The Machimura faction tries to untwist the Diet

The Machimura faction, which just gained a new member to solidify its position as the LDP's largest, has delivered a proposal to Prime Minister Fukuda that calls for the drafting of new rules for Diet management in light of the divided Diet. The proposal, according to Asahi, points to a "structural deficiency in the constitution," in that it mandates different methods for dealing with the budget and budget-related bills. As such, it demands that Mr. Fukuda push through rules that provide for the passage of the budget and budget-related bills at approximately the same time.

As usual for LDP and conservative complaints about the post-July political situation, the proposal bemoans how the divided Diet makes it difficult to address Japan's national interests, in this case fixing the country's abysmal fiscal situation. (No mention, of course, as to how that situation came about in the first place.)

May I make the modest proposal that perhaps more democracy is in Japan's national interest, no matter what the impact on public policy (and no matter how insufferable Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ can be at times)?

The rule changes demanded by the Machimura faction are nothing short of anti-democratic, in that they would limit the HC's ability to exercise its constitutional duty to act on a certain type of legislation. The Japanese people voted last year to give control of the House of Councillors to different parties than that controlling the House of Representatives. Just because it has made governing more difficult does not give the LDP the right to manipulate the political process to reverse the consequences of the election.

Fortunately Mr. Fukuda disagrees with the opinion of his faction. He replied by emphasizing that he intends to "take every opportunity to appeal to the opposition parties" for cooperation. And so it should be: as we learned this month, the government and opposition are perfectly capable of cooperating on legislation, despite the media-driven impression of gridlock. The constitution mandated roles for each house, and the LDP should not opportunistically undermine one house just because it's now become a hindrance to LDP rule.

(Incidentally, this is why Japan needs regular alternation of ruling parties: a ruling party aware that it could easily end up in the opposition would perhaps be less blithe about proposing rule changes to handicap the opposition.)

2007: The Year That Was In Japanese Politics

A recent article in the Yomiuri Shimbun surveying the Japanese political situation as 2007 gives way to 2008 included a sidebar that compared the present day with the bakumatsu, the last days of the Tokugawa.

Looking back over the events in political Japan over 2007, that comparison does not seem inappropriate. The picture that emerges is one of naiyu gaikan, a phrase from the bakamatsu referring to troubles at home and abroad that ultimately consumed the bakufu and served as the crucible for creation of the modern Japanese state. Rather than standing on the brink of a new restoration — as many Japanese politicians seem to think — Japan may be at the very nadir of this latest bakumatsu, with institutions in all areas of Japanese life breaking down under the stress of adjusting to new conditions. (Oddly enough, my first post of 2007 addressed Alvin Toffler’s idea of future shock as applied to Japan.)

Consider the events of the past year. Every month brought reports of corruption, fraud, and mismanagement in some area of Japanese life. I will focus, of course, on politics, but it is important to remember that 2007 saw major scandals and cover-ups in the food industry, professional baseball, sumo wrestling, and finance, the eikaiwa “industry” (specifically NOVA), and others that I have probably forgotten. Perhaps there is no better symbol than the Defense Ministry, which was hailed in January as a sign of the newly assertive Japan; by December it was widely criticized for corruption and had become the subject of a high-level reform panel. There was an unmistakable whiff of decay in the air, suggesting that the foundation of Mr. Abe’s “beautiful Japan” was rotten.

2007 may be remembered as the year that demolished the “Japan is back” meme.

Recall the confidence with which former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo headed into the New Year and the first regular Diet session of what many observers (and presumably Mr. Abe himself) assumed would be many. In early January the Japan Defense Agency became a full ministry, the result of a bill passed in the autumn 2006 extraordinary session of the Diet. Throughout January, Mr. Abe confidently declared that the 2007 would be the year of advancing the cause of constitutional revision — by passing a law establishing a national referendum system for constitution revision — and “leaving behind the postwar regime.” In his maiden speech to the Diet on 26 January, Mr. Abe spoke of remaking Japan to deal with twenty-first-century challenges.

His eyes fixed firmly on the distant horizon and his focus firmly on his obsessive pursuit of some ill-defined “beautiful country, Japan,” Mr. Abe walked straight into quicksand, which consumed his government and exposed the fragility of Japan’s recovery from its “lost decade” and the flimsiness of Japan’s pretensions to wield greater power regionally and globally.

As 2008 approaches, Fukuda Yasuo, Mr. Abe’s successor as prime minister and LDP president, is left to cope with problems inherited from Mr. Abe: a broken pensions system; an LDP torn between the reformist legacy of former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and the older legacy of generous state assistance to farmers, small businessmen, and other traditional LDP supporters scattered throughout Japan’s regions; and a “twisted” political system, in which the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, under the leadership of the mercurial Ozawa Ichiro, holds sway in the House of Councillors thanks to electoral gains in July’s election at the expense of Mr. Abe and the LDP.

He has also inherited international difficulties, not least turbulence in Japan’s relationship with the United States. Indeed, 2007 might also be remembered as the year of the slow-motion crisis in US-Japan relations, despite the presence of Mr. Abe, a favorite of Washington Japan hands, in the Kantei. After Christopher Hill, US assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, secured an agreement with North Korea at a meeting in Berlin in February to restart the stalled six-party talks a mere four months after North Korea’s putative nuclear test, disagreement between the US and Japan became inevitable. Under Mr. Abe, Japan took the lead in pressuring North Korea following the nuclear test, and its bargaining position in the six-party talks became decidedly inflexible on account of Mr. Abe’s special interest in the resolution of the dispute over North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the repeated assurances of US officials — from George W. Bush down — that the US would not forget Japan and its abductees in negotiations with North Korea, as the US committed more time and energy to reaching an agreement, a rift appeared increasingly inevitable. North Korea, whether by design or accidentally, scored a major diplomatic coup by appearing amenable to an agreement on its nuclear program, effectively isolating Japan in the six-party talks as the US shifted from Japan’s side to join with China, South Korea, and Russia to move negotiations forward. It is unclear whether Mr. Fukuda will be able to deemphasize the abductees and bring Japan’s negotiating position into line with the US, considering that doing so will likely require a bruising fight with conservatives in his own party.

