Cry havoc

Painted into a corner over the gasoline tax issue, Prime Minister Fukuda attempted to undercut Ozawa Ichiro in an interview on NHK Sunday, suggesting that the impetus for a grand coalition came from Mr. Ozawa. The facts of the negotiations surrounding an LDP-DPJ grand coalition — especially Watanabe Tsuneo's role in it — may never be known, but the significance of Mr. Fukuda's mentioning this now has everything to do with undermining Mr. Ozawa's position at the head of the party.

The grand coalition fiasco, after all, was the end of the DPJ's love affair with Mr. Ozawa, insofar as it was a love affair. Recalling the fiasco can only undercut Mr. Ozawa's relationship with his own party.

But Mr. Fukuda must be encouraged by the results of an Asahi poll that shows that the public is favorable towards his latest compromise solution to the gasoline tax dispute. In a phone survey of approximately 650 respondents from across Japan, 58% approved of delaying the transfer of the road construction fund into the general fund until fiscal 2009, while only 24% opposed. At the same time — and more than slightly contradictorily — only 31% approve of the plan to retain to the temporary gasoline tax and use the revenue for road construction in fiscal 2008 (55% opposed). Respondents were pleased at the prospect of a drop in gasoline tax in April by a margin of 72% to 12%, but that did not translate into more support for the DPJ. Asked whether they approve of the DPJ's position, 40% approved, 44% disapproved. Less significantly, the DPJ saw a one-point drop in its support rate to 20%, compared with the LDP's two-point increase to 31%. The LDP, however, should not be too encouraged by this poll: respondents overwhelmingly blamed both parties for the gasoline tax dispute, and when asked about the BOJ dispute, respondents approved of neither the LDP's nor the DPJ's approach to the succession battle.

There is now the open question of whether Mr. Fukuda truly has the support of the LDP in pushing for a compromise that includes provisions for the demise of the special road construction fund, whatever the time line. The opposition parties consulted with Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura on Friday on this question, who replied, "I think that individual members hold various opinions, but I think that since it is the prime minister's decision and leadership, understanding will be reached." Mr. Fukuda indicated Friday in response to a question in the HC Budget Committee that he consulted beforehand with the ministers of finance, transportation, and internal affairs, but not with the whole cabinet.

Neither response sounds particularly convincing to me, hence Mr. Fukuda's effort Sunday to change the subject to Mr. Ozawa's shenanigans last autumn.

Hence Kono Taro felt compelled to describe Thursday's about-face as a "palace coup," with Mr. Kono and his comrades, who believe in the need to transfer special road construction funds into the general fund and are prepared to vote against the prevailing measure if it comes before the HR a second time, "transformed in a stroke from opposition forces to imperial guards" as Mr. Fukuda wholly embraced their ideas.

The idea that road tribe and its allies in prefectural and local governments will be cowed by Mr. Fukuda's sudden shift is unrealistic. Confident that they had won the argument — convinced that the government, having passed the bill, would simply wait for sixty days to elapse and then pass the bill again — there is no reason to think that the advocates of business as usual will be silenced. As Mr. Kono wrote, "Within the party there are still various voices. Whether or not the LDP will completely cut longstanding ties of obligation, whether or not it can do the ordinary things — there will not be a second chance."

The just-passed compromise bill that extends to the end of May various taxes in the special measures bill on taxation except the temporary tax means that the price of a liter of gasoline is set to drop from Tuesday. It also means that both Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ozawa will now be under tremendous pressure that will grow by the day. Mr. Fukuda will be pressured by the reformists to hold the new line, even as the road tribe and its allies pressure Mr. Fukuda to back down from his newly announced plan. The prime minister will also face some pressure from the DPJ, which has promised once again to pass a non-binding censure motion against the prime minister if the HR re-passes the tax bill at the end of the sixty-day period. (Mind you, I don't take this threat particularly seriously — and I'm sure neither does Mr. Fukuda — because the prime minister is free to ignore the censure motion and carry on as if nothing happened. But it's worth mentioning...)

Mr. Ozawa, meanwhile, will be under pressure from opponents within his own party not to cave, lest his position as party leader become forfeit, just as the DPJ as a whole will be under pressure from the media (AKA "public opinion) and the government to compromise. Every day that passes will help the DPJ, as consumers become accustomed to paying less for gas and less willing to countenance a tax hike (and worried LDP backbenchers less willing to risk their seats to see the higher rate restored in a month's time).

The newly passed agreement may momentarily ease the sense of crisis, but not for long. The LDP and the DPJ are in the midst of a battle with significant consequences for the future of the Japanese political system.

Accountability comes to the alliance?

Chalk up another first for the Japanese political system.

For the first time since it was created in 1978, the "sympathy budget" by which Japan subsidizes the presence of US forces in Japan will not be passed before the end of the fiscal year, due to demands from the DPJ for more thorough deliberation. The bill, a three-year extension of the current host-nation support arrangement, will pass the HR at the beginning of April, but since the DPJ is expected to use HC deliberations to question the bill, it will most likely not take effect until the beginning of May.

The material impact of this delay is negligible. The US will have to take responsibility for paying civilian laborers and utility bills. The relocation of US aerial exercises from Okinawa to the mainland, scheduled to be paid for by Japan, will likely be delayed until May.

