Hold steady on China

Following the ASAT test conducted in January of this year, the behavior of the PLA is once again providing China hawks in the US with reason to bang the war drums (or perhaps just the containment cymbals, not that those are any less distressing). The latest incident, of course, involves China's last-minute rejection of a planned visit by the USS Kitty Hawk to Hong Kong, where the crew would meet with family members for Thanksgiving. This followed on the heels China's denial of safe harbor to US Navy minesweepers that were seeking shelter from a storm, contravening centuries of maritime custom.

The Pentagon, reports the BBC, has protested to the Chinese government, which responded by claiming that the Kitty Hawk incident was the result of a "misunderstanding." The FT suggests that the two incidents could jeopardize ties between the two navies, which have matured in recent years. Remember earlier this year when Admiral Timothy Keating, the new commander of US Pacific Command, suggested that the US might help China develop aircraft carriers?

There are two separate but not mutually exclusive theories floating around to explain these incidents. Some suggest that Beijing is retaliating for the Dalai Lama's receiving the Congressional Gold Medal. Others talk darkly of the PLA's being beyond the control of the Communist Party (an argument I considered here).

If it's the former, there's nothing to worry about — the issue will have passed, and Sino-US relations will continue to be as positive as the People's Daily says in an article about a meeting between President Bush and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. Meanwhile, even if this incident is part of a pattern along with the ASAT test and reports of Chinese cyber raids on the Pentagon, that still should not preclude a deepening of defense ties between the US and China.

The US has no choice but to deal with China. A PLA unaccountable to any authority, while worrisome, does not change this fact. Indeed, the greater the independence enjoyed by the PLA, the greater the need for regularized interaction between the military officers and government officials not just from the US and China, but from the other countries in the region. Scaling back or cutting security ties with China and its military will simply make the PLA more hostile and less cooperative, reaffirming the impression surely common in certain circles within the PLA that the US and its allies seek to encircle China.

Yes, China's behavior is maddening and hard to understand. But the US, as the maintainer of stability and order in the region, has the duty to ignore the slight and focus on the task of coaxing China into acting as a pillar of order, not an unpredictable actor and potential menace. Clearly, the signals from China are mixed — interesting that this incident has unfolded just as a PLAN destroyer arrives in Japan for a historic visit. Decisions made by the US and its allies still have the ability to affect the direction of China's emergence for better or worse.

Here's hoping that cooler heads within the US Navy and the defense establishment prevail, despite those inside and outside the government who look for incidents like this to confirm their worst fears about China (like, say, Lou Dobbs, as mentioned by Tom Barnett).

Perhaps it's time for that Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia.

Expanding options

I am increasingly led to think that there is one principle common among both states in the international system and politicians within a domestic political system (especially democracies), it is that power is rooted in flexibility. The more options an actor has, the better able he is to outmaneuver rivals and secure other interests.

A classic example of this principle in the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China, in which the US, in a stroke, exercised the option of a tacit anti-Soviet alliance in Asia to hem in the USSR while expanding US flexibility.

Prime Minister Fukuda, I think, understands this — the fewer the commitments, ideological or otherwise, the greater the flexibility and thus the greater the advantage over rivals. The more one is open to a rival's policy ideas, the easier to undermine that rival. Mr. Koizumi was a master of this, "borrowing" DPJ policies to the consternation of the DPJ. This principle was undoubtedly behind the prime minister's cabinet picks, neutralizing potential rivals by depriving them of reasons for contention (and co-opting them into his government).

Accordingly, it is no surprise that on Wednesday Mr. Fukuda met with Takagi Tsuyoshi, the head of Rengo, an ally of the DPJ, to discuss labor policy, including the minimum wage and pensions. The prime minister proclaimed his desire to cooperate with the DPJ on pensions reform and urged Mr. Takagi to push the DPJ to cooperate with the government.

At the same time, Mr. Ozawa, as a result of his restlessness, has painted his party into a corner. He has spurned cooperation with the government — by which I mean routine cooperation across party lines, not a coalition. He has shifted course in opposition to the government's anti-terror law enough to give whiplash to DPJ members and members of other opposition parties alike. As a result, he has, according to MTC, weakened his party's bonds with the minor opposition parties whose support the DPJ needs within the Diet in order to exercise a majority in the Upper House and whose cooperation is essential if the DPJ is to have any chance of winning a general election.

There is no guarantee, of course, that Mr. Fukuda and the LDP will succeed in the battle over the anti-terror law as the extraordinary session concludes. But I think that, despite the appearance of tottering on the brink of disaster, Mr. Fukuda is in a good position. He has stabilized his party's situation following the wreck of the Abe cabinet and has maneuvered the DPJ into a position of passing legislation in the House of Councillors that stands little chance of being adopted in the House of Representatives, such as the newly passed bill calling for the withdrawal of Air Self-Defense Forces elements in Iraq.

Of course, Mr. Fukuda's leadership has not been free of mistakes that have limited his room for maneuver. The biggest mistake may have been retaining the anti-terror law as agenda item number one. Dropping it may have been politically untenable for the new prime minister — I still suspect he has no great desire to commit Japanese forces to the mission, this being the unspoken message of his remarks in Washington — but the result is that Mr. Fukuda may have no choice but to use his government's supermajority in the House of Representatives to pass the bill lest he lose credibility with the US, undermine his position within the LDP, and hand a victory to the DPJ. I don't think Mr. Fukuda has a problem using the supermajority, but I think he would rather use his government's silver bullet on issues that are higher on his government's and the Japanese people's list of priorities.

