Web developments

The Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's largest daily by circulation, is finally entering the twenty-first century.

Earlier this month it revamped its website, introducing an RSS feed and other web tools. It also created a clipping service, for which users must register.

Meanwhile Japan's other political parties have followed the LDP and created YouTube channels of their own (DPJ; JCP; NKP; PNP; SDPJ; NPJ — links also available at YouTube's Japanese politics portal). Koike Yuriko has her own channel too.

Like the LDP channel — which at the moment features an odd video of Abe Shinzo promoting a Diet tour led by Mr. Abe himself — none of these channels is particularly interesting: lots of videos of people sitting in front of microphones. Nevertheless they should provide the occasional laugh.

Speaking of laughs, allow me to close with this video, featuring silly pictures of everyone's favorites, the "dangerous" ANA (Abe-Nakagawa-Aso) politicians.

The post-Fukuda landscape remains open — for now

Aso Taro, who has presumably been vying for the LDP presidency since losing it to Fukuda Yasuo in September 2007, was asked about his intentions at a speech on Monday. Like his potential rival, Yosano Kaoru, Mr. Aso demurred, declining to declare what has been openly acknowledged for months.

I suppose it would be inappropriate for Mr. Aso to start measuring Mr. Fukuda's coffin overtly, especially when he can let the media (and other members of the LDP) do it for him. But no one should take his humility at face value.

As noted previously, Mr. Aso's assumed candidacy has already upset the resurrection of the Kochikai, the onetime mainstream faction that was most notably home to dovish, liberal internationalist prime ministers Ikeda Hayato and Miyazawa Kiichi. An article in AERA, a weekly magazine, illustrates why the rebirth of the Kochikai does not mean the resurrection of the liberal internationalists as a major force within the LDP. The party, the article, notes has moved rightward in the years since the faction split in the aftermath of Kato Koichi's abortive rebellion against then-prime minister Mori Yoshiro in 2000. Not surprisingly, the resurrected faction is a diminished version of the faction that existed in 2000. The difference? The Aso faction, which in 2000 was the Kono (Yohei) group, did not reunite with the Koga and Tanigaki factions, largely because Mr. Aso's policy perspective is vastly different from the policy positions of leaders of the Kochikai.

Mr. Aso's candidacy poses a threat to factional discipline in all LDP factions, the Kochikai included, thanks to Mr. Aso's popularity among younger, reformist LDP members who are distributed throughout the party. Thanks to his "insurgents," Mr. Aso's showing in September 2007 was surprisingly strong considering that he was opposed by all factions but his own. It seems that Mr. Aso has learned his lesson, however: rather than tempt his supporters to buck their faction leaders, he appears to be using the fact of his cross-factional support to make appeals directly to faction chiefs. Two days after the Kochikai's first party, Mr. Aso met with Koga Makoto in an effort to heal a longstanding personal rift — presumably in the hope that Mr. Koga will swing the faction behind Mr. Aso's candidacy (which, as noted previously, would risk alienating his partner, Tanigaki Sadakazu).

Meanwhile the Machimura faction's failure to back a post-Fukuda candidate thus far is now an established fact. Mainichi, reporting on the occasion of the faction's party Monday night (which was attended by approximately 5000 guests), notes that the faction's chiefs are divided on whether to support a candidate from within the faction who if elected would be the fifth consecutive LDP president from the faction. Nakagawa Hidenao spoke of a "hero or heroine," presumably suggesting that he is continuing to back Koike Yuriko, despite Mori Yoshiro's openly dismissing her prospects. Mainichi rules out both Mr. Nakagawa and Machimura Nobutaka, the chief cabinet secretary and titular faction head. No word on Mr. Mori's thinking. Mainichi suggests that the faction leadership wants to nominate someone from within the faction for fear of forfeiting the faction's position, but there is no obvious contender — and the worst outcome of all (for the faction) would be for the faction to nominate one of its own over the opposition of a significant minority, prompting that minority to vote for another candidate.

Division within the Machimura faction is probably good news for both Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano, as it raises the possibility that either might receive the support of the largest LDP faction should it prove unable to resolve its deadlock.

Indeed, it seems conceivable to me that Mr. Aso might offer a "Tanakasone" arrangement to Mr. Mori and the other leaders of the Machimura faction, agreeing to pack his cabinet with members of the Machimura faction in exchange for its support in the party election.

The post-Fukuda era looms

Asahi conducted a poll of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters asking about support for the current party leaders.

In the DPJ, Ozawa Ichiro's relationship with the prefectural chapters is secure: forty-four of forty-seven want him to remain as party head to lead the DPJ into the next general election.

The news for Fukuda Yasuo, however, is bleak. Twelve chapters want Mr. Fukuda to lead the LDP into the next general election; twenty-two want a new leader (no indication what the other thirteen said). Interestingly, there is little correlation between how a prefecture voted in the September 2007 leadership election and its support for Mr. Fukuda today. The reasons given for discontent with Mr. Fukuda are typical: low public support numbers, poor leadership skills, an inability to make progress on the many pressing policy issues facing the Fukuda government. Asked how they think is an appropriate replacement for Mr. Fukuda, only seven chapters answered with a name (as opposed to qualities desired in a leader), and all seven provided the same name: Aso Taro.

