The DPJ gets its groove back (for now)

The past six months in Japanese politics have seen some surprising and unexpected events and reversals of momentum — and it looks as if we're in the midst of the latest shift in momentum. The DPJ, after a shaky start to the current Diet session following the government's deft maneuvering on the MSDF refueling mission (and a last-minute ambush by the other opposition parties), now appears to have gotten its act together and is pushing hard on the government on multiple fronts. It's beginning to look a lot like August 2007.

The Atago incident is turning into a major boon for the DPJ. As Jun Okumura notes, intensifying the push for Ishiba Shigeru to resign as defense minister may stymie the government's efforts to pass the budget by Friday, thus ensuring that it will pass even if the HC rejects it: "The less time that there is, the more inclined the LDP will be to make concessions and the less willing the DPJ will be to oblige." Of course, it looked like Mr. Ishiba would be immune to DPJ pressure, thanks to a vote of confidence from the prime minister and his status as probably the one man in the LDP willing (and possibly able) to reform the woefully deficient defense establishment. Even as recently as Tuesday, when Mr. Ishiba faced questioning in the HR Security Committee, he seemed confident dismissing calls for his resignation over this incident. On Wednesday, however, more reports emerged pointing to failures in the gathering and sharing of information between the Defense Ministry and the Coast Guard, implicating Mr. Ishiba's leadership in response to the incident.

Mainichi reports that pressure is now coming from within the LDP, especially LDP leaders in the HC. The prime minister continues to stand by Mr. Ishiba, but it seems that my initial impression was correct: Mr. Ishiba will likely be forced out. Presumably his replacement will be someone less likely to rattle cages and therefore more acceptable to both the LDP and the defense establishment. In short, despite this scandal, it will be business as usual in Ichigaya, once Mr. Ishiba is out of the picture.

Meanwhile the compromise on the leadership succession at the Bank of Japan that everyone — including myself — expected to occur remains elusive. The government decided Tuesday to delay the official presentation of Muto Toshiro, the government's nominee, until next week. With just under three weeks until Mr. Fukui's term expires, there is still time for the LDP and the DPJ to come to an agreement and avoid having a vacancy at the BOJ, but the DPJ is clearly content to make the government wait, to make the point that unlike on other issues, the Fukuda government has no choice but to work with the DPJ. This appears to please Mr. Ozawa to no end. As I suspected, the DPJ may eventually cooperate — but it has no reason to follow the government's desired timetable. Mr. Fukuda, at least according to this Asahi article, sounds a bit exasperated. When asked about Mr. Ozawa's comments on Mr. Muto ("I also know a lot from his time at the Finance Ministry, but whether he is appropriate as BOJ president is a different matter"), Mr. Fukuda said, "He's not really saying anything. We have no choice but to wait."

Finally, on the budget, the DPJ, together with the SDP and the PNP, absented themselves Wednesday from HR Budget and Finance and Monetary subcommittees to protest the government's plan to pass the FY 2008 budget on Friday. Hatoyama Yukio described the government's plan as making "scrap paper" of the LDP-DPJ agreement negotiated by Messrs. Eda and Kono, and warned of consequences in the battle over the BOJ succession. This afternoon the opposition will return to the Budget Committee to debate the special road construction fund. On Wednesday the DPJ announced the basic principles for its own legislation the fund: (1) repealing the temporary gasoline tax; (2) folding the special fund into the general fund; and (3) abolishing the "burden charge" for local communities for state-mandated projects.

Thanks to Mr. Koizumi, the DPJ now has less reason to compromise on this issue than ever. Mainichi reports, "...There is also the hope that the LDP is being rocked internally by the appearance of remarks in favor of the 'general fundization' [of road construction funds] from former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and others. Kan Naoto, DPJ acting president, emphasized at a press conference on the 27th: 'Mr. Koizumi's opinion is close to the DPJ's opinion. If he wants to get us to do reforms that he could not do himself, we welcome that. We also want to urge the LDP's young members who aim for true reform to rise to action."

It looks like the DPJ is finally learning to use "reform" as a wedge issue to get the upper hand in parliamentary battles.

As we have seen, the momentum could easily shift again, but for the moment, the DPJ, which has nothing to lose at this point by taking the mantle of reform from Mr. Koizumi, has painted the government into a corner. On every issue the LDP is playing not to lose.

Fukuda's falling popularity*

Speaking of what voters think, Sankei points to the latest public opinion poll delivering bad news to Prime Minister Fukuda. Following last week's Yomiuri poll that showed the cabinet's disapproval rising nine points to exceed 50% (just barely) for the first time Mr. Fukuda's inauguration, with the approval rating falling 6.9% to 38.7%, a public opinion poll by Fuji TV's Hodo 2001 program recorded a five point drop in the government's approval rating to 27.8%.