Accordingly, look for Mr. Fukuda to continue to seek partners for his initiatives, ignoring party and ideological lines in the process. At some point, he will have to deliver something, but in the meantime a willingness to cooperate will not be his undoing.

Interview at the Japan Times Blogroll

After being delayed a few months, the Blogroll at the website of the Japan Times has published an interview with me, available here.

Your comments, as always, appreciated.

Individuals matter

With the start of another week, there are now fewer than three weeks before the already-extended Diet session is scheduled to end. It is still unclear how Japan's first experiment with a divided Diet will end.

Six important questions, it seems, will be postponed into the final days of the Diet session. (1) Will the DPJ reject the anti-terror law outright, or (2) will it simply not act on the bill? In response to the former, (3) will the Fukuda government use the supermajority to pass the bill again? In response to the latter, (4) will it extend the session into January so that the sixty-day waiting period will lapse, giving the LDP a chance to pass the bill again in the Lower House (depending, of course, on its answer to question #3)? (5) Will the DPJ respond to use of the supermajority with an Upper House censure motion? And (6) will the government respond to an Upper House censure motion by dissolving the House of Representatives and calling a snap election?

MTC presents his answer to the penultimate question in this post, in which he argues, "A censure motion is, in a certain sense, a declaration of war. The power of the censure motion comes not from what it says about the present but what it says about the future." His argument that a censure motion will effectively sink the prime minister by ending any chance that the DPJ and LDP would work to facilitate cooperation between Diet chambers is convincing, but I cannot help but wonder whether the DPJ actually views it that way.

For my part, I remain agnostic about the meaning of the censure motion: by its very nature as a non-binding resolution, its power derives entirely from outside factors. Would a non-binding censure resolution have any power against a prime minister with Koizumian popularity? Would it have power if used against the prime minister over a policy issue in which he enjoyed public backing? I'm not saying that Mr. Fukuda enjoys a shield of high poll numbers — he doesn't — or that he has the public's overwhelming support on the refueling mission — again, he doesn't — but that's precisely the point. The public has been decidedly indecisive on both Mr. Fukuda and his refueling bill: he obviously doesn't enjoy the support he enjoyed upon taking office, but the public hasn't abandoned him, and the refueling mission continues to enjoy a near-majority of support so far as I can tell (and insofar as the Japanese people care). Thanks in part to public ambivalence, the meaning of a censure motion is essentially open to interpretation. (Another factor is, of course, that there are no meaningful precedents for this situation.) As a result, both parties will be busy with extracurricular maneuvering in the media to either talk down (cf. Mr. Koga) or play up the significance of a censure motion in the hope of moving the public decisively in one direction or the other.

Accordingly, the current situation is not unlike the situation in early 1993, as described by Gerald Curtis in The Logic of Japanese Politics — "It is a story of how politicians maneuver to exploit opportunities and how the context of their actions constrains the choices they make." The answer to the above questions will depend on contingencies. Which leader — both, as MTC notes in another post, extremely adroit — is gutsier? Which leader has the fatal flaw that will become apparent at the critical moment in the drama? Which party (and party leadership) is more disciplined? What role will the Japanese media — the omnipresent chorus of the drama — play in answering the six questions? And the fickle Japanese public? What part will the ongoing sideshow of Mr. Moriya, his relationship with Yamada Yoko, and corruption at the Defense Ministry play in the shifting calculations of the various actors?

As Curtis (and Richard Samuels, another advocate of the importance of leaders in spite of structural constraints, as discussed here) recognize, individual politicians have tremendous room to shape outcomes for better or worse. As this Diet session reaches its climax, we will get an illustration of just how much individuals matter.

I'm with Mr. Koga

Koga Makoto, head of the LDP's election strategy committee, has once again come out with remarks that suggest that the government is trying to deescalate tension in the political system that has resulted in a situation in which the press parses every comment by LDP and DPJ leaders in search of its significance in suggesting the timing of an election.

Addressing (ok, indirectly) a question that I asked in this post, Mr. Koga said, "By no means must the prime minister resign and the Lower House dissolve in the event of an Upper House censure resolution." He also reiterated that the LDP is in no hurry to surrender its supermajority in the House of Representatives.

I expect that the government will take this line should the DPJ use one of the few weapons that comes with control of the House of Councillors. And why not? There is no precedent of a non-binding censure motion taking down a government. Why would Mr. Fukuda want to set one? He could and should shrug off such a motion as an abuse of the powers of the Upper House, and press on with his agenda.

Looking back at my response to Mr. Koga's earlier remarks about delaying a general election, I'm inclined to think that this is another way to reiterate that contrary to appearances, the LDP still has the upper hand in the current political situation: the government will not be tricked or forced into calling an election it doesn't want.

New wind in Asia?

Is it me, or in a few short months has the mood in Asia changed?

Remember Sydney in early September? A bedraggled Prime Minister Abe, fresh from proclaiming a new era of cooperation among Asian democracies in India, went to Sydney for APEC, where he met with President Bush and Australia's John Howard. It was at that meeting, days before his resignation, that Prime Minister Abe promised that Japan would not withdraw from the Indian Ocean, a promise of support for his fellow democrats.