Between the gap in US and Japanese bargaining positions on North Korea and the still-unresolved battle between the LDP and the DPJ over Japan’s refueling mission in support of coalition activities in Afghanistan, 2007 may be the year in which the US-Japan alliance began to consider structural reforms necessary to ensure the alliance’s continuing relevance. In November, both Robert Gates, US secretary of defense, and Mr. Fukuda acknowledged the existence of structural deficiencies and argued for the need to answer fundamental questions about the alliance.

In politics, the biggest story of the year was, of course, the rapid decay of the Abe government, which prompted a near-civil war within the LDP before and after the House of Councillors election.

In January, there was the Yanagisawa indiscretion, in which Yanagisawa Hakuo, the minister of health, labor, and welfare, referred to women as “birth-giving machines”; this was but the most egregious in a series of inappropriate remarks by Mr. Abe’s cabinet ministers and advisers that seriously undermined public confidence in the government by making the government seem insensitive to the public (months before the pensions scandal demolished whatever illusions remained about the Abe cabinet’s concern for the Japanese people).

From February we witnessed the saga of Matsuoka Toshikatsu, Mr. Abe’s minister for agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, who stood accused of gross violations of laws regulating the use of political funds. Mr. Matsuoka spent most of the Diet session obfuscating, spinning a convoluted web of explanations that was laughable right up until the moment that Mr. Matsuoka hanged himself in late May. (Of course, the presence of Mr. Matsuoka in the cabinet was — or should have been — a scandal in its own right, given Mr. Matsuoka’s history of corruption, bribery, and use of his office to interfere with the policymaking process to the benefit of his supporters, his constituents, and, of course, himself. Mr. Matsuoka’s case was but the most prominent example of the corruption epidemic that hit Japanese politics in 2007. “Money and politics” was one of the year’s political leitmotifs, right up until the end of the year, with the LDP finally giving in to demands from opposition parties and its coalition partner Komeito to revise the political funds control law to require reporting for all expenses over one yen. Corruption brought down both of Mr. Matsuoka’s successors as agriculture minister, and became a major issue in the formation of Mr. Abe’s second cabinet during August, as the LDP struggled in vain to assemble a lineup that would be free of the accusations that dogged the first Abe cabinet. We should not forget, however, that allegations of corruption crossed party lines, with Mr. Ozawa as the most notable target for allegedly using his political support groups to purchase real estate, a forbidden practice.

The Matsuoka fiasco hit just as the Abe government took an ultimately fatal blow when a DPJ member of the House of Representatives questioned the government about missing pensions records, ultimately revealed to be on the order of more than 50 million missing records. Those affected were the most vulnerable members of Japanese society, those without a history of lifelong employment with a single company who therefore depended on the inadequate state pensions system. The revelations prompted widespread insecurity among the Japanese people, which was bad enough for the Abe government, but Mr. Abe made the situation worse in his tone-deaf and dilatory response to the situation: his first instinct was to defend the bureaucrats, who, it has since been revealed, were responsible for shoddy, careless work that exhibited a wanton disregard for the people they ostensibly served. The result was that Mr. Abe’s public support was fatally undermined; the election campaign, which Mr. Abe had wanted to focus on his issues of constitution revision, education reform, and national defense, instead focused on the pensions issue and associated “lifestyle” issues, those issues that Mr. Abe spent his time in office largely avoiding. The public did not necessarily reject his ideological program outright: the Japanese people simply decided to stop indulging the prime minister and punish him and his party for their misguided priorities.

All told, the pensions issue became what Columbia University’s Gerald Curtis has called Mr. Abe’s “Hurricane Katrina” moment. There was nothing Mr. Abe could do to escape from his predicament, which was largely of his own making. Extending the regular session of the Diet to pass a few more token laws, pushing the date of the July election back a week, apologizing profusely for the pensions scandal: none of it mattered. By 29 July, the only questions left were how big the LDP’s defeat would be and whether Mr. Abe would somehow be able to weather a landslide and cling to power. Thanks in part to Mr. Ozawa’s inspired campaigning, in which he sojourned in rural Japan in the hopes of taking advantage of rural discontent with both Mr. Abe’s rule and the negative consequences of Mr. Koizumi’s reforms, the DPJ won a victory of historic proportions, winning overwhelmingly in single-seat constituencies across Japan and making an exceptionally strong showing in Tokyo and the densely populated three-seat constituencies surrounding the capital.

The precipitous decline of Mr. Abe sparked a battle for the future of the LDP that remains unresolved and could very well intensify in 2008. Even before the election LDP members were publicly criticizing Mr. Abe for his disastrous leadership and speculating about the timing of his departure from office. The electoral defeat simply intensified the battle.

Mr. Abe managed to hold on for August, despite worsening health and appeals from party elders — including former Prime Minister Mori — to resign. By holding on, waiting a month before reshuffling his cabinet, and delaying the start of the extraordinary Diet session, Mr. Abe may have encouraged disarray within his party. The post-election vacuum likely prompted more jockeying for power among LDP leaders, not least by Aso Taro, his foreign minister and presumptive heir. (Mr. Aso’s maneuverings in the aftermath of the election led to questions in the media following Mr. Abe’s resignation about a possible Aso “coup” against the prime minister in the hopes of easing his path to power.) Even before Mr. Abe resigned, the party’s fault lines were apparent: the conservative ideologues grouped around Mr. Abe, who wanted the campaign to cast off the postwar regime to press on despite the election returns, were increasingly opposed to the party’s cautious elders, who, whatever their ideological leanings, feared that the election was a signal to the LDP to change its ways, to be more sensitive to the concerns of the people and more willing to work with the ascendant DPJ. Not surprisingly, it was in August that the Yomiuri Shimbun, the newspaper of the conservative establishment, began calling for a grand coalition for the DPJ. The underlying issue was the party’s post-Koizumi identity. If there’s one thing that the two camps could agree upon, it was the need to distance the LDP from Mr. Koizumi. Mr. Abe spent most of his year in office trying to differentiate himself from his charismatic predecessor, and in the post-election struggles, Mr. Koizumi’s followers remained marginal.

Mr. Abe finally resigned on 12 September, although not before a surprisingly defiant maiden speech at the opening of the Diet two days earlier and an intensification of his rhetoric on the extension of the anti-terror law, which had emerged as the defining issue of the post-election political environment due mainly to the DPJ leadership’s announcement in the immediate aftermath of the election that it opposed extension of the law. While the precise timing of Mr. Abe’s announcement was surprising — at least to everyone but Mr. Aso — his departure was not. The already-in-progress battle within the LDP simply manifested itself openly in the LDP’s presidential election campaign, with the party elders quickly deciding to back Mr. Fukuda (eight of nine factions, or, perhaps more accurately, faction leaders endorsed his candidacy), and the conservative ideologues rallying behind Mr. Aso.