The political significance of the delay, however, is enormous. I wrote last week that the Japanese contribution to construction on Guam could be a cause for delay in the project as a result of the DPJ's desire for oversight. Consider this a preview. The DPJ has made no secret of its eagerness to scrutinize how every taxpayer yen is spent in relation to the alliance — and it will take every opportunity to do so. Every bill related to the alliance that comes before the Diet will be an opportunity for the DPJ to search for and expose fraud, waste, and abuse.

The government is worried about the impact DPJ scrutiny will have on the alliance. Foreign Minister Komura said, "I have no doubt that US confidence (in Japan) is diminishing. I am worried that the US-Japan alliance's deterrent power is weakening."

On the contrary, I hope that DPJ oversight is the beginning of a more robust and equitable alliance relationship, one in which Japan raises its voice in alliance deliberations. In this sense, last year's fight over the MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean was the DPJ's first broadside in a long-term struggle to introduce accountability into the alliance. For too long the relationship has gone unquestioned outside the editorial pages of Akahata. But questions need to be asked. Who owes who what? What are the obligations of each ally? Should this arrangement change? Hopefully DPJ members will raise these questions in the next month of HC deliberations on this bill.

Japan passing, Australian style

Tom Conley and Michael Heazle, writing in The Australian, look back to the 1990s to criticize Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's travel itinerary.

In addition to haranguing Japan on whaling, they argue

Rudd has added insult to injury by snubbing Japan on his coming world tour. The Prime Minister seemingly can find the time to traverse the entire globe but not to visit Japan. The cold-shoulder is made more disturbing for Tokyo by the inevitable comparison it creates with Australia's relationship with Beijing and the constant reporting of Sinophile Rudd as China's new golden child. It is certainly no secret that early visits are symbolically important, since they give a strong indication of who and what the new leader considers to be important. In the arena of foreign relations and diplomacy, impressions matter and Australia has had few prime ministers more aware of this basic fact. All of which makes Rudd's Japan passing even more curious.

They further argue that Mr. Rudd's focus on China is misguided due to Japan's commitment sound Australia-Japan relations and its enduring significance as a regional economic power.

Back when Mr. Rudd followed Mr. Fukuda into power last year, I expressed my hopes that "with Fukuda Yasuo replacing Mr. Abe, and the Mandarin-speaking Mr. Rudd replacing Mr. Howard, the 'deputy sheriff,' the 'quad' may be no more. Both Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Rudd seem to believe that their power is best spent promoting cooperation in Asia, not deepening security cooperation among democracies conveniently located on all sides of China."

I still think that these leaders' thinking on Asia policy is the way of the future, but I was clearly mistaken in expecting that Australia and Japan might begin articulating a new approach in the immediate future. The fault is not Mr. Rudd's alone. What would a visit to Tokyo now accomplish? The Fukuda government, completely distracted by mounting domestic problems and possibly on its last legs, has made little progress articulating a new Asia policy or a new grand strategy in which to embed it.

So yes, Mr. Rudd should have made a stop — and should put some effort into thinking about both countries can balance their China ties with their links to the US. But he can't be blamed too much for passing up a photo-op with an enfeebled Mr. Fukuda.

Fukuda resignation watch?

In a handful of days, Prime Minister Fukuda has gone from cool and collected, to angry, to shaken and desperate.

On Friday, Mr. Fukuda called an emergency press conference to make one final plea to the DPJ to compromise on the gasoline tax, agreeing to reduce the sunset clause on the use of gasoline tax for road construction to one year.

Not surprisingly, DPJ Secretary-General Hatoyama Yukio signaled that the DPJ will not accept Mr. Fukuda's latest plea. LDP Secretary-General Ibuki Bunmei and Komeito Secretary-General Kitagawa Kazuo are reportedly working on an emergency one-month extension to avert "chaos," i.e. to not give the Japanese people a one-month tax cut that they might not want to see reversed in a month.

More interesting, however, is the impact of Mr. Fukuda's plea within the LDP. The road tribe is of course, apoplectic over his compromise; the Koizumians are pleased that the prime minister is coming around to one of the maestro's cherished positions. Considering that even some ostensible "reformists" have been spinning the road construction plans as beneficial for rural areas (as opposed to construction companies and the politicians they back), this last-ditch effort may well throw the party into complete disarray, more than it already is. Mr. Fukuda, already struggling to impose discipline and order on the LDP, may find himself completely friendless after this gambit. Will someone dare to act in the coming weeks to force him out? Will Mr. Mori withdraw his support and suggest that Mr. Fukuda ask for indefinite sick leave?

The debate in the coming weeks over whether to pass the tax bill at the end of next month over the objections of the HC, the opposition, and much of the Japanese public could well be the trigger for a realignment, with Mr. Fukuda's premiership consumed in the process.

Low posture to blame for Fukuda's problems?

In Japanese postwar political history, the phrase "low posture" — 低姿勢, teishisei — is most associated with Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato (1960-1964). No mere slogan, the phrase signaled an end to the Kishi era, which ended in violence in the streets of Tokyo.

The Ikeda era would be one of "tolerance and patience," of working with the opposition to formulate policy.