Now, in November, the second of the three leaders at that summit has left office, this time directly at the hands of his voters in a shining example for the region of the workings of democracy. John Howard, Australia's prime minister for eleven years, has lost to the Labour Party's Kevin Rudd in a landslide.

With Fukuda Yasuo replacing Mr. Abe, and the Mandarin-speaking Mr. Rudd replacing Mr. Howard, the "deputy sheriff," the "quad" may be no more. Both Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Rudd seem to believe that their power is best spent promoting cooperation in Asia, not deepening security cooperation among democracies conveniently located on all sides of China.

But how to build on this happy coincidence of leaders interested in an Asia without walls, an Asia of which I saw hints at the September APEC meeting? For the moment, the Bush administration will be absent from Asia as it prepares to launch yet another initiative in pursuit of peace between Israel and Palestinians. But should this latest effort fail — as seems to be universally anticipated — perhaps the presence of Messrs. Rudd and Fukuda will present Mr. Bush with another possibility to leave some sort of positive legacy.

Asia needs an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Asia. China's integration into the regional security environment has lagged behind its integration into the regional and global trading systems. Accordingly, there is a grave need for an organization that will promote military transparency, arms control, and conflict resolution in a region that combines territorial disputes and burgeoning defense budgets. Critics will no doubt argue that such an effort is futile, that China (and the PLA) cannot be trusted to participate in such an effort in good faith. Maybe, but the region's powers should at least give Beijing the opportunity to refuse. Even US Pacific Command seems to think that efforts to cultivate more open security relations between the US and China are worthwhile.

That said, without US engagement — sustained engagement — this sort of initiative would be doomed to fail. Perhaps this is an opportunity for two US Asian allies, which have periodically chafed at their dependence on the US, to carve out new political roles in the region by pulling the US and China to the table to discuss building a new Asia-Pacific security architecture. There might never be a better opportunity to construct a durable framework for security cooperation in Asia: the US, distracted in the Middle East, is increasingly interested in regional stability and cooperation with China, at the same time that changes of government in two of its major allies in the region have brought to power prime ministers interested in better relations with Beijing.

It will take persistence from Canberra and Tokyo — and it is probably overly optimistic to expect progress before January 2009 — but now is the time to start urging the US to reengage in Asia in a big way. The more concerted the effort the better.

The elusive rules of the game

Prime Minister Fukuda held another meeting with Ozawa Ichiro and the heads of the other opposition parties on Thursday.

Unlike the last meeting, nothing of note occurred — perhaps the other leaders were there to forestall a "corrupt bargain" between Messrs. Fukuda and Ozawa — and the LDP and the DPJ appear to be no closer to establishing the rules of the game for a divided Diet.

The editorials of the major dailies blame Mr. Ozawa for standing in the way of compromises on, "many things that should be done." (Believe it or not, that's in the headline of Asahi's editorial, not Yomiuri's.) Mainichi, while recognizing that both sides need to work together to make policy on behalf of Japan, singled out Mr. Ozawa for not taking a position amenable to cooperation on the new decision making rules, calling it "regrettable."

Yomiuri, not surprisingly, has the most strident tone in criticizing the DPJ: "Under the divided Diet, the DPJ, as the largest party in the House of Councillors, bears great responsibility in driving the political situation...However, on the DPJ's side, one cannot see them bearing this responsibility." The editorial goes on to criticize the party's irresponsibility at length for opposing the anti-terror law without passing alternate legislation, and raises the prospect of a "a debate on the uselessness of the House of Councillors."

Sankei largely echoes Yomiuri and Mainichi, and Asahi devotes most of its attention to the LDP and its agenda, but the common thread running through these editorials is dissatisfaction with gridlock.

I do think that the blame falls on the DPJ's shoulders. Had the party — and Mr. Ozawa — been more flexible on foreign policy questions, upon which the political debate is now focused, the DPJ could have pressured the LDP to approve all or most of the DPJ's domestic plans in exchange for the DPJ's assent to the MSDF refueling mission. But Mr. Ozawa has refused to give on anything, instead staking out a hardline position and hoping that the LDP will bend to his will. When push comes to shove, Mr. Fukuda and the LDP control a supermajority in the Lower House, and should public dissatisfaction (or, perhaps more accurately, media dissatisfaction masked as public dissatisfaction) grow, the DPJ will lose. The fact remains that the DPJ needs the LDP more than vice versa. I think the DPJ has completely mishandled the current Diet session. Even while compromising with the government on the anti-terror law, the DPJ could have criticized the LDP for ignoring the concerns of the public — which are overwhelmingly domestic, "lifestyle" issues — and for serving as the tool of the Bush administration. By holding its nose and supporting the MSDF mission, the DPJ could have refocused discussion on domestic policy issues, to its advantage, I think.

Now, in the wake of the meeting, it seems that talk is growing both of yet another Diet extension and a snap election. The former step will be necessary if, as I suspected (as in this post), the DPJ uses its control of the Upper House to delay action on the anti-terror law. Remember that according to the constitution, if the Upper House takes no action within sixty days — not counting days out of session — the bill is considered rejected, giving the Lower House the opportunity to pass it again. Should the bill be passed in this manner, however, a snap election could be unavoidable; Mainichi suggests that an Upper House censure motion would follow Lower House "re-passage" of the bill, leading to a general election. (I still disagree with the assumption that an Upper House censure motion against the government will necessarily lead to a snap election, but I recognize that it is a plausible outcome.)