Mr. Fukuda’s victory at the end of September was widely reported as a landslide, but a look at the voting in the LDP’s prefectural chapters suggests that were it not for the LDP’s quirky election laws, the party election could have been considerably closer. The margin of victory in prefectures where Mr. Aso lost to Mr. Fukuda was in many cases considerably narrower than in prefectures won by Mr. Aso. (And as it turned out, Mr. Aso received higher support in voting among Diet members than he would have had members followed the endorsements of their faction heads.) The party united behind Mr. Fukuda after his victory, although Mr. Aso made a point of not joining the Fukuda cabinet, but the unity that followed the election should be regarded as a truce, not a peace treaty. The December formation of a “true conservative” study group under Nakagawa Shoichi, chairman of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council under Mr. Abe, suggests that in 2008 the truce could come to an end should Mr. Fukuda’s difficulties continue.

The tasks facing Mr. Fukuda upon taking office were daunting. Beyond ending the LDP’s internal disorder, he had to assuage Komeito, which had also taken a blow in the July election and whose support had been taken for granted under Mr. Abe. More importantly, he had to begin the process of devising new rules of the game under a divided Diet. Mr. Fukuda gained a temporary political victory when it emerged that Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ozawa had purportedly discussed an LDP-DPJ grand coalition in private meetings, as the DPJ rank-and-file reacted in horror, leading to the fiasco surrounding Mr. Ozawa’s aborted resignation — but that episode did not necessarily bring the two parties any closer to determining whether and how the two parties and (two chambers) would cooperate on legislation.

Beyond these challenges, there was the struggle over policy. Thanks to Mr. Abe’s escalation on the refueling mission — his “international promise” — Mr. Fukuda had little choice but to maintain Mr. Abe’s policy, going so far as to extend the Diet session into January and (presumably) use the government’s supermajority in the House of Representatives to pass the new enabling law over objections from the DPJ and the House of Councillors. Regardless of what the new year brings, the DPJ has effectively “won” on this issue. The MSDF ships returned home following the expiration of the previous law on 1 November, but more importantly, the Fukuda government was forced to focus on the anti-terror law, a low-priority issue for the Japanese people, instead of devoting its energy to the pensions issue and other social issues. The cost of falling into the DPJ’s trap became apparent in December when the pensions scandal re-erupted, prompting the first substantial drop in Mr. Fukuda’s public support.

The events of 2007 have left a number of unanswered questions about Japan’s future. Will the LDP be able to heal the rift that has emerged since Mr. Koizumi left office? Will Mr. Fukuda be forced into calling a snap election, and will the LDP emerge victorious? Are the DPJ — and Mr. Ozawa — ready to govern? Will the divided Diet be able to produce legislation that strikes a balance between advancing structural reform and protecting those citizens hurt by structural reform? What role will Japan play in the region and the world, and how will the US-Japan alliance change to reflect Japan’s new role?

In addressing these questions, I hope that Japanese politicians draw the right lessons from the bakumatsu and the Meiji Restoration. Mr. Abe seemed to think that if he spoke in more grandiose terms about Japan’s role, visited the troops, and modified Japan’s national security institutions, Japan would magically wield more power and influence globally. But there is no shortcut to playing a greater role internationally. In the twenty-first century especially, national power depends as much on the strength and durability of domestic institutions (and a country’s openness to flows of goods, people, money, and ideas) as it does on more traditional metrics. Without reform in how Japan educates its children, provides for its elderly, interacts with the global economy, uses its workforce, and conducts its politics, Japan’s influence will shrink. Future governments need to be more concerned about these aspects of Japanese life — the lasting foundation for national power in the twenty-first century — than about the outward manifestations of national power. Architects of the modern Japanese state understood that national power depended on the quality of domestic institutions. Do their successors?

The answer to that question will determine where Japan will go from 2007. Was it a turning point on the road to a new system that will reinvigorate Japan? Or will the Japanese people and their elected representatives be unable to undertake structural reform that overcomes the sclerosis?

Ready or not...

The special session of the Diet is officially opened.

Prime Minister Abe, opening the session today, claims to have reflected deeply upon the results of the July's Upper House elections and recognizes that there are many who wish to see him gone, but for all that humility, it's entirely unclear whether he has actually learned anything. The LDP rank-and-file may have learned something. The new officials at the head of the party and the cabinet may have learned something. But has Abe Shinzo actually learned from his "deep reflection" on his party's colossal defeat in July?

As usual, he was, as MTC notes, long on ideals, short on vision. Recognizing one factor in the July defeat, Prime Minister Abe acknowledged that the government's countermeasures for the pain of reform "have been insufficient." But there are few signs as to how Mr. Abe plans to ease the pain of the people, solve the inequality problem, shrink Japan's national debt, and continue down the road of reform, all while overcoming opposition from within the LDP and working (or not) with the opposition.

As I've argued before, I think Mr. Abe's problem is that he doesn't particularly like politics. He loves being a statesman — he loves standing before the people, declaiming about national problems and Japan's destiny in the twenty-first century. But when it comes down to the messy compromises that are a necessary part of democratic politics everywhere, Mr. Abe loses interest.

So for all his heartfelt idealism, it's all so much hot air, because he has no conception of how to realize his abstract aims.

Now, a leader trusted by the people can get away with being short on the details — this to some extent explains Mr. Koizumi's success. But Mr. Abe does not have the trust of the people. "Trust me" is not an option. The lack of trust, especially following the revelation of the missing pensions records, has crippled Mr. Abe's cabinet, and there are no signs that the Japanese people are about to become more trusting of the prime minister. Even worse, he continues to lack the confidence of his own party, the latest blow being the response of some LDP officials to Mr. Abe's pronouncement in Sydney that he is staking his premiership on the passage of the anti-terror enabling law in one form or another.

President Bush has, I think, run into the same problem: when you fail again and again, "trust me" doesn't work. In the aftermath of 9/11, I think the American people decided to trust Mr. Bush — but now it's six years later and the people have learned better.

So here we go. The final months of the Abe premiership? The resurrection of the LDP's fortunes, with or without Mr. Abe? The final struggle before the DPJ takes the Lower House?