Interestingly, in contrast to the Yomiuri poll, the latest poll also recorded a widening gap between support for the DPJ and support for the LDP — in the DPJ's favor. Support for the DPJ increased by 5.4 points to 30%, while LDP support dropped 1.6 points to 20.6%. The Hodo 2001 numbers are nearly the exact opposite of the Yomiuri numbers.

Hodo 2001's poll, taken on 21 February, also posed three "policy" questions to respondents. First, "Do you think that the Fukuda cabinet is positively disposed to reform?" Only 16.2% answered yes, while 77.0% answered no. Second, "Do you think that bureaucrats, compared with civilians, are well-treated?" 85.2% said yes, 10.4% said no. Third, "Do you think there is a problem with the Defense Ministry's response to the collision between the JSDF Aegis ship and a fishing boat that occurred on the 19th?" 87.0% said yes, 5.8% said no.

Excluding the second question, which strikes me as too vague to be of much value, the first and third questions suggest that the public — or these respondents — see the Fukuda government as both paralyzed in the face of unexpected events and adrift when it comes to an agenda. I find it hard to disagree with that assessment.

But which poll to trust? Very little information is given about methodology. The Hodo 2001 poll says that a mere 500 adult men and women in the capital area were surveyed by telephone, which hardly seems to be a sturdy enough basis for reaching conclusions about where the Japanese public stands on the performance of the Fukuda government. What, for example, do rural voters think of the government's performance, especially in light of the battle over road construction? I think these figures would be more valuable in assessing the LDP's prospects for a general election than a poll limited to Tokyo and its surroundings.

Ishiba will fight on, with Fukuda's help

Far from abandoning Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru to his critics, Prime Minister Fukuda made clear today that he stands with Mr. Ishiba in emphasizing the need for fundamental reform of the Defense Ministry. The Atago incident, instead of spelling the end of Mr. Ishiba's second tour of duty in Ichigaya, may end up bolstering it and clearing the way to make substantial progress on reforming the ministry.

Speaking Friday morning at an informal gathering of cabinet ministers, Mr. Fukuda said, "I think that it's also a systemic problem of the Defense Ministry. The organization must be reconsidered from the foundation."

In short, Mr. Fukuda has given Mr. Ishiba his blessing, in the process providing Mr. Ishiba with a powerful ally in the fight against his opponents within the ministry, the armed services, and the LDP.

Mr. Ishiba responded by announcing the creation of a team to promote reform of the ministry, a group comprised of six ministry bureaucrats and nine JSDF members.

I expect that Mr. Fukuda's move will halt the DPJ's talk of censuring Mr. Ishiba in a bid to force his resignation. In this case, the DPJ is going after the wrong person. There is no one within the LDP who will go about the much-needed reform of the Defense Ministry with greater gusto and sincerity than Mr. Ishiba — the LDP's "Mr. Defense." Considering that the alternative to Mr. Ishiba could be a defense minister in the Kyuma Fumio vein, this is one area in which the DPJ should reject "the worse the better" logic and embrace Mr. Ishiba as an ally in advancing necessary reforms in the face of opposition from members of his own party.

Ishiba under fire from all sides

It looks like the Ministry of Defense's civilians and the JSDF may not have to fight Defense Minister Ishiba after all.

In the aftermath of the collision between the Atago, one of the MSDF's most sophisticated Aegis-equipped destroyers, and a fishing boat on Tuesday, questions have been raised about the vulnerabilities of MSDF ships to terrorist attacks like the one that crippled the USS Cole in 2000, and, more importantly, the gross inadequacies of the Japanese government's crisis response system. (See MTC's post showing just how inadequate that system remains, despite more than a decade of efforts to strengthen Japan's ability to respond to crises.) Prime Minister Fukuda himself highlighted the deficiencies of the government's crisis management capabilities in his weekly mail magazine.

The upshot is that now the DPJ is calling for Mr. Ishiba to resign his position, with Hatoyama Yukio suggesting that if Mr. Ishiba does not resign, this may be an occasion for the House of Councillors to pass a censure motion.

It is entirely possible that Mr. Ishiba will be thrown under the bus by Mr. Fukuda. If criticism grows over the government's handling of this incident — at the same time that the government's support continues to fall — the pressure to make Mr. Ishiba the scapegoat may prove irresistible, especially since his efforts to reform the Defense Ministry have made him enemies not just within the ministry and the JSDF, but also within the LDP.

Pity that Mr. Ishiba wants to streamline the ministry and improve coordination between the JSDF and the ministry's civilians, reforms that might actually strengthen the government's ability to respond to crises in the future.

UPDATE: It appears that for the moment Prime Minister Fukuda will not make a scapegoat of Mr. Ishiba; he suggested that it is improper to talk of such things when lives are at stake.