Whatever the difficulties ahead for Mr. Fukuda as the debate over the MSDF mission reaches a climax, whatever the problems associated with corruption at the Defense Ministry, the DPJ has squandered its advantages — and, for the moment anyway, the prime minister may be enjoying a slight boost thanks to two successful foreign trips. It is not at all clear how this Diet session will wrap up, but as MTC suggests, Mr. Fukuda has not faltered in the face of adversity.

Matsuzawa Shigefumi's experiments

Working out in Kanagawa-ken , I had the opportunity to become familiar with Matsuzawa Shigefumi, Kanagawa's reformist DPJ-backed governor. Mr. Matsuzawa, who worked for former Congresswoman Beverly Byron (D-MD-6) when he was younger and won three elections to the House of Representatives before being elected governor of Kanagawa in 2003, is one of those Japanese politicians who single handedly gives me some hope for Japan's future. (I suppose I might also group Masuzoe Yoichi in the same category.)

He recently made national news by pushing for term limits in Kanagawa (explicitly suggesting that Kanagawa should serve as an example for the nation, i.e., a laboratory of democracy), which prompted criticism from the national government. His push for term limits is wholly consistent with the reformist thrust of his businesslike campaign manifesto, which he has announced should be the yardstick by which his government is measured. This may sound simple, but look at the manifestos put out by both parties in 2007 and ask yourself whether they can really be used as yardsticks. Mr. Matsuzawa's 2007 manifesto also reminded voters of his 2003 promises, and showed whether he succeeded or failed at implementing his agenda. A token measure, perhaps, but I think it goes a long way to making candidates more accountable to voters — and I think it's no accident that Mr. Matsuzawa won reelection by a resounding margin in April.

With that as an introduction, I strongly recommend this challenging essay by Mr. Matsuzawa at the Genron NPO blog.

As the governor of one of Japan's most populous and economically dynamic prefectures, Mr. Matsuzawa takes aim at the notion of the revenue gap between urban and rural prefectures, suggesting that contrary to public perception, the gap between wealthy prefectures like Tokyo and Kanagawa and poorer, sparsely populated rural prefectures is not all that great, because urban prefectural governments have greater responsibilities (due to burgeoning populations) but get less revenue from the central government. Central government subsidies, according to Mr. Matsuzawa, effectively close the gap between urban and rural. He argues, in fact, that once central government taxes distributed to local governments are added to local taxes, rural prefectures like Shimane, Tottori, Kochi, and Fukui receive the most tax revenue per person, with Kanagawa receiving the least per person in all of Japan.

The problem, he suggests, exists, but is not as large as the media would have the Japanese people believe.

Accordingly, he is vehemently opposed to the government's plan to enable Japanese citizens to pay a portion of their taxes to places where they are not in residence (their former hometowns, for instance). Mr. Matsuzawa is quick to see that the costs of this plan would be paid by urban prefectures such as his own, which are swollen with "refugees" from rural prefectures who under this plan could send some tax money home, thereby depriving his government of revenue that rightfully belongs to it. Without denying the desperate economic conditions in rural Japan (for which he credits Mr. Koizumi and his attacks on public corporations), he attacks this problem from a variety of angles. He argues that this plan violates the basic principle of "no taxation without representation" — in other words, why should the vote of someone who pays full taxes to one prefecture be worth the same as someone's whose taxes are divided among jurisdictions ? (And from the perspective of a taxpayer, why should a taxpayer pay taxes to a jurisdiction in which he has no vote and thus no way of holding the taxing authority accountable?)

Moreover, Mr. Matsuzawa wonders how money will be transferred from one jurisdiction to another. Who will build and maintain a computer system to ensure that it happens smoothly? (And, I would add, echoing Mr. Masuzoe, can bureaucrats be trusted to handle the transactions without losing or embezzling the funds?)

I am not in a position to debate Mr. Matsuzawa's numbers, but he provides an important reminder that in the rush to solve the "Yubari problem," Japan's stressed metropolises must not be forgotten.

Mr. Matsuzawa, I think, represents the best of the DPJ. (Yes, he's officially independent, DPJ-backed, but as a former DPJ representative, it's fair to say that this distinction is meaningless in this case.) An urban governor, he is sensitive to the needs of urban voters and aware that jaded Japanese voters, disappointed by their government over and over again, desire accountable, transparent government, even if they can't quite articulate it that way. His critique is just one way for the DPJ to remind urban voters why they can't trust the LDP, ensuring that by the time another general election rolls around, the DPJ will be in a position to trounce the LDP in urban Japan.

The question is whether the DPJ, under the rule of Mr. Ozawa, the "king" of Iwate, can fully stake a claim as the true representative of the interests of urban Japan, or whether Mr. Ozawa's efforts to appeal to rural voters will undermine the party's message in the cities. If the latter — and I fully expect this to be the case — a general election campaign will be simply a matter of two nearly identical parties struggling to balance a message of reform in the cities with pork-barrel promises in the countryside.

In this scenario, urban Japan will, as always, lose.

Fear and loathing in the global economy

Every once in a while, I read an article that is worth posting largely without comment. Tony Judt, a professor of European history at NYU, has written one such article, a review in the New York Review of Books of Robert Reich's Supercapitalism.