All signs point to stasis

Asahi published the results of a survey conducted with Tokyo University that looks at the policy positions of victorious LDP and DPJ candidates in the House of Councillors election. (The detailed study will be published in the October issue of Ronza.)

Accompanied by one of those marvelously convoluted charts that Japanese newspapers seem to revel in printing, the survey suggests that after a period of relative dynamism in Japanese policy making perhaps going as far back as the Hashimoto Cabinet, the Japanese political system may be in for another period of what J.A.A. Stockwin has called "immobilism."

It's not just a function of institutional gridlock due to divided government, although that's certainly part of it. The survey, measuring the new members along two axes — foreign policy (dove v. hawk) on the x-axis, domestic/economic policy (retention of the Japanese-style system v. reform) on the y-axis — shows a shift away from the dynamic poles (hawkish, reformist) in favor of greater support for the status quo.

At the same time, differences between the parties are growing and the parties seem to be coalescing into distinct, coherent entities, showing the extent to which a two-party system is in the making. Of the DPJ's new Upper House members, only a small proportion of them fall on the hawkish end of the foreign policy axis, and an even smaller proportion are in the hawk/reform quadrant (this is where Prime Minister Abe falls, and it might be called the neo-conservative quadrant). This is a considerable change from the 2005 Lower House election. The largest portion of DPJ members falls in the dovish foreign policy/economic status quo quadrant, slightly outnumbering members in the dove/reform quadrant.

The LDP, meanwhile, is becoming less of a big tent as the onetime dovish mainstream continues to shrivel. In both the 2005 and 2007 elections, only a smattering of LDP members fell on the dovish side of the foreign policy axis. This survey also shows the troubled legacy of Mr. Koizumi within the LDP: in 2005, members were equally divided between support for the Japanese-style system and reform, but in 2007, defenders of the status quo enjoy a sizable majority among LDP members.

This seems to indicate that Mr. Ozawa may very well be making the DPJ into a new big-tent governing party that brings together a wide variety of views on economic and social policy — but at the same time, foreign policy may once again become the major cleavage between parties as it was during the cold war (which would explain why the DPJ leadership was so quick to emphasize its opposition to the extension of the anti-terror special measures law). It also suggests that the DPJ may be well placed to continue to compete strongly with the LDP in both urban and rural Japan, the key to political hegemony.

That said, until the details of the survey are published, it's perhaps premature to conclude too much from these findings.

The decider reflects (or not)

Mr. Abe has returned from his Asian tour (this is the term used in the Japanese press; apparently Japan hasn't quite returned to Asia), and is getting ready to announce his new cabinet on Monday.

There are few hints as to the comprehensive makeup of the new cabinet and LDP executive, but there are a few people who look certain to be offered positions. A number of sources suggest that Machimura Nobutaka, former foreign minister and head of the Machimura faction to which Mr. Abe belongs will be named chief cabinet secretary, Aso Taro will be named LDP secretary-general, and Yano Tetsuro, Upper House member and former vice minister of foreign affairs, will be given an unspecified position of power. Komeito's Fuyushiba Tetsuzou will likely stay on as transport minister. (Mainichi)

Yomiuri suggests that in light of allegations about funding improprieties, Mr. Suga may find himself out of a job, and indicates that ministerial portfolios will be given to Nakagawa Shoichi, Niwa Yuuya, and former foreign minister Komura Masahiko.

But beyond the roster of the new cabinet, the big question is whether Mr. Abe has actually learned anything after a month of "reflecting upon that which should be reflected." In the event that Mr. Abe has not yet completed his reflecting, Asahi's editorial today suggests five ways in which Mr. Abe should reflect on last month's loss, although Asahi reiterates its opinion that the surest way for the prime minister to reflect on the defeat would be to leave office entirely.

Asahi's five: (1) Know the importance of personnel, (2) be mindful of the ability to manage crises, (3) be responsible for your speech, (4) review basic policy, (5) abandon arrogance (i.e., not ramming legislation through the Diet).

It is revealing that Asahi's advice to the young prime minister have more to do with image management than with policy; this suggests, correctly I think, that the root of the LDP's defeat last month was poor political leadership, not bad policy. The message in this editorial is that being a political novice, having served in the Diet for a mere thirteen years before coming prime minister, Mr. Abe needs to skilled political operators around him to prevent him from making amateur mistakes. Asahi is quick to point out that it is not calling for a return to the rule of the factions, but simply a cabinet staffed with politicians chosen for their political skills, not for their loyalty to the prime minister.

Whether Mr. Abe will actually change his ways remains to be seen, but I remain skeptical. His makeup as a politician is rooted in abstract ideology — politics of the bird's eye view — not the messy busy of governing, which means being sensitive to the public and other actors in the political system. Accordingly, his rhetoric, rather than inspiring support and trust, just leaves listeners confused, asking questions like Asahi's: "What is a beautiful country?" "Does repudiating the postwar mean he wants to return to the prewar regime?" There was nothing inevitable about the LDP defeat in the Upper House elections. But Mr. Abe misused his bully pulpit from day one, preferring meaningless slogans to inspiring, transformational leadership, tolerating incompetence from his advisers, and otherwise preferring standing pat to using the Lower House super-majority to address the concerns of Japanese citizens. He wouldn't have had to do much. As Mr. Koizumi showed, the illusion of reform — saying the right words — can go a long way towards rallying support for an agenda.

In other words, the problem with the Abe Cabinet has been Mr. Abe himself, and the reshuffle will do nothing to change that. The new cabinet may allow Mr. Abe to muddle through indefinitely, but arguably Japan can do better.

Yatsu points fingers, but can the LDP change?

A panel convened by the LDP under the management of party election strategist Yatsu Yoshio has issued its final report on why the party lost in July.

The report suggests that there was a "gap" between the priorities of the party and the people, which was expressed not just in the party's responses to the pensions scandal, political corruption, ministerial indiscretion, and the growing inequality between urban and rural Japan, but even in its slogan — the report compares the DPJ's "living is number one" slogan to Mr. Abe's pet phrases, "beautiful country" and "leaving the postwar regime behind."