The phrase subsequently became associated with the LDP mainstream as embodied by the Kochikai — indeed, it became part of the furniture of LDP rule under the 1955 system. Even Fukuda Takeo, the current prime minister's father, who was associated with the anti-mainstream Kishi faction, declared his commitment to a "low posture" in Diet proceedings in August 1977: "As for Diet management, for my government and the LDP, in facing other parties we must have a low posture...So, concerning important policy, before the government decides we want to ask for everyone's opinions as much as possible."

Of course, the flip side of the declared commitment to a low posture was the inevitable criticism from opposition parties when the government reportedly failed to adhere to this stance. Prime Minister Ikeda was not immune, as in the later years of his government, Socialist Diet members regularly claimed that his low posture was just a political maneuver to placate the public before elections.

Fukuda Yasuo is but the latest adherent of the LDP's low posture school to serve as prime minister — and according to Sankei, the Fukuda cabinet's troubles illustrate the "bankruptcy" of the low posture and the need for a firmer line with the DPJ. In an article that sounds suspiciously editorial-like, the newspaper suggests that there are "omens" that Mr. Fukuda is set to abandon the cooperative posture he adopted upon taking office.

It seems that Mr. Fukuda's — and the LDP's — problem is that its posture hasn't nearly been low enough. While the government has been sparing in its use of its HR supermajority, it has acted as if the supermajority gives it the ability to dictate terms to the DPJ and the HC. Prior consultation? Genuine deference to the DPJ's positions? The government has preferred to submit its proposals and then attempt to hammer out a compromise after the fact. MTC ably demonstrates how the government's poor time management is indicative of the Fukuda government's attitude towards the DPJ. In the months since being denied its grand coalition with the DPJ, the LDP has preferred to gripe about the DPJ's failure to be a "responsible" opposition party than to forge realistic and working cooperation as necessary with the HC's largest party. If any government deserves to be criticized for announcing a "low posture" as a political ploy, the Fukuda government is it.

The government still has not come to terms with the idea that unless it wants to govern solely by Article 59 and leave important posts unfilled, it has no choice but to work with the DPJ. And so the BOJ governorship is occupied by an interim governor (has the sky fallen yet?) and the Japanese people are about to get a nice tax cut come April 1.

Regional decentralization is out of reach, for now

Bad news for Aso Taro: progress towards substantial decentralization may be impossible to realize.

So says the government's Prefectural Integration Vision consultation group, which released an interim report on Monday. The whole report is available for download here, in PDF format.

According to Mainichi, the group — which was formed in January 2007 under Mr. Abe — envisions the implementation of drastic reorganization of the relationship between central and regional governments by 2018, but it also announced that it won't have a final report ready for another two years. One sticking point is how the prefectures are to be reorganized. Not surprisingly, drastically redrawing the geographic boundaries of Japan's regional governments draws opposition from existing prefectural governments and bureaucrats in the central governments. Even the LDP and the government have differing ideas about a reorganization, with the LDP's Headquarters for the Promotion of Prefectural Integration calling for consolidating prefectural and local governments into 10 states and 700-1000 municipalities.

And the government's ministries and agencies are, of course, adamantly opposed to a transfer of authority to regional governments.

It's probably safe to say that without the bureaucracy's approval, regional decentralization will not happen.

As I've noted previously, decentralization could have considerable benefits for Japanese governance by bringing government closer to the people and making it more transparent. But there's a reason why this kind of change happens rarely, if at all. (The last major reorganization of regional governments, of course, was in the early years of the Meiji Restoration.) It is easy for politicians and business leaders to appeal to the example of the Meiji Restoration — not surprisingly, this interim report does — but it is considerably more difficult for political leaders to overcome institutional obstacles and implement Meiji-style reforms in the present political environment.

Who can overcome the opposition that proposals like regional decentralization necessarily attract? (And is there actually a majority in favor of sweeping reform? People may be unhappy with the current political situation, but that does not necessarily translate into support for broad change.)

Fukuda loses his cool

At a press conference Monday, Prime Minister Fukuda expressed his anger at the DPJ's rejection of the government's efforts to pass compromise legislation on taxation.

"[The DPJ] has an attitude of entirely not deliberating on the budget-related tax bill. What can the Diet do about this? Speaking honestly, this is incomprehensible."

Mr. Fukuda and the LDP executive has reportedly been leaning on Kono Yohei, HR speaker, to forge yet another compromise with the DPJ to forestall the "chaos" anticipated by some LDP members if the tax bill doesn't pass by the end of the month. (Jun Okumura argues here that the chaos might not be nearly as bad as suggested.)

Perhaps the impression that Mr. Fukuda is not worried about his situation — suggested here — is mistaken. With his government's six-month anniversary approaching Wednesday, his government is in trouble. Low popularity may be the least of his troubles. Most worrying is that Mr. Fukuda has had little success quelling internal conflict within the LDP, which will make it difficult for him to extricate himself from his situation. One conflict, of course, is the rift between the conservatives centered around the True Conservative Policy Research Group and risk-averse party elders, who are desperate to preserve unity; another rift, discussed in this article in Sentaku magazine, is between growth-firsters (led by Nakagawa Hidenao and Takenaka Heizo) and financial reconstructionists (led by Yosano Kaoru and Tanigaki Sadakazu). Keeping each of these groups content is a difficult, if not impossible task.