The key paragraphs:

But we have good reason to believe that this may be about to change. Fear is reemerging as an active ingredient of political life in Western democracies. Fear of terrorism, of course; but also, and perhaps more insidiously, fear of the uncontrollable speed of change, fear of the loss of employment, fear of losing ground to others in an increasingly unequal distribution of resources, fear of losing control of the circumstances and routines of one's daily life. And, perhaps above all, fear that it is not just we who can no longer shape our lives but that those in authority have lost control as well, to forces beyond their reach.

Half a century of security and prosperity has largely erased the memory of the last time an "economic age" collapsed into an era of fear. We have become stridently insistent—in our economic calculations, our political practices, our international strategies, even our educational priorities—that the past has little of relevance to teach us. Ours, we insist, is a new world; its risks and opportunities are without precedent. Our parents and grandparents, however, who lived the consequences of the unraveling of an earlier economic age, had a far sharper sense of what can happen to a society when private and sectional interests trump public goals and obscure the common good.

We need to recover some of that sense. We are likely, in any event, to rediscover the state thanks to globalization itself. Populations experiencing increased economic and physical insecurity will retreat to the political symbols, legal resources, and physical barriers that only a territorial state can provide. This is already happening in many countries: note the rising attraction of protectionism in American politics, the appeal of "anti-immigrant" parties across Western Europe, the call for "walls," "barriers," and "tests" everywhere. "Flat worlders" may be in for a surprise. Moreover, while it may be true that globalization and "supercapitalism" reduce differences between countries, they typically amplify inequality within them—in China, for instance, or the US—with disruptive political implications.

In the midst of an unfolding credit crisis that could wind up destroying major US banks and who knows what else, Professor Judt is sobering as only a historian of the European twentieth century can be.

Read the whole thing. (HT: Andrew Sullivan)

What does Osaka tell us?

In the first major election since Mr. Fukuda took office as prime minister, the DPJ-backed candidate for mayor in Osaka bested the LDP-Komeito-backed candidate by some 50,000 votes. Mr. Hatoyama, the DPJ secretary-general, was quick to proclaim the significance of the victory: "This election is symbolic for national politics. This is proof that the people of Osaka do not approve of the Fukuda cabinet." DPJ leaders also were quick to point out that the party need not fear consequences of the turmoil surrounding Mr. Ozawa's "resignation."

The LDP response is more confused, with some dismissing the significance of the municipal election and others suggesting that this is a continuation of a trend that began with the LDP defeat in July.

It is important to keep things in perspective. Yes, the government lost a municipal election in a city in which the LDP and Komeito combined to win eighteen seats in the 2005 general election. But that was twice as many seats as the two governing parties won in Osaka-fu in the 2003 general election. In other words, the DPJ would have been well-placed to succeed in Osaka regardless of the quality of the party's leadership or the occupant of the Kantei. It should be no surprise that the LDP will face an uphill battle in places like Osaka and Tokyo, where its vote totals were inflated to abnormal, unsustainable levels.

The critical factor when looking to the outcome of a general election remains the countryside. A repeat of July 2007, and the LDP could be in serious trouble. This election tells us nothing about the LDP's prospects in rural Japan. It does tell us that Mr. Fukuda still has a lot of work to do if he's going to pick up where Mr. Koizumi left off in the project to turn the LDP into a modern, urban-based party.

The DPJ should not take this occasion to gloat. As Mainchi reports, the DPJ's legislative agenda is at "a do-or-die moment," as the fate of bills passed by the DPJ in the Upper House remains uncertain. In other words, the DPJ is facing the reality of the post-July Diet: it needs the LDP's assent to do anything constructive. It could, of course, pin its hopes on public backlash against LDP obstructionism, but there are few guarantees that the public will react exactly how the party hopes it will.

The result may be a quid-pro-quo, with the DPJ's backing down on the anti-terror law in exchange for the LDP's assent to laws passed in the Upper House relating to pension funds and agricultural subsidies (although I have a hard time seeing how the DPJ can back away from a position on which Mr. Ozawa seems to have staked his reputation, and which has conveniently united most of the DPJ). Nevertheless, with Mr. Ozawa and Mr. Fukuda set to meet once again time this Thursday, a bargain of this sort could be in the making.

Nothing may come of this next meeting — at least, nothing like what happened in the wake of the last meeting between the two party leaders. But the underlying challenge of establishing the rules of the game for the divided Diet remains, regardless of the latest election returns.

Early election? Maybe not

Answering a question on election timing during a visit to Akita prefecture, Koga Makoto, the LDP's election strategy chairman, said, "It's good if done slowly. The term of office has another two years. We cannot possibly attain two-thirds of the seats. By this way of thinking, the end of the term is good."

This is, of course, no different from what most observers of Japanese politics have been saying for months now, since rumors of a snap election began proliferating in Nagata-cho last spring.

I do not think, however, that Mr. Koga's will be the last words on this subject. It may be what Mr. Koga, Mr. Fukuda, and other LDP leaders hope for — if I were an LDP backbencher, especially a first-term LDP backbencher, I would be angry if this isn't what they're thinking — but the LDP and the DPJ are engaged in a bit of parry and thrust on the subject of a snap election. The DPJ, vacillating between despondency about its electoral prospects and eagerness for a snap election, has dropped hints of a censure motion in the Upper House in the hopes that it will force Mr. Fukuda to call an election and effectively give up his government's supermajority. The government, meanwhile, has dropped hints of an early election, perhaps out of a desire to lure the DPJ into taking a more confrontational stance, potentially angering voters.