The news from the prefectures contributes to a growing sense in Tokyo that Mr. Fukuda is running out of time, a sense that has grown in the weeks since the LDP's defeat in the Yamaguchi-2 by-election as the party has studied its defeat. There is growing talk in the media of the post-Fukuda era, as the media probes the two leading post-Fukuda candidates, Mr. Aso and Yosano Kaoru, the leading anyone-but-Aso candidate for the LDP presidency. (A Google News search finds ninety-eight uses of the term "post-Fukuda" over the past week.) As expected, Mr. Yosano's failure to say yes or no to questions about his ambitions has only fed media speculation about his designs on Mr. Fukuda's job, and now Mr. Aso and Mr. Yosano are spoken of in the same breath as having barely concealed intentions to hasten the arrival of the post-Fukuda era. Indeed, both men have articles in the June issue of Bungei Shunju discussing their plans for saving Japan.

Mr. Aso is at the point where he can no longer deny his intentions. At a press conference Friday, Mr. Yosano was asked whether he intends to aim for the premiership. His response skirted the question: "I am a person who takes pride in his work, and if I have a task, I perform it with all my might. I have no awareness of my individual ambition — I want to do good work." Not quite "I'm in. And I'm in to win." But it is consistent with his overall media approach in recent months: Mr. Yosano has emphasized his desire to do what needs to be done to save Japan (raising the consumption tax rate, for example), regardless of what the polls say.

It is still unclear who has the edge in the post-Fukuda horse race. By dint of his having the support of the LDP's conservative ideologues concentrated in the True Conservative Policy Research Group, his following among prefectural chapters and the public at large, and his tireless efforts to proclaim his understanding of the insecurities of the Japanese people, Mr. Aso probably remains the front runner.

He may also be poised to claim the support of the newly reunited Kochikai, which officially reemerged on Tuesday and with sixty-one members is the third largest faction in the LDP. At its launch the new old faction is already troubled; the phrase that has been used in the press is "setting to sea in the same bed with different dreams." The reason for tension is that there are hints that some faction members are open to supporting Mr. Aso's bid for the party presidency, despite Tanigaki Sadakazu, perennial candidate for the leadership (and likely candidate in the next leadership election), being the faction's number two. Mr. Tanigaki assumed that the new faction would be a major platform for his next bid for the leadership and has reportedly threatened to leave the faction if it fails to support him.

That said, the all-important Machimura faction (i.e., Mori Yoshiro) has yet to signal which way it is leaning, despite Mr. Aso's active courting of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction chiefs. The post-Fukuda non-campaign campaign is in full swing, the candidates are emerging, and the LDP barons are starting to choose sides — with Mr. Fukuda helpless in the midst of the open campaigning for his job.

Mori discusses the post-Fukuda era

Mori Yoshiro, the man who probably has as good a claim as anyone to the title of LDP kingmaker, appeared on The Sunday Project yesterday.

He treated viewers to his assessments of potential successors for Mr. Fukuda, although he made clear that he still stands behind the prime minister (although who knows how much longer that guarantee will last). He dismissed Koike Yuriko's prime ministerial prospects as a "joke," noting that "only the mass media is talking about this." He gave general praise to both Aso Taro and Yosano Kaoru, who are shaping up as the leading contenders to replace Mr. Fukuda. He called particular attention to Mr. Aso's popularity. He also hinted that he's willing to consider a general election within the year. It is obvious that despite his protestations, Mr. Mori is thinking about the post-Fukuda era.

Interestingly, in a Jiji poll asking which politician would make an appropriate prime minister, Mr. Aso ranked second with 16% to Koizumi Junichiro's 21.2%, ahead of both Ozawa Ichiro (7.2%) and...Prime Minister Fukuda (7.1%). The gap between Mr. Koizumi and Mr. Aso was narrower among self-described LDP supporters, 31.3% to 28.3%, with Mr. Fukuda drawing only 12.5% from LDP supporters. Mr. Yosano and Ms. Koike barely registered on the poll, receiving .7% and 1.5% respectively.

In light of these figures, is Mr. Mori leaning to Mr. Aso? Is he willing to embrace the argument that the LDP can be saved only by charisma? He's giving few hints, but I wonder whether Mr. Aso's charm campaign is having some effect on the LDP boss — which leads me to wonder what promises Mr. Aso has made to him in their discussions over the past several months.

Meanwhile, it's entirely possible that Ms. Koike will have the last laugh if Mr. Koizumi's new study group is in fact a proto-party.

The domestic constraints on Japanese foreign policy

Prime Minister Fukuda, originally scheduled to visit Germany, Britain, and France as well as Russia during the Japanese political world's Golden Week holiday in early May, has changed his plans, announcing that he will be restricting his travels to a trip to Russia 25-27 April to meet with Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. The reason given for the change of plans is domestic politics, namely the revenue bill containing the temporary tax that the HR will be able to vote for again from 29 April.

Machimura Nobutaka, the chief cabinet secretary, once again took the shocked and disappointed pose he's taken in recent remarks on the political situation.

"It is a major principle throughout the world that partisan confrontation should not cross borders, but I'm sorry to say that this hasn't happened."

Does politics, in Senator Arthur Vandenberg's words, actually stop at the water's edge? I think in any democracy Senator Vandenberg's remark is more aspirational than descriptive, and thus Mr. Machimura's disappointment is a bit rich.