Who will Mr. Fukuda disappoint in the war over the tax bill? If no compromise emerges in the next week, will the government bow to the inevitable and not override the HC at the end of April? Mainichi suggests in this article that Mr. Nakagawa believes the government should not use the supermajority. Of course, if Mr. Fukuda lets the temporary tax lapse, he risks enraging his financial reconstructionist supporters, like Mr. Tanigaki.

The demise of the Fukuda cabinet is underway, although it will take months to play out. The timing will depend on who the government disappoints most over the next month.

Trouble at the tip of the spear

Most of the concerns about the lack of progress in implementing the 2006 US-Japan realignment agreement have focused on political troubles in Japan, as Tokyo has struggled to get local governments involved in the relocation of US forces in Japan to accept the terms of the 2006 agreement. With the change of government in Iwakuni removing an obstacle (and, in accordance with Tokyo's tit-for-tat tactics, resulting in the restoration of frozen subsidies to Iwakuni) and the environmental survey at Camp Schwab in Okinawa proceeding, albeit irregularly, attention is now shifting to Guam, the receiving end of the realignment agreement.

A look at Guam shows that even if the Japanese side of the process was proceeding smoothly, the US still has substantial work to do to prepare Guam to host an additional 40,000 US service personnel, dependents, and contractors, a substantial increase from the 13,000 who are there presently (in addition to 173,000 civilians).

The stakes of the Guam buildup are enormous. For Guam's citizens, the expanded military presence will mean a massive boon to the territory's economy. For the US military, Guam will become an important hub for the Navy, Air Force, and Marines, a transformation already underway as far as the Air Force is concerned. Contractors are undoubtedly excited about the projected $13 billion price tag, a number that will likely increase. But preparing the island for the massive influx of US forces will require cooperation among the federal government, the Japanese government, Guam's government, and the US military — and for the moment, cooperation has been elusive, raising questions about whether the project will begin in 2010 as scheduled.

The Hill, a Capitol Hill publication, highlighted an additional problem: Madeline Bordallo, Guam's congressional delegate, is struggling to build a coalition that will support funding for the project. The article notes that Ms. Bordallo is having a particularly hard time gaining support in the Senate, where Guam has no representation. (Another problem is that many lawmakers know nothing about Guam, beginning with its location.)

Federal funding is indispensable, because this project is not just a matter of military bases. The influx of personnel will entail major improvements in the island's infrastructure, which is already stressed due to its position in Typhoon alley and a surprisingly costly snake problem. It will entail new homes and schools. (The Washington Post reviewed the infrastructure and funding problems in an article last month.)

What does this mean for the Japanese government? According to the 2006 agreement, of course, Japan is obligated to pay $6 billion towards the transfer of Marines to Guam, meaning that Tokyo will be paying for this massive construction project. Undoubtedly Washington is eager to receive Japanese funds. But given the coordination problems that have hampered the process to date, and the oversight problems that will undoubtedly dog the process in the future, is Japanese money worth what the Japanese contribution will cost in terms of efficiency? The debate in the Diet last year over Japanese fuel contributions that may have been diverted to the Iraqi campaign was in a sense a preview for the debate that will surround the use of Japanese funds in Guam. While most of the contribution will be in the form of loans from the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), the GOJ's $2.8 billion direct contribution will come under intense scrutiny from the opposition — and if the DPJ and other opposition parties manage to form a government, the 2007 law authorizing the use of Japanese funds could be repealed (if the DPJ's opposition to the law's passage is any indication).

Admittedly, though, the efficiency gains for releasing Japan from its obligations are the least important argument in support of this idea, because as noted above the process is inefficient as is.

I think that the next president should offer to renegotiate the 2006 agreement and to release Japan from its financial contribution as a gesture of goodwill and a signal that the next administration will mark the beginning of a new, more equitable era in the alliance. For the Bush administration, a closer alliance has meant an alliance in which Tokyo is more subservient to Washington. The next administration can break from the past by recognizing Japan's financial difficulties and freeing Tokyo from having to pay for construction on Guam. While the Japanese financial contribution will be missed, particularly as the price tag grows, the change in tone that would result from renegotiation would yield long-term benefits from US-Japan cooperation (instead of the ill will associated with the current arrangement).

Meanwhile, the next president should make preparations on Guam a priority for US Asia policy and use presidential power to solve the coordination problems currently hampering the construction project, pressuring Congress to appropriate funds for the construction in order to expedite the process. (And the US might as well finance it from deficit spending and let China pay for the construction.)

Latest at FEER Forum

My latest contribution to FEER's website — "The Second Coming of Taro Aso" — can be read here.

What, me worry?

In an editorial Friday, the Hokkaido Shimbun wondered why Prime Minister Fukuda exhibits no sense of crisis despite mounting problems and falling popularity.

"It's strange," the newspaper writes, "that the prime minister's sense of crisis appears to be diluted," considering that the BOJ vacancy and the uncertain prospects for a compromise with the DPJ over taxes and road construction could spell the end of his premiership.