Where does Mr. Koga's statement fit in this scheme? A way to coax the DPJ to cooperate? An honest statement of the LDP executive's thinking? Mr. Koga and the Fukuda government may be trying to calm the political situation, draining some of the tension out of the nejire kokkai by reminding the DPJ, the media, and the public that the government can wait nearly two years before calling an election, and therefore it's necessary to think practically about how to formulate policy in the meantime.

Hard road ahead

Prime Minister Fukuda, upon returning to Japan, was greeted with criticism by the association of abductee families, whose representatives were also in Washington last week (meeting John Bolton, among others).

Interviewed at a press conference upon arrival at Narita Airport on Sunday, Iizuka Shigeo, the deputy head of the family association said, "May not Japan, as an ally, voice its opinion a little more?"

Undoubtedly the complaints of the families will be echoed by abductee advocates within the ranks of the LDP, the self-appointed enforcers of an uncompromising negotiating position in the six-party talks.

Whatever glimmers of the hope there are for Japan's reengaging in the talks, Mr. Fukuda still has formidable obstacles in his way. I think that if he pushes too hard for a shift in Japan's negotiating position, Mr. Aso's retainers will cause trouble for him.

Mr. Fukuda has thus far smoothed over the divisions within the party that were in full view under Mr. Abe, but he has been helped by the DPJ's opposition to the anti-terror law, on which the LDP is by and large united. But once he starts trying to move an agenda forward — both within the Diet and in Japan's foreign policy — the need to keep the party united and challenges to that unity will rise in tandem.

After a period of calm following the LDP presidential election, the LDP right is organizing again. Nakagawa Shoichi, PARC chief under Mr. Abe and Mr. Abe's id, has announced the creation of a new conservative study group (with independent Hiranuma Takeo). That alone isn't troubling for Mr. Fukuda, but it is a reminder that he walks a fine line as the head of a party that doesn't exactly share his cautious pragmatism.

He came, they talked...what next?

Prime Minister Fukuda, cold bug and all, arrived in Washington as scheduled on Thursday evening and spent Friday meeting with President Bush and then dining with the president and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

The Swamp, the Chicago Tribune's politics blog, has a summary here, and takes care to note that Mr. Bush served US beef to Mr. Fukuda, just as he did for Mr. Abe at Camp David in April.

There appear to have been few surprises in the summit. Mr. Bush made a point of mentioning, yet again, his meeting with Yokota Megumi's parents and the US commitment to the resolution of the abductions issue, despite proliferating signs that the US is ready to move forward in removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The agenda ran the gamut, from Iran to Burma to Afghanistan to the beef trade (of course) to climate change. Mr. Fukuda promised to exert full efforts to pass a new law that authorizes Japanese participation in operations in and around Afghanistan. Whatever differences exist in their respective positions, they were papered over in the joint press conference.

There was some talk, mostly by Mr. Fukuda, on the question of what the alliance is to become in the future. Following on his pre-summit interview in the Washington Post, in which he emphasized the alliance's Asian "vocation," Mr. Fukuda spoke at length about the role the alliance should play in Asia. "A firm US-Japan alliance," he said, "is the foundation for peace and prosperity in Asia."

Mr. Fukuda made very clear in his remarks that his vision of the alliance is of a contributor to peace and stability in the region, which means cordial and open relations with all nations in the region. This is a very far cry from Mr. Aso's amorphous arc of freedom and prosperity and Mr. Abe's address in New Delhi about an alliance of democracies (promptly ignored) — for the better. The alliance's success in the future ought to be measured by how it bridges gaps in the region, not how it exacerbates gaps in the region, as would undoubtedly result from the schemes of some American and Japanese conservatives. Mr. Fukuda unequivocally recognizes this. Does the American foreign policy establishment?

The tension over the refueling mission and the differing positions in the six-party talks remains, of course, but the crisis atmosphere will likely subside as a result of this summit. Neither government is truly prepared to begin addressing the structural problems that underlie the most recent bilateral disputes — and they have no choice but to live with one another under the current arrangement, warts and all.

But, as Jun Okumura notes in his response to the summit, the problem of North Korea remains a sword of Damocles hanging over the alliance, a problem that has been papered over for far too long in alliance discussions. I have a hunch that with Mr. Fukuda in charge in Tokyo, the allies will find a way to work through it. There are enough hints that Mr. Fukuda wants to change Japan's bargaining position in the talks, if not to improve relations with the US then to reengage Japan in addressing a challenge that is a major test of Japan's ability to be a political power in the region. It may depend on the US somehow giving Japan enough concessions as to provide political cover for Mr. Fukuda in battles with the conservatives in his own party who are both outraged over the US shift and adamantly opposed to any changes in Japan's positions on North Korea.

Whatever the policy implications of the summit, I suspect that the Washington trip will prove to be a boon for Mr. Fukuda's public support. He persevered in coming despite his illness, he stood alongside Mr. Bush without being overly sycophantic, and he avoided embarrassing gaffes that might have exacerbated tensions with the US.