And really, I don't know why he's disappointed. The DPJ isn't questioning Mr. Fukuda's aims in traveling to Europe and Russia. The only reason he won't be able to go is because the Fukuda government wants to be in a position to reinstate the temporary gasoline tax. If Mr. Fukuda is so concerned about summitry, then he could just as easily forgo reinstating the tax and stick to his original itinerary. The DPJ is doing what it thinks is best by opposing the temporary tax and going slow on deliberation on the bill in the HC, just as the LDP is doing what it thinks best by pushing for the temporary tax to be restored.

In short, no one is to blame for Mr. Fukuda's changing his plans. The reality is that for the foreseeable future Mr. Fukuda and his successors will be restricted in their freedom of action in foreign policy. As long as the domestic agenda is crowded and the people insecure about the soundness of public institutions, prime ministers will be penalized for paying too much attention to matters beyond Japan's borders — and the public discussion will likely not stray into matters related to the constitution and collective self-defense. As long as Japan's finances are in disrepair, defense budgets will remain constrained.

The contrast with the Koizumi era is telling. Arguably Mr. Koizumi had a freer hand in foreign and defense policy because of the public support he enjoyed as a result of domestic initiatives. His zeal for reform bought him space with which to pursue a more energetic foreign policy.

Perhaps Aso Taro imagines that his popularity will buy him similar space with which to pursue an assertive foreign policy such as he envisioned during his time as foreign minister. I suspect, however, that if Mr. Aso gets his chance, he too will find that foreign policy will take a back seat to concerns closer to home.

Caption contest! (2008 edition)

The following picture from the Sankei Shimbun begs for funny captions.


Post your suggestions in the comments.

Aso, campaigning

Aso Taro's eponymous faction held a party on Friday night, with more than 2000 guests in attendance. Undoubtedly he was in good spirits, as his faction acquired two new members the previous day, Muto Yoji (HR, Gifu-3) and Hasegawa Tamon (HC, Ibaraki). The faction now has twenty members including Mr. Aso, meaning that with two more faction members Mr. Aso will be able to secure the necessary nominations to contest the LDP presidency from entirely within his own faction.

A number of faction chiefs and party officials were in attendance, and many made introductions. Mori Yoshiro, the putative head of the Machimura faction and thus the man with perhaps the greatest say of Mr. Aso's fate, was also in attendance, although he made no introductions.

The various guests tried to dissuade Mr. Aso from overtly challenging Mr. Fukuda. Ibuki Bunmei, LDP secretary-general, said: "Mr. Aso is a powerful candidate for prime minister and LDP president, but with the DPJ as it is now, whoever becomes prime minister will not be able to resolve the situation easily."

In case anyone still doubts his intentions, Aso Taro is campaigning to replace Fukuda Yasuo as head of the LDP and prime minister of Japan. Nominally still loyal to the prime minister, he clearly expects that his chance is coming sooner rather than later.

It is still an open question as to whether he has successfully wooed Mr. Mori and with him the Machimura faction.

He can probably rely on more solid support from the LDP's prefectural chapters. Mr. Aso was in Kochi prefecture this weekend making his pitch for regional decentralization. I wonder whether LDP-controlled prefectural and local governments would prefer to remain dependent upon Tokyo instead of being responsible for their own finances and policies as envisioned by Mr. Aso's radical plan. The fight over road construction has revealed that for the most part the LDP isn't interested in innovative solutions to the rural question. Why else would LDP leaders continue to assert the importance of road construction to the development of lightly populated prefectures despite evidence to the contrary?

In short, while Mr. Aso may be in a better position to contend for the LDP leadership in both Tokyo and the prefectures than last September, there are still questions concerning his support in the parliamentary party — and his ability to secure such overwhelming support in the prefectural chapters to make it difficult for the parliamentary party to reject his candidacy once more.

And despite his preparations, I don't envision Mr. Aso doing anything to force Mr. Fukuda out — he will nominally support the prime minister up until the moment that the party's powers-that-be abandon him.

Koizumi changes his mind

Speaking Monday at a party held by the Kanagawa chapter of the LDP, Koizumi Junichiro changed his position on the timing of a general election.

He had previously stated that he shared the LDP leadership's view that an early election is unnecessary, but Monday he warned that an election is coming soon — and LDP members must be prepared for it.

I'm not convinced that the LDP will be so easily pressured into calling an early election with Mr. Fukuda's popularity reaching new lows and trending in the direction of Mr. Mori's abyssal figures. All sinking popularity tells me is that it is increasingly likely that it will not be Mr. Fukuda who leads his party into a general election. And what guarantee is there that a leadership change would prompt a general election? Yamamoto Ichita is adamant that another leadership change must necessarily trigger a general election lest the LDP face a severe backlash from the public. But is that really the case? The premiership passed from Hashimoto Ryutaro to Obuchi Keizo to Mori Yoshiro before the government called an election in 2000 — and given that the HR wasn't dissolved until two months into Mr. Mori's government, the LDP was clearly prepared to wait until the very last moment, which would have been October 2000, before seeking a mandate from the public. The June 2000 election happened only because of mounting criticism of Mr. Mori due to the corrupt manner in which he was selected as prime minister and his unfortunate "nation of the gods" remark. The LDP will do everything it can to delay the general election into the last moment; in the event of a leadership change I'm certain the party will conjure up some excuse for why now is not a good time to hold an election (too many urgent problems to solve, it will make Japan look bad the year it's hosting the G8, etc.), and the conservative press will help make the sale.