Yamamoto Ichita, LDP HC member, suggests that concerns about the durability of the Fukuda cabinet may be overblown because all Diet members are motivated by what he calls "election avoidance syndrome." His HR colleagues, he suggests, are terrified for their election prospects and will therefore be willing to bend considerably to delay a general election. He suggests that some younger LDP members will vote against renewing the gasoline tax if the tax is canceled and then comes up for a vote in the HR again. In a postscript, Mr. Yamamoto addresses the idea that the LDP might dump Mr. Fukuda prematurely: "With the Fukuda cabinet's approval rating dropping, 'Dump Fukuda' voices are strengthening within the party?!?...this case is inconsistent with 'election avoidance syndrome.'" The LDP will stick with Mr. Fukuda, he argues, because dumping him will raise the chances of an early election. (Then again, his logic that another leadership change will mean pressure to go to the people for a mandate is shaky, if only because the baton was passed from Mr. Abe to Mr. Fukuda without the people being consulted.)

Perhaps Mr. Fukuda's Thursday meeting with Nakagawa Shoichi and Yosano Kaoru, who represent two blocs that could potentially challenge Mr. Fukuda's leadership, suggests that his hold on the party, however tenuous, remains secure. (In other words, both men and their comrades are slight content to let Mr. Fukuda suffer the slings and arrows of the divided Diet.)

Mr. Yamamoto may be right: Mr. Fukuda could have nothing to worry about by virtue of being in possession of the leadership. But to echo a concern raised by the Hokkaido Shimbun, how long can he go without articulating a reform agenda? And for how much longer can he count on both the conservatives and the reformists to support his government?

Foreign policy could prove Mr. Fukuda's undoing. Sankei reported that the subject of the True Conservative Policy Study Group's meeting this week was China policy, which turned into criticism of Mr. Fukuda's reconciliatory approach. A muddled approach to Tibet could give the conservatives an opening, if they choose to exploit it.

The daunting political situation is probably enough to secure Mr. Fukuda's position through the July G8 summit — I still think that prospective successors would prefer that Mr. Fukuda take a thorny issue or two off the agenda first — but if his public support doesn't recover in the meantime, his opponents may be tempted to force him out before the start of the autumn extraordinary session, election avoidance syndrome or no election avoidance syndrome.

"Pride" is not just the property of the LDP

In this post earlier this month, I discussed the importance of "pride" — hokori (誇り) — in the thinking of the Japanese right.

In this vein, Younghusband at Coming Anarchy writes of a dispute between the DPJ and The Economist over the recent cover that featured the pun "Japain."

Iwakuni Tetsundo, head of the DPJ's international bureau, wrote to complain about the cover:

...I strenuously object to the title on the cover of your Asia edition, 'Japain'. Japan is the official name of our nation, registered and acknowledged by the United Nations and other international bodies. It is completely outrageous that you combined the word for our nation with 'pain'. You made fun of our respected nation's name on a cover that is sold on newsstands all over the region. This conduct is equal to burning a national flag, which is base and inconsiderate. No nation's name should be treated like this.

I disapprove of the utter lack of humor on the part of Mr. Iwakuni, and, presumably, the DPJ, since Mr. Iwakuni seems to have written in an official capacity. Please take a deep breath: this is nothing like the burning of a national flag, and this stance makes the DPJ look silly and irrationally nativist.

This episode goes to show that a national pride that occasionally borders on chauvinism is not the unique property of the LDP and conservatives like Nakagawa Shoichi. This is a reality of Japanese politics today. I suspect Japanese politicians — and the Japanese people — may have a bit of a chip on their shoulder as a result of the slights and put downs the country endured during the lost decade. (Of course, the Japanese establishment engaged in ongoing self-criticism throughout the 1990s.) This suggests that nationalism and related-foreign policy issues will not be the basis for a new cleavage in a realigned political system. A certain degree of nationalism — if not loyalty to the nationalist agenda proposed by the LDP's conservatives — may be common to most Diet members.

This episode may also reflect a certain powerlessness on the part of the Japanese establishment, prompting officials and businessmen to lash out like this: it is difficult, after all, for Mr. Iwakuni to take issue with the substance of The Economist article, although he attempts to refute the magazine's criticism of the DPJ. Japan is mired in intractable social and economic problems that have diminished the country's international profile. As such, the DPJ and the establishment as a whole should not vent its frustrations at foreign critics, who for the most part have Japan's interests at heart.

Recommended Book: The Peninsula Question, Yoichi Funabashi

In the year since Funabashi Yoichi, editor-in-chief of the Asahi Shimbun, finished The Peninsula Question, the US and North Korea made an agreement that restarted the Six-Party talks, overcame the Banco Delta Asia obstacle, and issued a joint statement with the other parties that included a promise by North Korea to account for its nuclear program and disable related facilities, before progress stalled at New Year's. In the process, the Abe government ensured that Japan would not play a constructive role in the talks.

Dr. Funabashi's book does not suffer from leaving off at North Korea's nuclear test in October 2006. Indeed, The Peninsula Question anticipates much of what's happened over the past year.

The Peninsula Question is, according to its subtitle, "a chronicle of the second Korean nuclear crisis." This is not a polemic — Dr. Funabashi does not deviate from his measured tone except in a few spots in which he criticizes US hawks — and he provides few answers to the titular question. But as a chronicle of the Northeast Asian crisis since 2002, it is nonpareil. Dr. Funabashi interviewed dozens of policymakers in the governments of five of the six parties, providing an intimate look at how the US, Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia approached North Korea in the Six-Party talks.