This analysis is largely unexceptional, although I think any discussion of why the LDP lost has to look at the party's long-term prospects post-Koizumi and struggle to answer the question of what kind of party the LDP should become now. This discussion is even more imperative now that the voters have effectively rejected Mr. Abe's solution — a starkly ideological party run by a hard core of ideologues that will run the country in a top-down fashion, outlining a vision and expecting the people to follow behind. Mr. Tanabe, former LDP secretary-general, has criticized Prime Minister Abe on precisely these grounds, suggesting that he and his "cabinet of friends" has been completely out of control and unaccountable.

Whether the new cabinet will be any more accountable remains to be seen. The press continues to talk up Mr. Mori's favorites, Fukuda Yasuo and Tanigaki Sadakazu — this Sankei piece considers them both in a discussion of who will be the next cabinet's "key man" — but any discussion of their entrance into their cabinet seems to be entirely driven by Mr. Mori, and it's not exactly clear that the prime minister will be taking his predecessor's advice. How and to whom the new cabinet will be accountable to anyone other than Mr. Abe is anyone's guess, and it's exceedingly clear that being accountable to Mr. Abe is insufficient, given that he is only slightly less tolerant of failure on his watch than his buddy George.

So figuring out why the LDP lost the election is only a start: the next step is to figure out how to restructure the party to provide balance and accountability, and to ensure that in the course of policy making the interests and needs of the people are not subordinated to cloud-cuckoo-land ideals and slogans. Whether the party is capable of that is unclear, although it's not like the party rank-and-file isn't aware of the problem. Indeed, for me one of the most revealing moments of the campaign was when Tamura Kohei, the incumbent candidate in Kochi prefecture who ultimately lost, castigated the prime minister for his "beautiful country" rhetoric.

Japan goes on vacation, Abe's unpopularity stays put

Prime Minister Abe has decided to forgo taking a vacation at his summer home in Yamanashi Prefecture during the O-Bon festival period, although it is not entirely clear what he plans to do in Tokyo — apparently he'll be going to movies and plays. He told reporters, "Since I also have preparations to make for foreign travel, I think I'll hold off." The Abe camp added, "Since there was an election, he has a lot to do." (A few loads of laundry? Changing light bulbs at the Kantei?)

You have to wonder if the prime minister would be better off taking a proper vacation. Maybe a few days away from Tokyo would allow him to take in the many signals emanating from the Japanese people and his own party suggesting that he should leave office post haste.

The criticism continues to mount. Most recently, party chapters that were home to losing candidates in last month's election called for the prime minister's head, perhaps finding that it is increasingly difficult for them to rebuild support in their prefectures so long as Mr. Abe is the weary face of a beleaguered party. Although former MAFF Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu has announced the formation of a Diet members' league to support the prime minister (whose membership is as of yet unclear), that seems to be small recompense for criticism from within the LDP that has increased by the day since the election. I mean, when you consider the size of the LDP's caucus in the House of Representatives — 296 seats — the fact that, according to a Mainichi article, Shimamura is aiming at 100 members is revealing. Shouldn't the prime minister's support league be his party's caucus?

Still, much will depend on the reshuffle that is scheduled to come on 27 August, a reshuffle that looks ever more certain to see Foreign Minister Aso shuffled off to the LDP secretariat — a move that looks awfully similar to a demotion — and Internal Affairs Minister Suga elevated to chief cabinet secretary.

The shape of the cabinet to come?

Over at Shisaku, MTC relays a Yomiuri story reporting that Foreign Minister Aso will be Nakagawa Hidenao's replacement as LDP secretary-general.

MTC correctly notes that the LDP secretariat is hardly the ideal position from which Aso can claim the premiership, indeed, it will likely burden him with the trying task of hammering together a unified LDP capable of competing in the next general election. This would no doubt make him more enemies within the party than he already has and seemingly forestall his plans to be the party's leader in the next general election. (Dissent within the party continues, with Nakatani Gen, another former JDA chief, calling for Abe's resignation.)

Meanwhile, the report about Aso squares with an article in the 9 August issue of Shukan Bunshun, which outlines the possible roster for a new Abe cabinet:

If one generalizes from the predictions of political journalists and LDP notables, everyone agrees that Aso will be secretary-general and Suga [Yoshihide, internal affairs minister] will be chief cabinet secretary. If one looks to future party presidential elections, Nikai Toshihiro as secretary-general is also possible.

"In order that the Abe-Shiozaki duo is not felt to be changing, why not have Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki sidestep into the post of minister of financial affairs or another economic porfolio? Mr. Aisawa Ichiro from the Tanigaki faction and Kamoshita Ichiro from the Tsushima faction will probably be nominated. The time is coming for Kishida Fumio of the Koga faction to enter the cabinet. There is also the view that in order for Secretary-General Nakagawa to return to his faction, faction chief Machimura will hand over the leadership and become the head of the Policy Affairs Research Council. With recommendations from factions tending to harden and bear fruit, for a surprise concurrent policy change, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda will also be appointed foreign minister." [Former LDP notable]

If Fukuda were in fact to be named foreign minister at the same time that Aso was relegated to perform the dirty work of LDP secretary-general, it could very well transform the race to succeed Abe, or, alternatively, could lead to speculation as to who will actually be in control of the Abe Cabinet.

As for the other mooted names, Aisawa Ichiro is an exact contemporary of the prime minister, a third-generation Lower House member from Okayama, and a foreign affairs expert who belongs to Diet members' leagues in support of cordial relations between Japan and China and Japan and South Korea. Kamoshita, a representative from Tokyo, was once a member of Ozawa's New Frontier Party before joining the LDP in 1997. Kishida, meanwhile, is forty-eight, has been reelected five times, and is currently the deputy head of the LDP's Diet Strategy Committee. With Suga, perhaps the one prominent member of Abe's cabinet not to face corruption charges or to be guilty of indiscreet speech, would likely provide a steady hand on the tiller. Together with the continuing presence of the popular Koike Yuriko as defense minister, this would be a cabinet designed not to achieve brilliant policy initiatives, but to stabilize the LDP's position and perhaps pave the way for a bloodless coup.

That said, an article in the latest issue of Shukan Bunshun suggests that struggle is underway for the chief cabinet secretary's post, with Suga challenged by supporters of Koike and Upper House member Matsuzoe Yoichi, with the latter, an open opponent of Abe's staying in office, selected in order to co-opt him and to signal a "new Abe." A similar logic could lead to the appointment of Ishiba to the defense ministry and even Fukuda's appointment as foreign minister.

