time than resolving the North Korean nuclear situation. And I think the way in which China and the United States have worked together on that is wholly positive and is obviously to the credit of both of those countries.

So to view this agreement -- together with last year's US-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue -- as anything more than a slight hedging option in the midst of very real cooperation between all three countries and China is overblown. Each is trapped in its own way by mutual interdependence with China.

As overblown responses go, that includes China's, which, according to The Australian, has voiced reservations of the Australia-Japan declaration. If Australia, Japan, and the US are bolstering their hedge against Chinese belligerence, it's because China has given them enough reason for concern: hedging by these countries is a sign of Chinese policy failure, not belligerence on the part of the trilateral partners. If China were to sound slightly more conciliatory and look slightly less like a country eager for regional hegemony buttressed by military power, each party to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue would be less likely to push for a hard hedge.

I can't help but wonder what post-Howard Australia will look like in terms of its Asia-Pacific policy. Will Australia, in some sense like post-Koizumi Japan, compensate for Howard's emphasis on strong ties with Washington by reorienting to continental Asia and placing less emphasis on the nascent tripartite maritime hedge?