He may have also boosted his popularity among that other important constituency to which Japanese prime ministers must be attentive — the community of American Japan hands. Mr. Fukuda specifically requested a meeting with Japan hands from universities and think tanks to discuss the problem of Japan's dearth of international intellectual and academic exchanges, especially with the US. Given that some of the experts invited to the session were among those who questioned the durability of his government when he took office, Mr. Fukuda may have earned some points in giving this select group the opportunity to question him in an intimate setting.

On the road

I will be in Chicago for Thanksgiving week.

If any readers in the Chicago area are interested in meeting, please drop me an email.

Ozawa, on top again

Ozawa Ichiro has granted an interview to Asahi (one of the papers he didn't single out for criticism in his "parting" remarks) in which he reviews the circumstances surrounding the meetings with Prime Minister Fukuda that resulted in his decision to resign, his plans for a general election campaign, and the DPJ's policy goals.

With a confidence that is perhaps the result of being firmly in control of his party, Mr. Ozawa is defiant and seemingly free of doubts surrounding his position and that of his party.

In recounting his discussion with Mr. Fukuda, he denied that they discussed the timing of a snap election or the distribution of cabinet posts in an LDP-DPJ grand coalition. But he did, as Amaki Naoto notes, "even now assert with amazing self-confidence and arrogance that the grand coalition plan was right," suggesting that the plan would have given the DPJ an opportunity to pass its cherished policy goals, enhancing its position for an election and helping DPJ members "know power." He also snapped at opponents within the DPJ. When asked about rumors that he was considering leaving the party with enough members to throw the Upper House back to the government, he said, "Isn't it stupid? It's awful that there is a group of people within the party who say such foolish things."

As for his party's strategy, he insists that winning the next election comes first — indeed, winning elections is the only thing that matters. He suggested, regarding the party's plan to aim merely to become the Lower House's largest party, that the DPJ is open to a coalition with all parties — Communists included — except the LDP. He demurred when asked about conditions that could lead to a snap election, and declined to say whether the DPJ would push for an Upper House censure motion in the event of the government's passing its anti-terror law over an Upper House veto.

Meanwhile, as far as policy goes, I detect a desire on Mr. Ozawa's part to shift the discussion away from foreign policy and the Afghanistan mission and back to the "lifestyle" issues that helped the DPJ win in July, the issues about which the Japanese people actually care. Indeed, asked about ISAF participation, he said, "Since we promised participation in UN activities to the people in our manifesto, from now on we will not speak of a debate. Why this simple debate is not understood — it's a mystery to me and can't be helped." Finally, he both dismissed the idea of a compromise with the LDP on a permanent law on JSDF dispatch and suggested that a DPJ government would prepare to revise the constitution to make provisions for JSDF dispatch.

In short, as is widely assumed, a DPJ government, especially one led by Mr. Ozawa, would differ very little from LDP rule. Beyond the policy questions, of course, there could be value to a DPJ victory in producing alternation of ruling parties, but then, if the DPJ doesn't try to take a majority of its own, a DPJ victory would just result in a sloppy reenactment of 1993 (especially if the JCP were to join a coalition government).

For my part, I think Mr. Ozawa comes across as arrogant in this interview, and, as I suspected, he seems to be in more control of the DPJ than ever before.

Ozawa prepares for his last stand

Mr. Ozawa, back at the helm of the DPJ — and apparently no longer estranged from the other party leaders — has fixed his attention squarely on a campaign that many seem to think will happen any day now (another "Happening Dissolution" [Japanese Wikipedia]).

Accordingly, the DPJ is scrambling about to conclude the nomination process for its candidates for a general election.

At present, there remain eight-five districts (out of 300) for which the DPJ has not designated a candidate, with the ultimate aim being between 270 and 280 candidates for the single-seat districts (the remainder being DPJ-backed Socialist and Kokuminto candidates). The vacancies, according to Mainichi, are particularly pronounced in urban areas, with candidates nominated for only thirteen of Tokyo's twenty-five districts. Asahi notes the same, but also suggests that DPJ may end up with only 250 candidates of its own.

Mr. Ozawa has acknowledged the difficulty the DPJ faces in a general election, and suggests that the party's goal is to become the largest party in the House of Representatives — as opposed to winning an outright majority — and form a coalition with other opposition parties. Even that may be a stretch.

Given the documented discrepancy in Japanese voting patterns between Upper House and Lower House elections, given Mr. Fukuda's skill at navigating the perilous situation he inherited upon taking office (with the help of his predecessor's dismal performance making him look great without doing much of anything), and given the very public display of the DPJ's internal disorder, it seems extremely unlikely that the LDP would lose its position as the largest party in the House of Representatives. It may lose its supermajority in the event of a snap election, but I think the Japanese people are still willing to give Mr. Fukuda a chance. Recent opinion polls on the Fukuda cabinet may be downward trending — a recent NHK poll (not online) showed a four-point drop to 54%, a recent Sankei poll showed a fourteen point drop to 41% (largely due to the idea that Mr. Fukuda wanted a grand coalition with the DPJ) — but a recent Nikkei poll found a four-point drop (to 28%) in support for the DPJ, with a four-point increase (to 42%) for the LDP. The bottom certainly hasn't dropped out of support for Mr. Fukuda, and a good performance in Washington — which, as today's Nelson Report confirms, truly is more open-ended than US-Japan summits have been of late — could shore up his support.