The result is of interest to both general readers and international relations specialists, as Dr. Funabashi shows the constraints that impact foreign policy decision makers. Dr. Funabashi shows that neither international politics nor domestic politics is the primary constraint on policy makers: both are important, with some variance from country to country. Policy makers are also constrained by history, ideology, and geography. This is not to deny the role of human agency in policy making, but it suggests that policy makers operate exercise their agency within a narrow band. The main protagonists of Dr. Funabashi's book were further constrained because they were, for the most part, not heads of state and government. Perhaps the only figure willing and able to defy the constraints was former prime minister Koizumi Junichiro, who traveled twice to Pyongyang in pursuit of the normalization of diplomatic ties with North Korea.

As a result of his interviews, Dr. Funabashi draws special attention to the domestic constraints on each country's North Korea policy. While Washington and Tokyo were perhaps the most divided of the six parties, each government — North Korea included — had divisions that undermined the pursuit of an agreement. These domestic divisions resulted in first the rift between South Korea, and the US and Japan, and then in the rift between the US and Japan in 2007 as the Abe government took a firmer line on North Korea at the moment that the US approach softened.

Ultimately, though, it may be the international constraints that will undermine any agreement. North Korea, perhaps for good reason, believes that a nuclear weapon is the key to its security. Neither the US nor Japan is willing to live with a North Korean nuke; neither government, however, is in a position to take decisive action to end the North Korean nuclear program. China is clearly annoyed by North Korea, but appears willing to act only so far as to prevent a war on the Korean peninsula. Russia has little influence in Northeast Asia, as illustrated by Dr. Funabashi's chapter showing the failure of Russia's attempt to offer itself as an "honest broker" in the talks.

The result? North Korea will continue doing exactly what it's been doing. In the meantime, the five parties should be strengthening cooperation in preparation for the collapse of the DPRK, because post-DPRK North Korea may be the source of more trouble in the region than the DPRK itself, albeit trouble of a different sort.

Life imitates The Simpsons

From io9, Gawker Media's science fiction blog, comes a report that Russia will once again be parading ICBMs in Red Square on Victory Square.

This story brought to mind a moment from "Simpson Tide," an episode from the ninth season of The Simpsons:

Russian official: The Soviet Union will be pleased to offer amnesty to your wayward vessel.
American official: The Soviet Union? I thought you guys broke up.
Russian official: Yes, that's what we wanted you to think! [laughs]

(Sorry, no clip on YouTube.)

See me live

I'm back in New York City now and normal blogging will resume momentarily.

In the meantime, readers who will be in New York City area on Thursday, April 10 will be able to see me live at an event called "The Republic of Bloggers" at the Korea Society. The official announcement follows.

---

The Republic of Bloggers

Thursday, April 10, 2008

The Korea Society, 950 Third Avenue, Eighth Floor, New York City
(Building entrance on SW corner of Third Avenue and 57th Street)
6:00 PM-6:30 PM ♦ Registration and Reception
6:30 PM-8:00 PM ♦ Presentation and Q&A
$10 for members (The Korea Society, Japan Society or Carnegie Council). $15 for non-members.
Buy tickets

For more information or to register for the program, contact Patrick Clair at (212) 759-7525, ext. 328 or email

With some of the highest rates of broadband and wireless Internet penetration in the world, Korea and Japan are home to thriving online communities that affect politics, shape public opinion, and forge new forms of social bonding. In Korea, the net has empowered citizen journalism and created a new national pastime of “massively multiplayer online games.” According to the Washington Post, more blogs are written in Japanese than in English, despite the fact that English speakers outnumber Japanese speakers by five to one. Both countries are bastions of participatory Internet use, but what accounts for subtle differences in user attitudes and behavior? In addition to exploring the challenges and lessons learned by people blogging about Korean and Japanese society and politics, the panel discusses how the peculiarities of Japanese and Korean political and online cultures affect participatory democracy in those countries, and whether these experiences will be a bellwether for the global community.

This program takes place in conjunction with the ongoing, two-year, Ethical Blogger project conducted by Brown University’s Watson Institute, the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, Demos, NYU’s Center for Global Affairs, and Oxford University’s Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism.

Introductory remarks by Devin T. Stewart, Director, Editor, Global Policy Innovations program, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

Speakers:

David Weinberger, Author, Fellow, Harvard Berkman Center for Internet & Society

Wendy H.K. Chun, Assistant Professor of Modern Culture and Media, Brown University

Tobias Harris, Publisher, ObservingJapan.com; freelance blogger and journalist

Stuart Thorson, Professor of Political Science, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University

Samuel Jamier, Senior Program Officer, Contemporary Issues & Corporate Affairs, The Korea Society

Moderated by Daniel B. Levine, The Korea Society

Without a clue

LDP proposes, DPJ disposes — again.

As MTC points out, the LDP did the exact same thing in introducing the nomination of Tanami Koji as it did with the nomination of Muto Toshiro: it failed to consult with the DPJ beforehand.