As such, the jockeying for position in the post-Fukuda sweepstakes is set to intensify. We're already heard quite a bit about Mr. Aso's efforts to position himself to take power, but expect to hear more about a possible Yosano cabinet (given that Yosano Kaoru is at this moment the presumptive favorite to be the Anybody-But-Aso candidate). For the moment Mr. Yosano is being coy. He appeared on a talk show Monday evening, where he was asked about speculation about his replacing Mr. Fukuda: "I'm surprised that such talk has come so quickly. I am the kind of politician who does other than politicking — I just focus on the question of what needs to be done to solve difficult problems." That answer strikes me as a way of making the case for a Yosano premiership without saying so. What he may actually be saying is, "In contrast to Mr. Aso, I'm not campaigning for the job." Regardless, this response will likely fuel speculation about Mr. Yosano's readiness for the premiership.

Sankei speculates that a cabinet reshuffle is the prime minister's ace, and suggests that Mr. Fukuda would try to "entrap" possible successors in his cabinet. Would Mr. Aso reject a cabinet offer this time around? Meanwhile, there is no reason why a cabinet reshuffle would save Mr. Fukuda. His problem is not his cabinet, aside from a minister or two. His problem is that his party is at war with itself and doesn't know how to deal with a divided Diet, problems that would swamp all but the most talented of politicians.

In short, I expect that if Mr. Fukuda manages to get the tax reinstated, he'll make it to the G8 summit in July, after which Mr. Mori and others will suggest that he step down for health reasons. If he doesn't, we might see a new prime minister before the summit.

Three weeks and counting

Aso Taro continues to position himself as the LDP's savior in a rapidly approaching post-Fukuda period — in MTC's extended (and excellent) Fukuda-as-currency analogy, Mr. Aso is hoping that he is the best store of value in a chaotic environment.

His latest move is to come out on behalf of the restoration of the temporary tax on gasoline, using the environmental logic to make the case for the tax (and perhaps to present himself as a kinder, gentler Aso Taro.) Appearing at an event in Yamaguchi prefecture with Abe Shinzo in advance of the April 27 by-election in Yamaguchi-2, Mr. Aso said, "Since the gasoline tax is cheaper, it invites the consumption of more gasoline; for Japan, which is hosting an environment summit, this is an extremely bad state of affairs." Mr. Abe used the somewhat contradictory road construction logic, placing road construction above the environment, odd given his new environmental policy responsibilities: "I think that the consumers had a good feeling about the fall in the gasoline price, roads cannot be built and maintained. The LDP has a great responsibility to resolve this situation immediately."

I think that while Mr. Aso (and his fellow conservatives) believe that the tax should be reinstated irrespective of the politics of the matter, Mr. Aso also figures that supporting it strengthens his political position. In the event of a new leadership election, it hardly matters that his position is antithetical to the vast majority of Japanese. It does matter that his position is consistent with forty-one LDP prefectural chapters, according to an Asahi survey of LDP and DPJ prefectural chapters. His views on the tax are also consistent with the bulk of the LDP's parliamentary membership, although as noted by Yamamoto Ichita, it remains uncertain whether Mr. Fukuda will be able to muster the necessary two-thirds majority to pass the temporary tax at the end of April. Mr. Yamamoto reports that nearly 200 LDP representatives support passing it again, leaving the government 120 votes short. Even if the government manages to corral Komeito members and the majority of the remaining LDP members, it will take a mere sixteen votes to scuttle the tax bill.

Would the LDP be willing to exile the sixteen (or more), in the process tossing away its supermajority? The potential dissenters, whoever they are, are incredibly powerful at this moment in time — their actions, aside from determining whether Japanese citizens have to pay more for gasoline, could be decisive in toppling the Fukuda government, breaking up the LDP, triggering a realignment, forcing a general election, or all of the above. It's safe to assume that Mr. Ozawa will be working hard to get them to defect to the DPJ, just as the LDP's elders will be doing the best they can to buy their allegiance (and/or threaten them with political oblivion).

As for the DPJ, based on the Asahi survey, the DPJ has its own problems with its prefectural chapters, which are split nearly evenly on the question of absorbing gasoline tax revenue into the general fund, with a slight majority (23-20) in favor of it. Oddly enough, forty-six of forty-seven chapters support Mr. Ozawa's response to the LDP's plan; forty-six (all except Tochigi) also oppose the extension of the temporary tax. In short, nearly half the DPJ's prefectural chapters support the continuation of the road construction special fund, just with less revenue due to the end of the temporary tax.

The DPJ can do little more but hold the line, try to tempt LDP defectors, and watch as the LDP continues to tear itself apart on this issue.

And Mr. Aso? He may yet get his chance to lead. As before, the deciding vote will be cast by the Machimura faction's elders, Mori Yoshiro, Machimura Nobutaka, and Nakagawa Hidenao. For the moment, Mr. Fukuda still has their confidence, but how long before they begin looking for a safer investment? And does Mr. Aso stand a chance of earning it?

It's probably safe to say that the revote on the tax bill will make or break Mr. Fukuda. If he can somehow muster the supermajority, he will likely survive until the G8 summit, if not longer. If he can't, his government will be finished.

Regional decentralization is out of reach, for now

Bad news for Aso Taro: progress towards substantial decentralization may be impossible to realize.

So says the government's Prefectural Integration Vision consultation group, which released an interim report on Monday. The whole report is available for download here, in PDF format.