Undoubtedly Mr. Abe recognizes that deferring to the factions diminishes his authority as head of government and party, hence his insistence upon ignoring factional nominations for ministerial posts. The factions have until 27 August to impress upon Mr. Abe the wisdom of their nominations, as Mr. Abe has determined that that will be the date he shuffles his cabinet. The composition of the new cabinet will say much about the new balance of power within the party and the prime minister's chances for survival beyond this year.

The DPJ's first tactical mistake?

The debate over the extension of the anti-terror special measures law is quickly becoming the defining issue of the post-election political environment, with each party struggling to stand fast and embarrass the other side — with Washington watching closely for signs of whether Japan's commitment to the alliance is withering, and wondering whether the DPJ can be trusted.

Even before Ozawa meets with Ambassador Schieffer on Wednesday, there are signs that the DPJ might be willing to compromise. On Sunday, DPJ Acting President Kan Naoto signaled that the party recognizes the differences between the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, hinting that it might be open to a compromise bill, but not before raking the government over the coals. Prime Minister Abe responded on Monday with conciliatory gestures in a press conference following the ceremony in Hiroshima.

For his part, Amaki Naoto, former diplomat and recent Upper House candidate on a anti-constitution revision platform, is convinced that the issue is all about Japan's subservience to the US and its participation in America's wars, and that the DPJ will have little choice but to cave eventually.

So if the DPJ is in fact destined to step down and compromise on the extension, what will drive it to do so? A desire to avoid appearing irresponsible and incapable of governing, an impression that would undoubtedly result from a serious dispute with the US? Fear of secession by the hawkish Maehara wing of the party if the leadership pushes too hard against this bill?

Interestingly, this issue may be more of a wedge for the DPJ than the for the LDP-Komeito governing coalition. As Jun Okumura argues, there are good reasons for Komeito to stick with the LDP despite the recent emergence of ideological fissures within the coalition, not least because it is unclear whether the DPJ will be a more suitable partner for Komeito on foreign policy. Meanwhile, this issue highlights differences between the DPJ's Upper and Lower House caucuses. As an article in Yomiuri (not online) noted, DPJ members in the Upper House caucus are more likely to be in the former Social Democrat or Democratic Socialist groups, and beyond that Maehara's group is centered on the House of Representatives. It seems that the danger for the DPJ is the DPJ-controlled Upper House's pushing forward legislation that the party's Lower House caucus finds difficult to support. Why the party hasn't put more emphasis on pocketbook issues as a way to unite keep the party united and maintain considerable pressure on the government is beyond me.

As such, if the DPJ ends up backing down on this issue, I'm not exactly clear what it will have gained. It will have exacerbated fissures within the party needlessly, while giving the government a chance to regroup in the aftermath of the landslide defeat. The DPJ could not have made it any easier for the LDP to rally, with members standing up in the Diet haranguing the DPJ for abandoning the US, endangering Japan's security, and shirking Japan's burden to support global security. Indeed, the LDP's line in this confrontation will undoubtedly resemble this editorial in Sankei, which wonders whether the DPJ "is following the road of a responsible political party."

Watching the fault lines

When looking at the post-election political landscape, observers have turned to the Democratic Party of Japan and asked whether it has the durability to press its advantage following the election and push for a quick dissolution and general election. After all, one need not look all that far back for signs of division within the party.

For the moment, I think that talk of a party split is premature, because nothing succeeds like success.

But the rifts exist, ready to reopen at the first sign of trouble. The DPJ "faction" usually cited as a potential splinter group is that of former DPJ party leader Maehara Seiji, who led the party for a brief period following the party's disastrous showing in the 2005 House of Representatives election until forced to resign as a result of the DPJ's claiming — based on a fake e-mail — that LDP politicians took bribes from convicted Live Door head Horie Takafumi.

Maehara's faction, a group known as the Ryounkai [凌雲会] is generally recognized as "conservative" or "neo-conservative," and many of its members voiced their support for Koizumi-style structural reform, not to mention their support for constitutional revision, the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, and more robust China and Korea policies. By the reckoning of one blogger at Kihachin, this group and its associates in the DPJ could number somewhere between four and five dozen members, with most of its members in the House of Representatives.

It is for this reason that the DPJ leadership's emphasis on opposing the renewal of the anti-terror special measures law is important. Mr. Maehara has already come out in opposition to the DPJ's official position, stating that he thinks renewal is "essential," although he criticized the government's failure to explain its reasoning.

As noted in this month's issue of The Oriental Economist, Mr. Ozawa may be using the anti-terror law as a wedge issue to drive Komeito out of the governing coalition and back into his arms (remember the self-destructive role played by Ozawa's alliance with Komeito's Ichikawa Yuichi — the Ichi-Ichi line — in bringing down the anti-LDP coalition engineered by Ozawa). This might work. It is no secret that a massive gulf separates the foreign and security policy positions of Komeito and the Abe government of which they are a part. Indeed, Asahi, in its editorial today, lambastes Komeito President Ota Akihiro for immediately reaffirming his party's support for the government, despite the serious blow suffered by his party last week — and despite alienating supporters by tacitly support policy positions that are fundamentally at odds with Komeito's. In other words, Mr. Ozawa is gambling that it is more likely to attract Komeito than to repel the Maehara group. For the moment, that may work, especially if Mr. Ozawa can, by meeting with Ambassador Schieffer next week, dispel some of the concerns that have arisen from the US.

This position is not without risk, not least because it could undermine DPJ efforts to present itself as capable of wielding power. At the moment, according to a Yomiuri poll cited in an op-ed criticizing the DPJ position on the extension, 46% found the DPJ incapable of wielding political power compared to 36% who thought otherwise.

I don't expect any changes immediately, but much will depend on how the DPJ leadership deals with the fallout from its initial announcements and how it intends to move the issue forward henceforth.

Meanwhile, Mr. Ozawa, it seems, is not the only one in need of a few days' rest. On TV today, Matsuzoe Yoichi said that the LDP doesn't have the energy for a leadership fight at present. He might as well have been discussing the entire Japanese political system. All parties appear to be bracing for the coming turmoil, in which Mr. Maehara and company may be set to play an important role.

More signs of Abe's end

Mainichi has a long account of the meeting between (now former) LDP Secretary-General Nakagawa, Upper House head Aoki, and LDP boss former Prime Minister Mori on Sunday evening as the returns came in suggesting a major LDP defeat.