The DPJ has yet to give the voters any reason to defect from the LDP. The key to a general election remains rural Japan. Mr. Ozawa undoubtedly still hopes that he can pry rural voters away from the LDP again, with the result that the LDP's norin zoku are panicking and will no doubt put pressure on Mr. Fukuda to throw some pork ("emergency countermeasures" in response to the fall in the price of rice, for example) their way as the budget process progresses. The DPJ has already passed its plan for income compensation for farmers in the Upper House — and it's unclear what the LDP will do in response. Kan Naoto suggested, "The LDP is working to adopt the DPJ's thinking."

Whatever his desire for fiscal rectitude, Mr. Fukuda may find demands for more largess for farmers irresistible. What better way for him to placate LDP backbenchers, shore up support in the countryside, and steal the DPJ's thunder.

But will Mr. Fukuda be tempted to strike fast and call an early election, while the DPJ is disorganized? I still think that Mr. Fukuda would like to keep the DPJ guessing right up to September 2009.

An unscripted summit?

Mere days before President Bush and Prime Minister Fukuda are scheduled to meet in Washington, a State Department spokesman has announced that the US will not give concrete consideration to the abductions issue when it comes to removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Now, I don't disagree with this policy — the US shouldn't let what it is a bilateral issue between Japan and North Korea interfere with what the US government feels is in its best interests. There seems to be little chance that progress towards delisting North Korea will stop, especially considering that the Israel-Syria-North Korea mystery seems to have vanished from the media space. Even John Bolton, of late the Bush administration's most vociferous critic from the right, admitted to a delegation of abductee advocates in Washington, "I agree with you completely, but the flow towards delisting will be extremely difficult to stop."

The problem with this announcement is the timing. Mr. Fukuda has in recent days and weeks suggested that the Japanese government might be prepared to re-engage in the six-party talks, despite its reservations (which in a sign of progress increasingly concern the problem of verifying denuclearization as well as the abductions issue). For a State Department spokesman to deliver this message prior to the prime minister's arrival in Washington strikes me as indicative of a gratuitous disregard of the difficult position that Mr. Fukuda faces in trying to shift Japan's bargaining position in the six-party talks. Style matters as much as substance; the US should be trying to coax Japan back to the table, not bludgeon it over the head until it concedes.

Of course, the gap between the US and Japanese bargaining positions may be unbridgeable, meaning that it is high time for the allies to discuss the implications of being unable to coordinate policy on the North Korea question.

In any case, that an announcement like this can be made this close to a major summit suggests that there may be a surprise or two in store this Friday. For once there might be a US-Japan summit that is more than a photo-op and a joint press conference that enables the two leaders to exchange sweet nothings about the alliance.

Observing Japan in J@pan Inc.

The November-December issue of J@pan Inc. magazine includes an article by me on why the DPJ's Upper House election might not have been such a great thing after all.

It went to press before changes could be made to reflect the Ozawa follies earlier this month (thankfully Mr. Ozawa returned to the helm), but otherwise I think it is still relevant when it comes to the current political situation, perhaps more so now.

As always, your comments are appreciated.

Fukuda makes it explicit

Following my discussion of the US-Japan alliance in this post and this post, Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo, a few days before his summit with President Bush in Washington, has told the Washington Post that "his government's reach in global security affairs would not be as expansive as the Bush administration wants."

In other words, Mr. Fukuda is making it explicitly clear that Japan is not prepared to share Washington's global security policy. Instead, "I believe the heaviest responsibility for Japan is to see to it that there is stability and prosperity in Asia."

So it seems that Mr. Ozawa and the DPJ are not alone in being discontent with the US-Japan relationship, even as Mr. Fukuda reassures Washington that the alliance remains essential to Japan's foreign policy. (Indeed, this week the allies will break out that favorite word from the 1990s — "affirm" — to demonstrate the importance of the alliance.)

I hope — but doubt — that Washington will view Japanese discontent as an opportunity to strengthen the relationship, not as either grounds for panic or grounds for ignoring Japan and focusing on China (as some seem tempted to do).

The alliance in an Atlantic mirror

I went to Carnegie Hall last night for a panel discussion on US-German relations held as part of the current Berlin in Lights festival underway in New York City. Moderated by Richard Holbrooke, the discussion featured Henry Kissinger, Josef Joffe, John Kornblum (a former US ambassador to Germany), and Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg, a member of the Bundestag from the Christian Social Union (CSU).

In light of recent difficulties in the US-Japan relationship, I was fascinated, if not surprised, by how easy it would be to subsitute "Japan" for "Germany" in the discussion without skipping a beat. Indeed, Japan was mentioned one way or another by every speaker, including Dr. Kissinger, who as readers of Kenneth Pyle's Japan Rising will know has not exactly been appreciative of Japan. In fact, Dr. Kissinger made a point of saying that Japan is a country to watch, as he thinks it is quietly and slowly making itself a substantial player in international security. If by slow he means glacial, perhaps, but Japan's "normalization" is far from linear and is only impressive when compared to what Japan once was, not when it is compared with other countries.

Nevertheless, the discussion had a pessimistic edge to it, and all of the speakers made clear that the reasons for doubt about the relationship are structural and have little to do with George W. Bush. The problem is interests. Just as in the US-Japan relationship, there is a growing gap in how each country perceives its national interests. At the heart of the problem are the differences between global and regional powers. As a global power the US increasingly views the world holistically; few p