According to Mainichi, the group — which was formed in January 2007 under Mr. Abe — envisions the implementation of drastic reorganization of the relationship between central and regional governments by 2018, but it also announced that it won't have a final report ready for another two years. One sticking point is how the prefectures are to be reorganized. Not surprisingly, drastically redrawing the geographic boundaries of Japan's regional governments draws opposition from existing prefectural governments and bureaucrats in the central governments. Even the LDP and the government have differing ideas about a reorganization, with the LDP's Headquarters for the Promotion of Prefectural Integration calling for consolidating prefectural and local governments into 10 states and 700-1000 municipalities.

And the government's ministries and agencies are, of course, adamantly opposed to a transfer of authority to regional governments.

It's probably safe to say that without the bureaucracy's approval, regional decentralization will not happen.

As I've noted previously, decentralization could have considerable benefits for Japanese governance by bringing government closer to the people and making it more transparent. But there's a reason why this kind of change happens rarely, if at all. (The last major reorganization of regional governments, of course, was in the early years of the Meiji Restoration.) It is easy for politicians and business leaders to appeal to the example of the Meiji Restoration — not surprisingly, this interim report does — but it is considerably more difficult for political leaders to overcome institutional obstacles and implement Meiji-style reforms in the present political environment.

Who can overcome the opposition that proposals like regional decentralization necessarily attract? (And is there actually a majority in favor of sweeping reform? People may be unhappy with the current political situation, but that does not necessarily translate into support for broad change.)

Latest at FEER Forum

My latest contribution to FEER's website — "The Second Coming of Taro Aso" — can be read here.

Hiranuma's kiss of death?

After nearly returning to the LDP in the waning days of the Abe cabinet, Hiranuma Takeo, holdout postal rebel and conservative stalwart, is not particularly popular among the LDP's elders.

Recall, for example, that in January Mori Yoshiro scolded Nakagawa Shoichi for working with Mr. Hiranuma in their "True Conservative Policy Research Group," AKA the HANA no Kai. Undoubtedly Mr. Hiranuma's presence outside the party is noxious to LDP leaders like Mr. Mori eager to keep their divided party together, not least when he speaks of creating a new "true" conservative party.

In a move that will likely irritate the party elders, Mr. Hiranuma has endorsed Aso Taro for LDP leader. He said Friday, "If the Fukuda cabinet resigns en masse, everybody is looking to the birth of an Aso administration. Since my principles and opinions are very similar, I will work hard to realize it."

I don't see how Mr. Hiranuma's endorsement helps Mr. Aso, particularly since the latter is trying to make a case for why he is the best man to reunite the LDP in the post-Fukuda era, which may be coming sooner than anticipated (and may therefore begin before the next general election). Indeed, despite Mr. Aso's fervent courtship of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction power brokers, I wonder whether his association with Mr. Hiranuma — and comments made during last September's presidential election about factional politics — will once again deny him the LDP presidency, a scenario that leads me to wonder what Mr. Aso, Mr. Hiranuma, and the other conservatives will do in response.

Will Fukuda last?

Many analysts of Japanese politics assumed at the inception of the Fukuda cabinet that his was little more than a caretaker government.

Now more than 100 days into the Fukuda administration, it remains difficult to say whether that assessment will turn out to be accurate. If the caretaker's job is to stabilize the ruling party and ensure that his successor's government will have surer footing, then Mr. Fukuda is an abject failure as a caretaker.

That would explain the intra-party maneuvering described in a long, rambling article by Akasaka Taro in the April issue of Bungei Shunjyu, posted in two parts at Yahoo! Minna no seiji.

The first part describes Mr. Fukuda's efforts to bolster his government's ability to lead on social security and taxation — Akasaka opens with the example of the recent appointment of Ito Tatsuya, a lieutenant of Nakagawa Hidenao as the prime minister's adviser on the social security issue in defiance of the health and welfare "tribe" to show the treacherous waters in which Mr. Fukuda is navigating.

The Fukuda government, Akasaka suggests, has been paralyzed in terms of its policy leadership, for reasons having more to do with Mr. Fukuda's struggle to impose some discipline on party and bureaucracy than with the divided Diet. At the same time, however, he may be laying the groundwork for a Fukuda-"colored" policy agenda that will enable him to serve as something more than a caretaker:

"The Social Security People's Conference." "The Conference for The Promotion of Consumer Administration." "The Global Warming Problem Consultative Group." These are all Fukuda ideas. In these three big policy areas a Fukuda color is becoming clear, sweeping away the "no policy" criticism and marking the start of the search for Kantei-led policymaking.

On this basis, Mr. Fukuda will attempt to prolong his government and delay a general election.

The second half of the article, however, suggests that reformist opponents of Mr. Fukuda may already be laying the groundwork for a new cabinet.

Akasaka points in particular to the activities of Sonoda Hiroyuki, a seven-term HR member who left the LDP in 1993 to join Sakigake before returning to the LDP in late 1999. He suggests that Mr. Sonoda is plotting with certain DPJ members to create an emergency government under the leadership of Yosano Kaoru. Supposedly Mr. Sonoda is working, through Sentaku, with anti-Ozawa members of the DPJ to undercut both Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ozawa and vault a reformist government to power that will deal with Japan's most urgent problems. Mr. Yosano would be the man for the job apparently on the basis of his having been acknowledged as Mr. Koizumi's truest heir by longtime Koizumi aide Iijima Isao.