Indeed, showing that it has learned absolutely nothing and suggesting that the government is in fact not above playing politics, it submitted, in the words of Hatoyama Yukio, DPJ secretary-general, a man with the "same career history as Mr. Muto."

Little wonder that the DPJ has rejected this latest, feeble effort to avoid a vacancy in the leadership of the BOJ.

While the DPJ has once again stated that the reason for the rejection is fears about the independence of the BOJ from the Ministry of Finance, this fight is not about central bank independence. It is about the LDP's persistent inability to come to terms with the idea that the Diet is divided and that it needs to consult with the DPJ beforehand, especially in cases like this in which it has no recourse to the Article 59 override used in the MSDF refueling mission case.

Heading into the midst of the worst economic conditions since World War II without a central banker may be harrowing, but maybe it will be the only way the government will learn that treating the opposition with condescension doesn't work when the opposition has a major stake in the policymaking process. For all the complaints about DPJ intransigence, the government bears much of the blame for a failure to find a way to compete short of mutually assured destruction or cooperate short of a grand coalition.

Back stateside

I've just returned to New York City from Japan, and I'm off to Boston tomorrow morning.

Posting will probably be light through Wednesday.

The BOJ battle's winners and losers

The big news of the day is, of course, the government's decision to submit a new candidate for the BOJ governorship in place of Muto Toshiro. It is still unclear who the government will submit in his place — the LDP is reportedly sounding out the plausibility of Mr. Fukui's staying in office, although the DPJ has nixed it. But a compromise is likely to emerge any day now.

So who won, who lost?

Obviously the biggest loser is Muto Toshiro, who was rejected for the scantiest of reasons, guilt by association with the Ministry of Finance. Then again, with the Bear Stearns blowout and its likely ramifications, maybe he's the biggest winner of all, given that he won't have to the helm of the BOJ in the midst of a rapidly worsening global financial crisis.

Did the government and the LDP win or lose? Politically, the LDP lost, simply because it conceded. But by conceding, the government can spin its concession as an illustration of its willingness to compromise with the opposition and its desire to put the national interest before political opportunism.

As for the DPJ, in simple political terms, the DPJ won. It forced the government to withdraw Mr. Muto, and showed that it will not be ignored by the LDP, especially on appointments.

But it is necessary to look at the winners and losers within the DPJ. This is not a victory for Mr. Ozawa, who found as the BOJ fight intensified that his hands were tied by hardline Muto opponents who are also opponents to Mr. Ozawa's leadership. The anti-Ozawa group will likely emerge from this fight emboldened, more confident in its ability to pressure Mr. Ozawa to bend to their wishes — and more prepared to unite behind a candidate to oppose Mr. Ozawa in the September leadership election.

Hiranuma's kiss of death?

After nearly returning to the LDP in the waning days of the Abe cabinet, Hiranuma Takeo, holdout postal rebel and conservative stalwart, is not particularly popular among the LDP's elders.

Recall, for example, that in January Mori Yoshiro scolded Nakagawa Shoichi for working with Mr. Hiranuma in their "True Conservative Policy Research Group," AKA the HANA no Kai. Undoubtedly Mr. Hiranuma's presence outside the party is noxious to LDP leaders like Mr. Mori eager to keep their divided party together, not least when he speaks of creating a new "true" conservative party.

In a move that will likely irritate the party elders, Mr. Hiranuma has endorsed Aso Taro for LDP leader. He said Friday, "If the Fukuda cabinet resigns en masse, everybody is looking to the birth of an Aso administration. Since my principles and opinions are very similar, I will work hard to realize it."

I don't see how Mr. Hiranuma's endorsement helps Mr. Aso, particularly since the latter is trying to make a case for why he is the best man to reunite the LDP in the post-Fukuda era, which may be coming sooner than anticipated (and may therefore begin before the next general election). Indeed, despite Mr. Aso's fervent courtship of Mr. Mori and other Machimura faction power brokers, I wonder whether his association with Mr. Hiranuma — and comments made during last September's presidential election about factional politics — will once again deny him the LDP presidency, a scenario that leads me to wonder what Mr. Aso, Mr. Hiranuma, and the other conservatives will do in response.

Signs of compromise?

With the end of Fukui Toshihiko's term as BOJ president rapidly approaching, there are signs that the LDP and the DPJ might be able to come to terms on the nomination of his successor.

Messrs. Oshima and Yamaoka, Diet strategists for the LDP and DPJ respectively, met once more on Thursday and agreed that a vacancy at the BOJ is undesirable. The two reportedly discussed an idea, emerging from within the LDP, to revise the BOJ law to allow for a temporary extension of the BOJ president's term. There is also the possibility that Shirakawa Masaaki, a Kyoto university professor already confirmed by both houses as vice president, could serve as acting president until the parties agree on a BOJ president.

In the meantime, the LDP has announced that it will wait until Monday to submit Mr. Muto's nomination once again, giving the parties time to pursue a compromise while ensuring that the BOJ presidency will not be vacant. Sankei suggests that there are signs that the LDP might be willing to reconsider its support for Mr. Muto.