In case anyone still has any doubts, this article makes it clear that it is wholly unclear whose confidence Abe still enjoys. He is alone, but for his band of followers, and undoubtedly with each passing day, with each new poll that shows his cabinet's support rate dipping lower and records public opposition to his remaining in office, his position and with it his party's position grows ever more tenuous.

On that evening, Mori, Aoki, and Nakagawa had apparently discussed and agreed upon a caretaker Fukuda government, because Fukuda would "be calming, and ensure a sense of stability." "But," the article continues, "Fukuda is 71. Mori, who values Fukuda, persistently argued that this is a 'provisional emergency plan.'" However, Nakagawa, representing the trio, met with the prime minister, who completely rejected the plan, and informed Mori directly that he will not go. The article suggests that Abe's decision has killed the Fukuda caretaker government plan, but I'm not entirely sure whether that plan is dead or simply on hold until the "opposition forces" (to borrow a phrase from the Koizumi era and put it to entirely different use) can gather strength and force the prime minister to face the reality of his situation.

So again, what mandate does the Abe government enjoy at present? By whose leave is Abe still ensconced in the Kantei? Will the only way to get him out be a full-scale reenactment of the 1960 ampo demonstrations that Mr. Abe remembers so fondly? None of this should be all that surprising. Perhaps the most significant lesson I learned from reading his book is that Abe is driven by a sense of mission; while vague and ill-defined to the rest of the world, it is apparently clear to him inside his head, and nothing or nobody is going to interfere with his mission. Maybe Japan should think twice about the presidentialization of the premiership, if it is only going to result in a Kantei completely unaccountable to the rest of the government and the rest of a country as a whole.

Bigger than the alliance

As noted in this post, much of the discussion surrounding the DPJ leadership's decision to oppose the extension of the anti-terrorism special measures law before it expires in November has focused on the impact on the US-Japan alliance of Japan's effective departure from coalition activities in and around Afghanistan.

The debate has hinged in part on questions surrounding the lack of a meeting between DPJ President Ozawa and Ambassador Schieffer, with Asahi reporting that Schieffer requested a meeting to discuss the special measures law following the DPJ victory, but Ozawa insisted such a meeting was "unnecessary." According to Amaki Naoto, meanwhile, Michael Auslin, the Sankei Shimbun's newest friend-of-Japan-in-Washington, was quoted by Sankei as saying, "In the event that it is not extended, it will have a worrisome impact on US-Japan relations."

Amaki, in his summary of this dispute, embraces Asahi's suggestion that the Bush administration has been uninterested in cultivating a relationship with Ozawa's DPJ, preferring to focus entirely on working with the Republican party's traditional friends in the LDP, and then goes on to argue that the debate over the extension is a great opportunity for Japan to demonstrate its independence from the US.

If the debate over the renewal of the anti-terrorism special measures law is an alliance matter, it is only because advocates of a more independent Japanese foreign policy wish to make it one (and alliance managers in Washington are happy to oblige them by suggesting that it is a major concern for the US).

The way I see it, however, is that the basis for Japan's renewing its participation in the coalition has little if anything to do with the alliance, and in fact rests on both Japanese law and UN Security Council resolutions, and is consistent with the DPJ's own foreign policy proposals. While the initial passage of the law in November 2001 had much to do with the alliance and the need for Japan to commit its support to the US campaign in Afghanistan, it is now 2007 and the logic behind coalition activities has changed. Afghanistan is still troubled, and Pakistan too is now embroiled in the struggle (as Barack Obama made clear, perhaps indelicately). Somehow it seems that the need for Maritime Interdiction Operations in the Indian Ocean as part of Operation Enduring Freedom is as important as ever, given who and what (drugs, nuclear material, etc.) could be flowing out of Pakistan by sea. Japan is refueling the warships of some eleven of the more than twenty countries participating in the coalition, this according to the 2006 Defense white paper. Meanwhile, in the intervening six years the campaign in Afghanistan has been internationalized, becoming as much as NATO project as as US-UK project, in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions 1386, 1383, and 1378.

Recall that in December, when the Defense Agency was elevated into a full ministry, some of the JSDF's secondary missions became primary missions. Among those missions are, according to the MOD's latest white paper, "activities that contribute to maintaining the peace and security of Japan and the rest of the international community, including international disaster relief operations, international peace cooperation operations, operations based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, and operations based on the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq." While this provision does not permanently bind Japan to current missions abroad, it does suggest that constitutional concerns, and alliance concerns for that matter, are overblown. The discussion ought to be based on an assessment of the situation in and around Afghanistan and whether Japan can still contribute to the mission.

According to its own policy list produced for the Upper House elections, the DPJ acknowledges the legitimacy of international missions on the basis of UN Charter Chapter VII: "UN peace activities concur with the philosophy of the constitution, which seeks a positive role in international society. Our country, under subjective judgment and democratic control, will participate positively based on UN demands that are in turn based on Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter, which differ from the character of a sovereign nation's right of self-defense." While the DPJ's position reserves a place for Japan to adjudge whether to participate in a UN mission, it also suggests that Japan has a role to play internationally outside of the alliance with the US and based on the constitution, in this case the preamble, which states, "We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in the peace, free from fear and want."

So yes, under the DPJ's own policy statements Japan reserves the right to decide whether to participate in a mission under UN auspices, but presumably such a decision would be based on an assessment of the facts of the matter and not held hostage to domestic political exigencies. Frankly, DPJ members and other politicians who seek a more independent foreign policy role for Japan ought to welcome opportunities for effective international cooperation such as that in the Indian Ocean, which shows both the US and the rest of the world that Japan is capable of cooperating outside the narrow confines of the US-Japan alliance in contributing to global security.

Japan's foreign policy needs to become less US-centric; it is unhealthy for both Japan and the US for Japan to defer to the US on every security policy issue. And the multinational coalition in and around Afghanistan is the perfect opportunity for Japan to begin weaning itself off depending on the US, seeing as how the coalition includes not just the US but NATO and other participants, and that the mission enjoys the imprimatur of the UN and thus greater international legitimacy than the Iraq mission.

So I repeat my objection. Barring an argument against renewal based on the facts of the campaign suggesting that there is no longer any role for Japan to play, the DPJ's actions are shamelessly opportunistic and constitute a failure of leadership on the part of Ozawa.

Back in action

MTC, after going on hiatus in advance of the official campaign period, is posting again, firing a salvo against the besieged Mr. Abe.