Whether there is something to this Sonoda "conspiracy" is besides the point. What's important is what this means for dynamics within the LDP: Akasaka acknowledges that the next LDP leadership struggle will likely be between Aso Taro and his conservative allies led by Nakagawa Shoichi, and the group of reformers around Yosano and centered in the reborn Kochikai, with outside help from Komeito and the DPJ. The decisive factor will be the backing of the Machimura faction.

For the moment, Mr. Fukuda — who vaulted to the premiership thanks to the backing of the Machimura faction, or rather Mori Yoshiro, its capo — enjoys the support of the LDP's largest faction. There is the possibility, however, that Mr. Mori and his lieutenants, the most vocal advocates of postponing a general election until September 2009, will begin looking for a more popular alternative to Mr. Fukuda later this year in the hope of repairing the LDP's prospects in the year leading up to a general election. It is possible that pressure for Mr. Fukuda to step aside in the aftermath of the G8 summit could come from his own "backers."

As for the prospects of the "Yosano emergency government," I think any plan that rests on the support of the DPJ's anti-Ozawa group is an unreliable one, not least because for the moment I think they would prefer to focus their efforts on unseating Mr. Ozawa from within the party — in September's party election for example — than in pressuring the DPJ from outside. That could change if and when someone triggers a realignment, as the Yosano camp could be the germ of a Koizumian new party, but for the moment this is just another example of the fevered speculation prompted by the uncertain political situation.

Finally, as for Mr. Fukuda, he remains, for now, the head of a woefully divided party that could splinter at any moment. Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.

Radical decentralization

Aso Taro, looking hungrily to his next bid for the LDP presidency, has continued his campaign to remake his image with an article in Voice in which he discusses the need for a radical reorganization of how Japan is governed, including both a consolidation of prefectures into larger "states" and a transfer of authority, including tax authority, to the regional governments. In case anyone needs a reminder of why this argument is important, The Economist has an article about the dependence of prefectures and localities on Tokyo here.

Not surprisingly for a contemporary Japanese politician considering radical changes to Japanese governance, Mr. Aso appeals to the Meiji Restoration, pointing to the effectiveness of the centralized system built by Meiji elites — and sustained by postwar elites — in first fending off the European empires and then promoting the rapid development of postwar Japan, making Japan, he argued, into what may have been the world's most efficient and equal society.

Facing the reality of faltering regions, however, Mr. Aso recognizes that drastic changes are needed to revitalize Japan; the central government is not up to the task:

In order to stop centralized rule, a drastic transfer of work on the domestic affairs side to the states is necessary. That is, public utilities, industrial development, and social welfare. Also, so that we can think for ourselves and work for ourselves, taxes must also be handed over...The central government will become much smaller scale, specializing in foreign affairs and the administration of justice — the work of thinking about Japan in the world.

The goal is to enable local and regional governments to undertake whatever measures they think will best promote the rejuvenation of their jurisdictions, i.e. the states will be the laboratories of Japan's recovery (and perhaps even democracy).

Meanwhile, in Tokyo the rump central government will be, in Mr. Aso's words, "small but strong."

As a federalist, I find much of value in this proposal. The central government has failed, again and again, for the past two decades (or more). The LDP has enabled and exacerbated these failures. Piecemeal measures have not been enough to correct these failures, and the bureaucracy remains opaque and all-too-unaccountable. Regional governments under Mr. Aso's system could have the same problems as the central government has had, but the hope is that by being closer to the people, they will be more accountable.

Incidentally, I imagine that Mr. Aso's conservative colleagues find some value in this new system, seeing as how it would allow them to continue to be blind to Japan's social and economic problems and focus exclusively on the question of Japan's place in the world. At the same time, this plan is a non-starter within the LDP, just as even modest decentralization faces fierce opposition within the party. I expect that even within the LDP's prefectural chapters this plan would draw opposition — look at how LDP members from prefectural assemblies rushed to Tokyo to show their support for the continuation of the special road construction fund.

For a politician bent on taking control of the LDP, Mr. Aso has opted for an unusual path to power.

The reinvention of Aso Taro

Speaking in Yokohama on Monday, Aso Taro, former foreign minister and LDP secretary-general, and conservative stalwart, called for an LDP-DPJ compromise on the road construction fund, emphasizing the need for mutual consent.

So continues the reinvention of Mr. Aso in advance of his next bid for the LDP presidency.

As I noted last month, Mr. Aso has recently reengaged himself in LDP politics after touring the country in the months following his loss to Fukuda Yasuo in last September's LDP presidential election.

From the looks of it, he has been doing some serious thinking about how to present himself as the man best capable of tackling Japan's contemporary problems. He lays out his new thinking in a long article in the March issue of Chuo Koron, available in two parts here and here.

Unlike some of his conservative colleagues, Mr. Aso appears to have realized that Japan's problems are such that insisting on "growth first" is not a policy, but the absent of policy. He appears to recognize that serious changes are needed in how Japan is governed — he speaks of the need "to grow a spine" in order to make the tough decisions needed to revitalize the economy — and in how public money is spent. While his proposal that the consumption tax rate should be doubled to 10% in order to fund the social security system will draw the most attention, of greater interest are some observations towards the end of the article that suggest Mr. Aso is prepared to make his peace with Mr. Koizumi's legacy.

He calls for regional decentralization ("subsidiarity" to those acquainted with Eurospeak), describing the dependence of prefectures on Tokyo as "inexcusable." Indeed, Mr. Aso lists regional decentralization as one of the three pillars of his Japan Renewal program, along with strengthening the pensions system to ease insecurity and reforming the labor market to strengthen Japanese companies.