On the gasoline tax front, Mr. Fukuda alluded to the possibility of a compromise in deliberations at the HC Budget Committee Thursday, although he provided to details on what a compromise might entail. Ota Akihiro, Komeito head, suggested that the compromise could entail shortening and trimming the 10-year, 59 trillion yen road-construction plan, directing more gasoline tax revenue to the general fund, and putting a shorter time limit on the temporary tax. Koishi Azuma, the head of the DPJ group in the HC, dismissed Mr. Ota's suggestions off hand.

Compromise on this issue has proved elusive even among the LDP's and DPJ's young reformers, who agree on so much else. At a debate on Thursday, each party's Young Turks repeated the party line: LDP members emphasized the importance of road construction for rural areas, DPJ members emphasized the importance of redirecting road construction funds into areas that have even more importance for the lives of Japanese citizens. The DPJ reasons — not inappropriately, I think — that it stands to gain from letting the gasoline tax lapse, at least for the month until the HR can automatically pass it again. Local governments will be unhappy with the DPJ, of course, but then with so many local governments in LDP hands, should the DPJ be bothered by their criticism? What matters is how voters will respond, and I find it hard to believe that they will be too irate about a tax break.

Koizumi Junichiro has used the stalemate to continue raising his political profile. The former prime minister, speaking in Hamamatsu on Thursday, appealed to the leaders of both the LDP and the DPJ to compromise for the good of the nation. Will Koizumi power be enough to break the deadlock? I'm skeptical.

Will Fukuda last?

Many analysts of Japanese politics assumed at the inception of the Fukuda cabinet that his was little more than a caretaker government.

Now more than 100 days into the Fukuda administration, it remains difficult to say whether that assessment will turn out to be accurate. If the caretaker's job is to stabilize the ruling party and ensure that his successor's government will have surer footing, then Mr. Fukuda is an abject failure as a caretaker.

That would explain the intra-party maneuvering described in a long, rambling article by Akasaka Taro in the April issue of Bungei Shunjyu, posted in two parts at Yahoo! Minna no seiji.

The first part describes Mr. Fukuda's efforts to bolster his government's ability to lead on social security and taxation — Akasaka opens with the example of the recent appointment of Ito Tatsuya, a lieutenant of Nakagawa Hidenao as the prime minister's adviser on the social security issue in defiance of the health and welfare "tribe" to show the treacherous waters in which Mr. Fukuda is navigating.

The Fukuda government, Akasaka suggests, has been paralyzed in terms of its policy leadership, for reasons having more to do with Mr. Fukuda's struggle to impose some discipline on party and bureaucracy than with the divided Diet. At the same time, however, he may be laying the groundwork for a Fukuda-"colored" policy agenda that will enable him to serve as something more than a caretaker:

"The Social Security People's Conference." "The Conference for The Promotion of Consumer Administration." "The Global Warming Problem Consultative Group." These are all Fukuda ideas. In these three big policy areas a Fukuda color is becoming clear, sweeping away the "no policy" criticism and marking the start of the search for Kantei-led policymaking.

On this basis, Mr. Fukuda will attempt to prolong his government and delay a general election.

The second half of the article, however, suggests that reformist opponents of Mr. Fukuda may already be laying the groundwork for a new cabinet.

Akasaka points in particular to the activities of Sonoda Hiroyuki, a seven-term HR member who left the LDP in 1993 to join Sakigake before returning to the LDP in late 1999. He suggests that Mr. Sonoda is plotting with certain DPJ members to create an emergency government under the leadership of Yosano Kaoru. Supposedly Mr. Sonoda is working, through Sentaku, with anti-Ozawa members of the DPJ to undercut both Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Ozawa and vault a reformist government to power that will deal with Japan's most urgent problems. Mr. Yosano would be the man for the job apparently on the basis of his having been acknowledged as Mr. Koizumi's truest heir by longtime Koizumi aide Iijima Isao.

Whether there is something to this Sonoda "conspiracy" is besides the point. What's important is what this means for dynamics within the LDP: Akasaka acknowledges that the next LDP leadership struggle will likely be between Aso Taro and his conservative allies led by Nakagawa Shoichi, and the group of reformers around Yosano and centered in the reborn Kochikai, with outside help from Komeito and the DPJ. The decisive factor will be the backing of the Machimura faction.

For the moment, Mr. Fukuda — who vaulted to the premiership thanks to the backing of the Machimura faction, or rather Mori Yoshiro, its capo — enjoys the support of the LDP's largest faction. There is the possibility, however, that Mr. Mori and his lieutenants, the most vocal advocates of postponing a general election until September 2009, will begin looking for a more popular alternative to Mr. Fukuda later this year in the hope of repairing the LDP's prospects in the year leading up to a general election. It is possible that pressure for Mr. Fukuda to step aside in the aftermath of the G8 summit could come from his own "backers."

As for the prospects of the "Yosano emergency government," I think any plan that rests on the support of the DPJ's anti-Ozawa group is an unreliable one, not least because for the moment I think they would prefer to focus their efforts on unseating Mr. Ozawa from within the party — in September's party election for example — than in pressuring the DPJ from outside. That could change if and when someone triggers a realignment, as the Yosano camp could be the germ of a Koizumian new party, but for the moment this is just another example of the fevered speculation prompted by the uncertain political situation.

Finally, as for Mr. Fukuda, he remains, for now, the head of a woefully divided party that could splinter at any moment. Uneasy lies the head that wears the crown.