After laying out how Mr. Abe has become an albatross to the LDP — and demonstrated his worthlessness as a leader, he asks, convincingly, "So what is the benefit of having Abe Shinzō carry on--for members of the LDP, that is?"

To quote Victor Laszlo, "Welcome back to the fight. This time I know our side will win [more than it already has]."

Who's the adult here?

One trope that has emerged in the days since the election has been talk of "adult politics" in terms of how the DPJ will conduct itself as the Upper House's largest party. The fact that it is even necessary for the DPJ to promise that it will act "grown up" is a sign of just how far the party has to go before it is ready to hold power (this stunt, for example, doesn't strike me as particularly adult).

But, at the same time, one has to wonder who exactly is adult in the Japanese political system. Prime Minister Abe? The way he has reacted to the defeat — to the outright rejection of him and his leadership by the voters — is little better than that of a petulant child. This article in Asahi shows him consulting with Messrs. Mori, Nakagawa (Hidenao), and Aoki in the midst of the defeat and insisting that he will not be resigning no matter what. Mr. Abe might think it makes him look courageous, holding his ground in the face of growing opposition, but in fact it makes him look like a stubborn toddler refusing to eat his vegetables or go to sleep at bedtime.

So the question is how and when the grown-ups will finally punish Mr. Abe. Will he be felled by a kind of frontal assault in the Diet in the manner of Kato Koichi's aborted attack on Prime Minister Mori in 2000, building up public support and then moving against the prime minister? This time around, with party discipline in shambles, such a gambit might work, because it's hard to see the threat of expulsion from the party carrying the same weight as it did then. That scenario depends, of course, on someone having the courage to do it. Alternatively, will Mr. Mori, the LDP capo di tutti capi, finally make Mr. Abe an offer he can't refuse and put a steadier, more senior hand at the wheel who will listen to the wisdom of party elders? (Mr. Abe, for his part, recently met with former Prime Ministers Mori, Nakasone, and Kaifu for advice, and he was told to make his next cabinet an all-faction unity cabinet; it remains to be seen whether he'll take that advice.) Another scenario would be a kind of pincer movement, with a reformist upstart challenging Mr. Abe in the Diet while the elders sneak in from behind and finish the job.

Whatever the case may be, I increasingly doubt that the LDP's "civil war" will last all that long. I expect over the next few weeks that the newspapers will be full of rumors and innuendo concerning potential moves to unseat Mr. Abe before swift action against him. After all, the virtue of a parliamentary system is that when a leader descends into the Bush range of unpopularity, while possessing the same tenuous hold on reality, there are steps that can be taken to show said leader the door.

No surprises here

Akagi Norihiko, the late Matsuoka Toshikatsu's successor as minister of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, has resigned after two scandal-tainted months in the cabinet.

His resignation in and of itself is not newsworthy. It is inconceivable that he would remain in the cabinet given that he has spent his entire tenure fending off corruption charges and in general not answering questions, whether about financial improprieties or the bandages on his face.

What is interesting, however, is the response within the LDP to his departure. An article in Asahi on Akagi's resignation suggests that more than half the party's members think it "natural" that he resign. Apparently they think his scandals are a major reason explaining why the LDP lost big in the Upper House elections.

Now, there is no question that Akagi's follies were part of the story of the election, but would the LDP have somehow done better had he resigned earlier? I strongly doubt it. His improprieties were symptoms of widespread malfeasance in the LDP, but one need not look far for other, more egregious examples (this was my initial reaction to Akagi's appointment, in fact). Moreover, I suspect that as far as corruption is concerned, public distrust of politicians and bureaucrats is deep and goes back years, even decades; more recent examples serve merely to keep the fire of public disgust burning strongly.

I suspect that whoever the government finds to replace Akagi, he will likely have the same fiscal improprieties tucked away in his closet, especially if he is an "agricultural expert."

The Upper House elections and Japanese security policy

Of all the factors that went into the LDP's historic loss on Sunday, it is safe to assume that the security policy pursued under the Koizumi and Abe cabinets — an emphasis on the alliance with the US that has seen the JSDF deployed to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, albeit in non-combat roles — was not a significant factor in inducing voters to abandon the LDP.

As Michael Zielenziger argues, echoing a point I made here in advance of the election:

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s stinging defeat in parliamentary elections demonstrates that the Japanese people aren't interested in abandoning their pacifist constitution and taking on the mantle of military might to help Washington manage some form of global hegemony. Japanese citizens don't want to send troops to Iraq and are rejecting Abe’s stand on North Korea which is even tougher than Washington’s own now that direct talks are moving forward between officials from Pyongyang and the State Department.

Instead what voters affirmed on Sunday is that they want a government that will end years of eroding wages and prices, offer hope to millions of alienated young adults, and pledge to the nation’s growingly restive reserve of the elderly that their pensions and retirements will be protected and that the gap between rich and poor will somehow be narrowed.

That seems to be the lesson that the DPJ has drawn from its victory (or perhaps non-defeat is more accurate?) on Sunday. And so almost immediately after the results became clear DPJ Secretary-General Hatoyama Yukio voiced the party's opposition to the renewal of the anti-terror special measures law when it expires in November. The law, first passed in November 2001 as the keystone of the Japanese response to the 9/11 attacks, enabled the dispatch of MSDF vessels to support coalition efforts in Afghanistan, and there they have remained, refueling coalition warships in cooperation with the ongoing multinational campaign against the Taliban. Note that this law applies only to the campaign in Afghanistan; Japanese forces are in Iraq under a different piece of legislation, renewed earlier this year over opposition objections.

DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro, having left his election-day sickbed, has confirmed Hatoyama's proclamation, suggesting that it will be part of an aggressive strategy on the part of the DPJ to force an early election. If the DPJ plans to cooperate with the LDP to make good policy, it's being awfully coy about it.

For Ozawa to hold the special measures law hostage to Diet tactics is shamefully opportunistic, and it will give Ozawa the dubious honor of having both authored Japan's shift to bearing a greater burden in upholding global order and pushed for a new period of isolation. As LDP secretary-general during the Gulf War he pushed hard for Japanese boots on the ground, and when that failed, he authored the postwar international peace cooperation law that resulted in Japanese peacekeepers being sent to Cambodia, the beginning of the legal expansion of Japanese security policy that eventually produced the anti-terror and Iraq special measures laws as well as the formal adoption of "international peace cooperation activities" as a primary mission of the JSDF