Politically, he appeals to both parties to debate in good faith on legislation in these areas. He furthermore suggests that his program is the beginning of a conservative revival:

I believe that from before, the former Abe cabinet's establishment of pioneering constitutional revision, education reform, and resolute foreign and defense policy — part of the work of reimagining the conceptual aspect of the state as demanded by the age — is an important pillar [of the conservative revival]. But I think that if we do not embrace our former LDP mainstream's "politics of tolerance and patience," if we do not stop growing inequality, and if we do not work cooperatively for economic policy that unifies Japanese society, we will not become a conservatism that opens the way to the future.

Mr. Aso closes his essay by presenting himself as the natural successor to Mr. Koizumi. "Former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro," he writes, "destroyed the old politics. Former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, entrusted to be his successor, tried to point out a new Japan, but failed along the way. To make the right decisions in the time to come, I am engaged in my present study."

With these words, Mr. Aso essentially acknowledges more or less openly the failures of the Abe cabinet and "true" conservatism more generally. He realizes that any government that fails to tackle these problems is a non-starter.

If his ideological colleagues line up behind Mr. Aso and this agenda, they will be that much more potent a force in the coming battle for control of the LDP. Mr. Aso will have a much easier time presenting himself as the man for the moment, the charismatic leader capable of delivering the LDP and Japan from its malaise. With this approach, which does little more than acknowledge what just about everyone else seems to have already realized, Mr. Aso is a much more potent candidate for the LDP leadership than he was in September, when his platform contained only hints of this new approach and instead suggested that his government would likely be a continuation of Mr. Abe's (albeit wackier).

Aso returns from the wilderness

Aso Taro, faction leader, former foreign minister, former LDP secretary-general (briefly), and losing contender for the LDP presidency in 2001, 2006, and 2007, essentially went into self-exile after the LDP's faction chiefs united to deny him the premiership and make Fukuda Yasuo prime minister. He indicated that he would not accept a post in Mr. Fukuda's cabinet or party executive. While associated in the media with Nakagawa Shoichi's study group, he has been absent from the headlines. Since the fall of Abe Shinzo, Mr. Nakagawa has become the face of the LDP's ideologues.

After losing in September, Mr. Aso embarked on a national tour, bringing his optimistic "Awesome Japan" message to than eighty locations around the country.

Sankei, however, has published an article that suggests that Mr. Aso may once again become an active participant in the LDP's power struggles, positioning himself for another run for the party presidency.

To do so, however, Mr. Aso has to ingratiate himself with party elders who have long been cool to the idea of his running the party (and the country). Sankei notes that Mr. Aso met with Nakagawa Hidenao, his predecessor as secretary-general, in late January, Machimura Nobutaka, chief cabinet secretary and head of the largest faction, on 1 February, and he will travel to South Korea later this month with Mr. Nakagawa (H) and Mori Yoshiro. (He has also reached across the aisle to talk with Hatoyama Yukio and other DPJ members about his nonpartisan "Diet Members' League for the Promotion of IT in Regional Governments.")

After watching the party's leaders unite against him in September, Mr. Aso has little choice but to grovel before the LDP's powers that be. But he is also hedging. His followers still seem loyal; when a party election comes, it seems like he will once again represent the conservatives. They still think that he is the one man — echoes of his grandfather, "One Man" Yoshida — who can lead the LDP through troubled waters, thanks to his charisma. As Kyuma Fumio, described by Sankei as Aso's "brain," said, "If one looks around the party, only Mr. Aso can be found to have the 'showiness' indispensable for the party president. He has one more essential quality for a party president, 'flexibility.'" Although Nakagawa Shoichi has been the most visible of the HANA group (excluding Hiranuma Takeo, who as an independent seems free to say whatever he wants wherever he wants), he appears to be more of a lieutenant than a leader, first to Mr. Abe, now to Mr. Aso.

With the conservatives suddenly active in opposing the Fukuda government's agenda, over the human rights bill (discussed here), Mr. Aso's return comes at an auspicious time. I still do not anticipate an overt challenge to the government by the conservatives before a general election, but Mr. Aso's return to the limelight could signal a decisive rejection by the conservatives of the Hiranuma line — the call for the creation of an ideologically pure conservative party — and a clear move to focus their efforts on retaking the LDP from Mr. Fukuda and his "liberal" allies.

This is hinted at in an acronym suggested to Mr. Nakagawa (S) by Mr. Aso: NASA, for Nakagawa, Aso, Suga (Yoshihide, minister of internal affairs and communications under Mr. Abe), and Amari (Akira, METI minister under Mr. Abe, staying on with Mr. Fukuda). This formula, an alteration of the HANA acronym, drops Mr. Abe, who seems consigned to the ash heap of history, and Mr. Hiranuma, who is not a member of the LDP and whose activities with Mr. Nakagawa have led some party leaders, most notably Mr. Mori, to criticize Mr. Nakagawa for being disloyal.

For Mr. Aso, keen to be at the helm of party and nation, distancing himself from both Mr. Abe and Mr. Hiranuma is a wise move that can only strengthen his efforts to repair his relationship with party elders.

Whether Mr. Nakagawa is prepared to do the same, however, is unclear. He responded to Mr. Aso's suggestion by joking, "Are we also doing space flight?"

The right is alive, if not kicking (yet)

As planned, onetime Abe wingman Nakagawa Shoichi has formed a conservative study group within the LDP that will keep the flame of the Abe revolution burning.

At the opening meeting, Mr. Nakagawa said, "The things which everyone said 'we must do' until a few months ago must not be forgotten." By which he means those things that were completely at odds with the desires of the Japanese people, leading them to categorically reject "leaving behind the postwar regime" at the first opportunity.

Sakurai Yoshiko, leading lady of the right, spoke to the gathering on the subject of "What is genuinely conservative?" — and the attendees can be found in this Mainichi article.

It's by no means surprising that Mr. Abe's followers would regroup after their champion left office prematurely, and his natural successor defeated in the LDP presidential contest. The question that remains is whether Mr. Nakagawa's group will sit quiet until the next LDP presidential election or whether it will be a thorn in the side of Mr. Fukuda.

Does anyone really expect the former?

I suspect that it's just a matter of time before Mr. Nakagawa's (Mr. Aso's) army finds some issue on which Mr. Fukuda has let them down.

Fukuda (not surprisingly) purges Aso

Not surprisingly, Mr. Fukuda has acted quickly in replacing the LDP leadership. Mr. Aso is out as LDP secretary-general, Ishihara Nobuteru, his supporter, is out as PARC chairman, and Suga Yoshihide is out as election strategy chairman. Messrs. Nikai and Oshima will retain their positions as chairman of general affairs and Diet strategy respectively.

Stepping in are Ibuki Bunmei as secretary-general (vacating the education portfolio) and, coming in from the cold, Tanigaki Sadakazu as PARC chairman.

I can't say that the new party leadership is surprising, and I'm not altogether sure it's an improvement. Competent, maybe, and sure to do the bidding of Mr. Fukuda — but I guess that's what counts.

UPDATE — I mistakenly omitted the appointment of Koga Makoto as the election strategy chairman, meaning that, as MTC points out, the Fukuda cabinet has become a "faction head employment agency." All but three faction heads (including Aso) are now in either the cabinet or the LDP leadership. I'm not sure what difference it will make, if any. It certainly makes it harder for Mr. Fukuda to present himself as standing for a new LDP, as the DPJ has hastened to note. But will it mean that Mr. Fukuda is excessively deferential to factional interests?

Kono looks on the bright side of life

Kono Taro, wunderkind Lower House member from Kanagawa, and Aso supporter, looks at the bright side of Mr. Aso's defeat in a post at his blog:

In Saitama prefecture, with 10,055 and 10,498 votes, we lost by only a difference of 400 votes [Ed. — fuzzy math?]. If we had one won this, we would have taken three votes, giving us a total of 200, and influencing Saitama's Nakano, Imai, and Yamaguchi.

Our predictions were exceeded considerably, and we were in good spirits. Aizawa Hideyuki-sensei [Ed. — 89, LH, Tottori 2] made a toast and joked about not saying congratulations. Someone said it was like the wake of someone who died at 100 years of age, disappointing but sufficient. Someone else said, yes, ninety-seven years of age. The Saitama three laughed bitterly.

The received votes were Aso 197, Fukuda 330.

The party member votes were Aso 65, Fukuda 76.

But the actual numbers of party members' votes cast around the country were Aso 252,809, Fukuda 250,186. Aso won by more than 2,000 votes.

In Tokyo, Osaka, Kagawa, and Miyagi, where he made campaign stops, it was all Aso.

In Kagawa, Ehime, and Kochi, where there were no Diet members publicly supporting Aso, it was all Aso.

There were seventeen prefectures in which Aso won the vote among party members, eighteen where Fukuda won, and twelve prefectures in which party officials decided without regarding member votes.

The population of prefectures Aso won totaled 64,700,000, the population of prefectures Fukuda won totaled 37,890,000. (The remainder was 25,180,000.)

Among the ten most heavily populated prefectures, Fukuda won only fifth-ranked Saitama and seventh-ranked Hokkaido. Excluding the three votes Aso automatically won in ninth-ranked Fukuoka, seven were Aso's (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Osaka, Aichi, Chiba, Hyogo, Shizuoka).

I'm not sure how much significance one should attach to these numbers, but they do suggest that while an Aso insurgency didn't materialize, he did find not inconsiderable support among broad swathes of the country. His support in urban areas, however, may not matter much, because the challenge in a general election is appealing to nonaligned voters — not the party rank-and-file. For the immediate task at hand, healing the party's wounds in advance of a general election, means appealing to the rural rank-and-file, who have recently shown their willingness to desert the party.

Mr. Kono's remarks suggest relatively little ill will, meaning that the risks of an Aso irritant within the party are pretty much nil. He will return to the fold, chastened.

But as Asahi finds in its analysis of the vote, the result among Diet members was beyond the Aso camp's wildest dreams: "It's a protest vote against the contemporary LDP."

Fukuda follows his father

The LDP presidential election is now just two days away, set to be held on Sunday. All signs point to Fukuda Yasuo being elected as party president and thus prime minister.

Mr. Fukuda evidently has the support of seventy percent of the 387 Diet members and leads in at least twenty-three prefectures.

Mr. Aso simply overplayed his hand, as the controversial article in this week's Shukan Gendai — which discusses Aso's "coup" and his overweening ambition to be prime minister — makes clear, and whatever concerns the prefectural chapters have about Mr. Fukuda's ascending to the premiership on the back of factional support, those concerns do not seem to be significant enough to lead them to buck the parliamentary LDP.

And so Mr. Fukuda will step into the leade